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Peshawar — March

On the Jihadist Media

"Fight the polytheists with your wealth and yourselves," Prophetic Hadith

The Jihadist media is considered an important tool for the communication of the Jihad movement with the Muslim masses because it is part of the political effort of this movement and a tool to mobilize the masses and instigate the public to the Islamic understanding.

There are different ways to address the population- initially Muslims, and even non-Muslims. Engaging in strife with the tyrant authorities in order to keep the Jihad movement in a very close and continuous connection with its population is, in fact, a vital axis and a challenge for the movement and separating its success from failure. Any Jihad movement that ignores this prospect or let it be wilted is thus giving a good opportunity for the tyrant authorities to isolate the Mujahideen from their natural base, which is the Muslim population. The success of this isolation by the tyrant authorities would surely be a beginning to eradicate the Mujahideen using armed forces.

From this, we emphasize again the danger of relying on military action as the sole way to oust the apostate regime. We must comprehend that the rate of political action, the effort it requires, and the accuracy required to plan it, exceeds by tens of times the importance and gravity of military action. Furthermore, the Jihadist military action alone without parallel political and media effort may end up serving the interest of another tyrant power and not benefitting Islam and Muslims.

As the armed Jihad action requires us to build our military apparatus and penetrate the repressive tools of the enemy, the political action also requires us to form our political system and penetrate the counter political institutions. Both actions require a high level of courage and creative imagination.

The political communication and calling on the masses may take different and unlimited forms that are subject to continuous change in methods so that the enemy will not be able to stop this communication or curtail it. In fact, this communication must take an escalating form.

Despite the tyrant repression, the Muslim population itself is going to seek to follow the Mujahideen, and look for ways to communicate with them, whether it is directly or through the communication tools and networks created by the Mujahideen. This depends, of course, on the success of the Mujahideen themselves in preoccupying the emotions and minds of Muslims with different trends and different social and economic standards.

Means of Communication with the population:

1. Oratory — is the most important and effectively powerful communication tool according to modern media studies. It is highly ranked even compared with the electronic media —television, radio, etc- because it achieves direct contact between the messenger and the audience, and does not require being inside mosques or meeting halls. In addition to this importance, random gatherings can be useful for delivering oratory speeches. This may be done under armed protection on the part of the Mujahideen themselves during the development of military action.
2. Pamphlets — the appearance of pamphlets in the hands of people represents a challenge and harm to the government authority and its standing, in addition to the significance of the Jihad message the pamphlets carry. It has been noticed that the educated class is the one mostly influenced by the pamphlet; it is a small social class in societies where illiteracy prevails, but it is the educated class that leads revolutions and major social changes therefore the regime focuses on spreading ignorance in it, subjugating it, and removing the rebellion fuse from it by using both temptation and repression.

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3. Posters and Printed Slogans — posters can be regular pamphlets containing a message relatively long. They can be just a Jihad slogan countering the tyrant authority aiming for emotionally moving the population by using different events and occasions- religious, political, etc. The poster can be photographic pictures or caricatures. The places to stick them may be walls of houses, private and government installations, and the chassis of buses and trains.
4. Cassette Tapes — this tool proved to be efficient and significantly dangerous during the events of the Iranian revolution which some people called "the revolution of the cassette." The cassette recorded speeches of Khomeini were invading Iran from one border to the other within a few hours in massive quantities. The speeches harbored instigation and guidance to people and revolution elements. The same tool was also used during the Jihad movement in Syria but with relative success. The influence power of cassette tapes is noticed in societies where illiteracy and refraining from awareness prevails along with the spreading of regular cassette tapes among people in an epidemic manner, which makes controlling and monitoring them almost impossible. In fact, this tool is considered the most spread and popular communication tool, and the least dangerous for the Jihad movement.
5. Video Tapes — this is a field that can be used even though it has small number of people that can be reached through. It is characterized, however, of being more documented and can be used more efficiently to address the public opinion outside the circle of conflict in order to isolate the tyrant regime abroad.
6. Radio — is the most comprehensive public communication mean; it addresses all social classes at the same time and in all locations, regardless of the level of their education. It is readily available for the Mujahideen in the early stages of their work, in particular, to have their own radio station. But they do aim, however, at having this effective weapon in the later stages of their work. It is possible to use fine- and affordable to some extent- technological means under the huge

development currently happening, for the Mujahideen to use irregular radio messages in their early stages of work.

7. Display Tools — Such as the use of balloons [blimps] or gliders to drop pamphlets on big cities, or electronic jamming of the government radio and television networks etc. They are all temporary tools that are hard to be used repeatedly for several times, but they have huge impact on eliminating the prestige of the authority, and placing it in a marginal position before citizens and making the Mujahideen subject of people's admiration.
8. Rumors — when there is less trusted information there's an increase in rumors. This is a true media fact, as people have lost trust in the tyrant media. The Jihad media - and despite all the efforts — remains too small to cover the entire arena. This is when the importance of rumors appears. The Mujahideen must have a device to spread the true news about the prevailing situation of the conflict, and people must have the freedom to circulate this news while giving it a [trade]mark of their imagination which is characterized with the tendency to exaggerate and natural hatred to the tyrant authority with growing admiration towards the Jihad movement. The rumor weapon is characterized by being impossible to stop by the tyrant authorities especially if the Jihad ambiance prevails in the conflict arena.

Media Message:

The essence of the conflict between the Mujahideen and the tyrant authority is a conflict between atheism and belief, and the spirit and minds of people is the real ground of this conflict. While the tyrant aims at making people slaves to it and its satanic approach, the Mujahideen fight to liberate human beings from the claws of the man-devils and demons, and turn them into people worshipping God according to the Islamic approach. Thus, the public is the true subject of this conflict, and the military effort of the Mujahideen aims at two aspects:

1. Destroying a part of the tyrant's violence and terrorism machine.

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2. Influencing the Muslim population at the moral, psychological, and intellectual level of the necessity to oust the tyrant regime and giving the practical example of the possibility to do so. Regardless of its violence tools, the tyrant remains just a beast made out of paper.

The courageous military action of the Mujahideen is the best convincing way in this regard. After that, comes the media message of the Mujahideen to benefit from the impact of the military action and push its influence deep into the souls of people in order to destroy the prestige of the tyrant, lift the Islamic Jihad spirit among Muslims, and encourage them to fight the tyrant and destroy its might.

The media message of the Mujahideen will not be at the level of real danger for the tyrant until it is supported by military action. However, it must precede the military action by a period of time, but cannot fall much behind it. The success of the enemy in paralyzing the

media action of the Mujahideen is as significant as the capability of the enemy to paralyze the military action itself.

The political skill required from the Mujahideen to exploit the outcome of their military action, is more important than the skill required carrying out the military action itself.

It is very dangerous for the Mujahideen to leave their military action without political exploitation, giving some opportunists or tyrant powers the chance to seize the results of the military action and achieve goals adverse to Islam and Muslims.

We realize now that the political and media action require as much studying and planning as the military action, and the Mujahideen must stay away from improvisation, clowning, and random action in their political and media practices. The political action, in reality, is a military action using words as its tool, just like military action uses rifles as its tool.

Types of Media Messages:

Comprehensive and General Message — this is the most significant type and the least frequent. It is a message issued personally by the supreme leader of Jihad, or the supreme commanding staff of the Jihad organization regarding important issues covering the entire population in the conflict zone. It must take place infrequently so that it will not lose its importance and value if it becomes frequent and in the form of cliché. It must also take into consideration the moderate level of perception of average people, the growing degree of religious understanding, Jihad sense among people, and the level of escalation reached by society on the issue of conflict between what's right and what's wrong, as well as the extent of connection or contradiction of the interests of different social classes in regards to the same issue.

Programmed Special Message — this is the general image of the Jihad propaganda. The message is described as special because it will be addressed to a very specific social group, and it is also programmatic because it is subject to studying and planning process before being executed, with a follow-up and correction process during the carry out after that, and then an escalation process in the course of time. These are common attributes with the military action as well.

Social Groups:

Social groups or social classes are human groups with common attributes in terms of their economic situation and the standards of professional and occupational living, cultural and educational level, and psychological status.

Every [group] has its special importance in the social and economic structure of the state. Also, each group has a certain standard of culture or education, and a special psychological state and temper, thus it is a necessity to address each social group in a different way.

Knowing the importance of the group and then the appropriate style to address it is the key of success of the Jihad call or the political media effort of that movement.

Among the most important social groups are:

1- Intellectual Group

The majority of its members are middle class and higher. The group is saturated by Western culture with much loyalty and admiration for this culture, along with being proud [arrogant] of its opinion and alienation from the Islamic ideology. This group represents the intellectual leadership of society and its educated elite.

The Jihad action has slim chances to polarize members of this [group], because of the western intellectual formation on one hand, and the eminent social position and economic comfort this group enjoys on the other hand. This makes it a natural ally or nominal opponent to the regime. However, the minority with Islamic tendencies inside that group must not be excluded.

2- Educated Group

This group is larger than the first one and includes big sections of people from the middle and poor class. The most dangerous group of this [group] is the students of high schools and universities and the recent graduates who did not reach a level of social stability, suitable employment, and marriage. It is a group that accepts the Jihad ideas since it has no burdens along with young age and lives under stressful social and economic circumstances causing increased tensions and preparing young men to accept the revolution. Members of this group form the majority of the Jihad movement cadres.

3- Workers Group

This is the most important and significant social groups especially if the society made big progress in industrial development. In particular, we mean here the workers at large factories. This group or class is considered dangerous for many considerations; among the most important ones are:

- A- High concentration: it is grouped in large numbers in regions relatively limited; therefore, it moves in groups and effectively.
- B- Its direct impact on the economy of the state: any interruption at work means a loss in millions that hurts the economy of the state. No other population mass has this attribute.
- C- Readiness for organized work: the industrial process itself is organized and accurate, and workers acquire some of these attributes to become the most social group ready for organized work.
- D- High level of political and social awareness: as a class, workers are considered the most social group aware of internal issues, whether they are economic or political.

Communists and Left Wing groups focused on gaining the workers class and benefitting

from its power of influence; they considered it a pioneering class leading the society and a first tool for the revolution. Due to this presence of the class; governments, in response, focused on controlling it, shackling its movement, and repressing the movements inside the workers sector against the authority. Islamists are still outside the conflict to take control of this influential social class.

4- Farmers Group

This group is important because it represents the largest portion of the population in Islamic countries, and the most naturally inclined group towards religion. In addition, the largest area of the country is the agricultural countryside, offering a vital field for the Jihad military action.

Based on this, work in the farmers circle was definitely a necessity on the road to success. The main difficulty remains in the negative nature of this [group] which tends to reliance and submission to reality and the difficulty to turn it into revolutionary Jihad action.

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This group has great economic importance as agriculture is the first source of the state revenue in most Islamic countries. This attribute cannot be useful in carrying out strikes that will affect the economy of the regime since the nature of agriculture production does not allow this action, and the farmer might turn to carry weapon, but will not quit agriculture unless he is forced to do so.

Educated young men in the countryside class provide huge support to the Jihad movement; they are an excellent channel to deliver the ideology and Jihad action to the farmers' circles.

5- Armed Forces

The army is the most dangerous institution of the state; it has the following characteristics:

- A- Compact organization — the army is the most organized group in the state.
- B- Strong integral armament — the military is the most armed organization in the state and the most prepared and trained to engage in battles.
- C- Big spending — the military is the state's largest institution in terms of expenditure and its budget exceeds any other budget, whether the one officially and directly mentioned in the budget of the Armed Forces, or the part mentioned in the budget of other ministries but indirectly serving the Armed Forces. The military has another attribute; it is the largest organization in the state in terms of representing different social classes especially in countries with compulsory military service. The collapse of the military means the collapse of the existing regime and maybe the collapse of the state itself. For this reason, in wars, the financial destruction of the military of the enemy or the destruction of its combat determination is considered the goal of the war and the ultimate victory. Revolutions seek to achieve the same goal.

While destroying the military machine is a goal almost impossible for rebels, the destruction of the combat determination of the military, or neutralizing it, is easy if the rebels succeed in conveying their cause to the lines of the military and gaining the loyalty of its associates and leadership to this cause.

Jihad Media and Position toward the Military:

The military is considered one of the most important challenges facing the Jihad revolutionary movement; A work strategy must be laid down and has to be:

A- Accurate

B- Coherent to tackle this problem

The first step in defining this strategy is to have an accurate and detailed answer for questions like the following:

1- Is the military dogmatic or non-dogmatic?

Meaning officers of the military and its cadres are subject to an ideological education controlled by the ruling party, as it is the case of the Communist bloc armies, the Afghan governmental military, and the Ba’athist armies in Iraq and Syria, etc.

Such armies are willing to commit barbarian massacres against their citizens, which makes it inevitable to face them by force in a bloody, tough, and long fight. As for national militaries, facing them will be relatively easier.

2- What is the extent and forms of the military interference in the state’s policies?

The majority of Muslim countries are ruled by military officers directly or indirectly.

Directly is when the officer, riding his tank, carries out a coup to take over power ('Abd-al-Nasser in Egypt, Al-Qaddhafi in Libya, and Al-Assad in Syria, etc.).

Indirectly is when military officers monopolize the regime under legal constitutional cover, as it happened in Egypt - 'Abd-al-Nasser — who was replaced by military officers and the regime turned into a semi military royal institution,

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Or when powerful military officers become the custodians of a weak presidency, as it happened in Indonesia after Sukarno and in Pakistan after Zia-ul-Haq,.

Or when the military becomes a partner in the rule based on family, or customary, or commercial relations, as it is in Saudi Arabia, Morocco, Jordan, etc.

3- What is the nature and ideology of the military command?

The military command might be of a tribal nature, as in Syria and Iraq or professional like the Egyptian army from -- to – [TC: The dates are blank in the original]. Or, corruption, paralysis, and political and military ignorance might prevail like the Egyptian army during the revolution era and until the defeat of [TC: blank].

As for the ideology of the military, it might be doctrinal, national, or professional only concerned with pure military education and duties, or it might be fascinated with politics and entangled in its game.

Some elements of the military command might be clearly connected to the big powers, calling for military cooperation with them, while others might be known for turning away from that inclination, etc.

What are the special characteristics for each of the military branches and what is the relation between the officers and personnel in these different branches? In most cases, competition prevails among the ranks of different military branches. Even more, relationships among military branches might become quite hostile or alienated. Generally, one of the branches would be in the hands of the elite of the ruling group and its allies and another military branch might turn into a den for the opponents or those traditionally alienated from authority.

The common trends among people, whether they are religious revolutionary trends or socio-political complaints, get favorable reactions within the military, but in a different way. This impact varies from one branch to another and so does the reaction to these trends within the ranks of soldiers as opposed to the ranks of commanders.

Also, the impact of trends prevailing among the public circles, on the ranks of officers, varies between the following three levels of officers:

The ranks of higher military commanders: they are usually selected from the regime itself; they are very loyal to the regime and isolated to a great extent from the people.

The ranks of mid-level military commanders: they are more connected to the people; most of their individuals are transferred to provisional retirement before reaching the ranks of higher command according to the standards of loyalty to the regime.

The ranks of low-level commanders: they are young men in their prime of life; most of them are more sensitive and idealistic than the higher ranks of commanders. They quickly become full of the revolutionary spirit with the presence of the social, political, and economic circumstances, and the emergence of an active and acceptable resistance movement within the public circles.

4- What is the level of military organization within the ranks of the armed forces?

The corruption of the general political situation in the country leads, for the most part, to the spread of general neglect, disintegration of the military regimen within the armed forces, and the spread of corruption within the officers' ranks, characterized by the decadence of conscience and illegally getting wealthy at the expense of the budget of the military and its assets. Weapons and ammunition trafficking, or involvement in all types of smuggling operations becomes widespread.

Who are the influential people inside the armed forces? What are the intellectual and ethical constituents of each one of them, and what is the nature of their internal relation and the relation of each one of them with the regime?

This is in addition to other important questions, such as:

What are the professional and living issues that preoccupy the armed forces? What is the combat doctrine of these forces?

What is the level of training and armament of these forces, and how suitable this is for the missions assigned to them?

Military industrialization, and to what degree are the armed forces relying on outside countries for armament and what are these countries?

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What is the nature of the real foreign threats the armed forces face, what are the official missions for which the forces are morally mobilized, and how consistent are the official missions assigned to the armed forces are with the true missions imposed by the geographic, political, and historic situation of the country?

What are the defense and armament agreements and military alliances with the foreign countries, especially the big powers, and how does this impact the independence of the country, its national security, and Islamic identity?

Accurate answers to these questions and others help lay out a militaristic and political strategy for this mighty machine and the media effort as a part of the political effort relying completely on that study with many details some of which are related to the current events inside the military institution and its units. Also, the media rhetoric must take into consideration the historic past of this military and quote it, emphasizing Jihadi testimonies, Islamic roots, and the contributions of the military to this bright historic framework.

According to the study mentioned, the Jihad media effort addressed to the military must be divided among the different groups of the military, whether it is within the officer ranks or the different branches. The Mujahideen must have separate rhetoric for each group by itself, so that this effort will bring the desired results and achieve the Jihad plan with regard to the military.

How does the Jihad media message reach the military?

The best way to convey the Jihad media message to military officers and soldiers is while in contact with them in civilian society, which provides better security opportunities away from the tight monitoring inside the military units. Distributing the pamphlets or cassette tapes among the officers and soldiers is better done outside the units, although it is preferable in very special cases to do so inside the units in order to expose the weakness of the ruling authority and how it lost control of the reins of power.

The most critical moment in the relation between the Jihad movement and the military is when the tyrant authorities push the armed forces in direct action to counter the Mujahideen who are supported by the people, sending military forces into the street in order to maintain security and carry out repressive action. This is a moment that can bring the Jihad movement closer to victory if the movement knows how to implement it

politically well, and uses the right approach to address the military through the media.

National armies will be faster in dissolving and revolting against the ruling authorities in such situations, especially when the Mujahideen hold together and receive strong public support.

These militaries might dissolve quickly if they face public gatherings with dominant determination and command, as happened during the Iranian revolution. This does not only depend on a good propaganda plan on the Mujahideen part, but also on an extremely accurate Jihad strategy, especially with regard to the position toward the military. An improvised military policy on the part of the Mujahideen might result in pushing the entire military to side with the tyrant government. The Mujahideen have open choices between complete reconciliation with the military, even if the latter resorts to opening fire on the Mujahideen and their supporters —this was the choice of the Iranian revolution with regard to the Iranian national military, except for one military clash that took place in the late hours of the revolution between pro revolution units and others loyal to the regime and at that critical hour, the armed revolutionary militias emerged to control the streets of the capital and protect the revolution’s command — or full confrontation from the first moment of the outbreak of Jihad, as it happened with the doctrinal party militaries in Syria and Afghanistan.

Any mistake in defining the appropriate policies towards the military may cost the Jihad movement its own survival.

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Conveying the media message:

Like military action, the planning of media strategy will be controlled by the supreme command which will specify the tactics that need to be followed in order to convey the media message to the concerned parties. However, the choice will be open for the cadres and the members of the movement to be creative in finding new work methods, and consult with them regarding the reaction of the public toward the Jihad media message. The command also specifies the appropriate media plan for each social group. It is preferable that media and psychology specialists and Jihad cadres whose families belong to these social groups participate in laying out this plan in order to find the best way to address these groups and influence them.

In general, the military cadres are forbidden from practicing media work at the beginning of the action; separate groups are assigned to this work, such as:

- A.** A group to prepare the message and print the pamphlets or cassette tapes.
- B.** A group to distribute the message and deliver the pamphlet or the cassette to the set areas.
- C.** A group to deliver the message and distribute the pamphlets and cassettes among the specifically desired social class.

The three groups do not know each other; they communicate through accurate organizational ways in order to observe secrecy. There is also no connection whatsoever between their members and those of the military apparatus. Opportunities should be offered for the Mujahideen who became known to the regime's security forces, to deliver public media messages, such as the speeches given in public gatherings, or publishing and circulating the news of the Mujahideen and their ordeal with the tyrant authority. They can also work within the "rumors apparatus" related to the Mujahideen, where they will have great influence along with the rules to spread the rumor we mentioned.

Political Action Groups:

The Jihad organization must assign groups to work inside each of the aforementioned social classes, and acquaint each group with the work strategy inside its specialized sector. The command must make sure its cadres comprehend this strategy and agree with them on the means and methods of work. It is preferable to appoint a political instructor for each sector to supervise the carrying out of the political and media work strategy inside its specialized sector.

It is also preferable that this political instructor be from the same social group; submitting reports to the general command on the level of progress in executing the political program inside his social group, and presenting his suggestions for modifying the means and methods, meaning "the tactics," or modifying certain parts of the strategy itself, if necessary. The political instructor may be given the authority to make immediate decisions to modify the methods of execution - "tactics" - within his sector.

As for implementing media or political strategy modifications, this must be done within the scope of the higher command and specialized committee in this field.

Importance of Slogans:

A slogan is an expression that is concise and easy to circulate, focusing in few words on the goals of the Jihad revolutionary movement in a certain phase. The slogan is to be replaced with the development of the general situation in the conflict arena, where new slogans suitable for the current developments will be released. The importance of a slogan arises from the fact it resembles the flag, behind which the soldiers crowd together. Therefore, the slogan is a beacon showing the Muslim population the goal and objective of the conflict in a limited period of time;

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Thus, it is a temporary strategic goal always connected to the ultimate goal of the Jihad movement. Adopting the right slogan suitable for the phase's circumstances is as important as the right aiming of the rifle at the targeted goal.

An example of this is the slogans brought up in the conflict phases of the events in Egypt

during the conflict between Egyptian people and the British occupation:

A- At the beginning of the conflict following the defeat of 'Arabi Basha and the domination of despair and frustration among the Egyptian people, people spontaneously brought up a simple slogan reflecting their situation and hopes in a simple song saying, "Ya 'Aziz, Ya 'Aziz, Dahya Takhud alingleez" [TC: this is in colloquial Egyptian; it means "'Aziz, 'Aziz, may a misfortune hit the British and make them leave"].

This is a slogan that rejects the occupation and places hope on God after all means available to people failed in overthrowing the occupation.

B- Intense emotions rejecting the occupation with a rise in patriotic feelings rejecting armed resistance of the occupation. After the emergence of an educated class saturated with Western culture and education, like Sa'd Zaghloul and his comrades, elicited a slogan suitable for that phase saying "Either full independence or violent death," and "oh my country, my country, I give my soul and heart for you." These slogans show the growth of patriotic emotions, taking the reins of the initiative to resist the occupier, and defining the temporary goal by achieving independence even by force.

C- Under national pressure, the British limited their occupation presence in Egypt to only staying inside the military base of the Suez Canal. Egypt acquired a nominal independence according to a treaty. A disagreement between the king of Egypt and the British surfaced about the fate of Sudan which nominally belonged to the King. Thus, the patriotic Egyptian movement led by the Al-Wafd Party raised the slogan of "Egypt and Sudan are ours and England if we can."

We shall notice obviously, based on the slogans raised and their development, the intellectual stumbling and weakness of the national leaders which ultimately led the strife of Egyptian people to a military coup bringing 'Abd-al-Nasser and his clique to power and starting a new era of national rule that was more catastrophic to Egypt than the foreign occupation.

As a result, the conflict with the tyrant regimes is going through long phases with each phase different in nature and circumstances. Each phase requires a slogan, or even more, expressing the goals of the Jihad movement, charging the public psychologically to continue striving and supporting the Mujahideen and illuminating their way for the right action. The slogan also acts as the flag the Mujahideen raise so that people unite behind it. Without a slogan, uniting the people is impossible.

An accurate slogan is an accurate aiming at the target.

Developing slogans accordingly matching the development of the conflict phases is an accord process between the act of aiming at the target, the change occurring at the target location, and the change occurring at the direction of the wind and its strength. The ultimate goal remains the same which is destroying the tyrant regime and erecting the Islamic regime on the ruins of the tyrant.

Political Mobilization:

All that we have mentioned beforehand falls under an extremely important Jihad mission and that is the political mobilization of Muslim people. The main tool of this mobilization is the Jihad media that we talked about and its devices. However, we must redefine this important expression, "political mobilization."

This mobilization means that the Mujahideen must explain to Muslim people the reason for this war between the Mujahideen and the tyrant, as well as the goal of this war.

This mobilization must spread horizontally between the members of society in a way that it will not leave any group of people, whether in the city or desert, unaware of this goal. After that, the Mujahideen will use all of their political and military means to strengthen and deepen this concept in the consciousness of people.

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This mobilization attracts millions of people to the battlefield, giving the Jihad movement great opportunities for recruiting people and getting financial help. The sympathy of people provides great chances to the movement and great chances for information, as well.

Political mobilization does not settle for explaining the reasons for war and its purpose; it also presents its assigned political agenda according to why it is engaging this war. The political slogan does not substitute for the political agenda since the latter defines the parties participating in the combat, position toward them, and the political steps of Jihad action and its purpose.

If the political mobilization stopped at this point it would be work that could be done in a short time; so what about the conflict period that stretches over several years, and how would the political mobilization during that period be? The political mobilization of people continues in order to connect its social groups and classes with the Jihad and fighting the tyrant.

The political mobilization explains not only the role of each group in this conflict, but also the role of every individual in this group. And then, it explains the general concepts for the people during long periods of conflict when there is confusion in conceptions and mixed positions. The political action of the Mujahideen is the dividing line between success and failure. The Mujahideen's ability to continue mobilizing people politically is their first line of support for military success. The Jihad military action cannot develop and reach the final stage of victory without serious media action that pushes the political mobilization of people forward, and connects the emotions and interests of each individual in the nation with the progress of the Jihad and its victory. It is obvious that religious awareness is a key part of the political mobilization that we intend.

Talking with common people requires starting with tangible reality [TC: that they can see]

in order to bring them to the bare reality [TC: Abstract, true reality]. One must not forget the story of a Bedouin who converted to Islam during its early days and how he started by saying that dung is an indication for a camel, which is a tangible reality for him that led him to the bare notion of the existence of God the only one.

The mobilization of common people in Jihad politics must start from their tangible reality, and to be more specific the reality and problems of daily life, in order to gradually reach the bare notion, which is governorship and implementing God's Sharia on earth.

As we mentioned, stopping the political mobilization of Muslim people means the isolation of the Jihad action, which leads to its blockage, and then inevitable defeat.

Here, we emphasize again the opposite of what is known in the Jihad circle; the political Jihad effort is more significant, difficult, and has a longer range than the Jihad combat action. This is a serious point that requires the revision of all or most of what is currently present in the Jihad arena, and reorganizing the priorities and work agendas according to that concept which falls under the conflict laws in societies.

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Truthfulness and Credibility

Truthfulness was the first argument (hijah) that the Prophet, may God's blessing and peace be upon him, used with his people in his first open call to Islam. When he called them in serenity, asking them whether they would believe him if he said men on horses in the valley are about to attack them? They unanimously believed he was truthful and honest, and only then he declared his message.

Those who call for Jihad cannot deviate from this approach. Even though all human approaches will inevitably resort to lying, Islam is distinguished by its commitment to truthfulness. The speeches of the Prophet, may God's blessing and peace be upon him, stated that the believer might be a coward or stingy, but not a liar. Lying is a detestable attribute on the personal level, and a deadly attribute at the calling [recruiting] level. The caller will be killing his call when he explores lying even if we presume he had a good reason for it.

The modern political approaches and their media tools use lying as an approach and style, and do not refrain from resorting to the most ignoble ways on the basis of "The end justifies the means." Everything is allowed to them, no matter how unethical it is as long as it leads them to their goal.

On the other hand, Islamists must stick to their political and media approach, complying with truthfulness and adopting the religious tools to reach the religious goal.

Experience proves that the most powerful media source is truthfulness. Because no matter how costly the media can be with new equipment and embellished looks, it is worthless if it loses public credibility. The experience of the British Broadcasting Corp (BBC) is a good

proof of this. This station is considered the most significant station in influencing the international public opinion at our present time; it built its reputation during World War II when it truthfully reported news of the German air raids on Britain to the point where the number of British losses mentioned in the broadcasts was higher than the one announced by Germany itself. The BBC continued to do so throughout the war, which helped it earn great credibility all over the world. Britain benefited from this attribute with slyness and started to slip its poisonous lies into the BBC's newscasts and reports in a way hard to discover. The radio station became the best tool for the British sirs to achieve their malicious goals in the world.

Lying leads to the loss of trust. This is what happened in our current era when people lost their trust in every approach and idea suggested to them. It is unfortunate that some people and trends that are considered Islamic have been swept away in the lying current and became prominent figures in lying.

There are Sheikhs with turbans issuing Fatwas saying that the tyrant regimes are consistent with Islam and others with beards issuing Fatwas saying that those profligate tyrants are the Imams of the right path. There are ideological schools with former Jihad expertise, calling for western democracy and melting in the tyrant regimes in order to reform these regimes from the inside and turn them into an Islamic regime. There are also enemies of Jihad who resist its ideology wherever it is by running business in the name of Jihad and containing any Jihad movement to use its name to make their living and earn glory and money.

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Then they use this glory and money to kill the Mujahideen's movement. There is no other way to resist that dark stack of lying and defamation, except for a current of honest Jihad that looks for truthfulness and is armed with Jihad, as there is no hope in saving humanity except through such a current.

Reasons for the Diversion of the Jihad Media

The two most prominent Jihad experiences in our modern era are the Syrian and Afghan Jihad experiences. Unfortunately, the media accompanying both experiences was an example of the deviation and straying away from the Islamic approach. In both experiences, the media was swept away by open lying, spreading the wrong information, and intentionally confusing the mind of Muslims in order to achieve strictly party interests and selfish personal interests.

Among the sad paradoxes is that most of the right information on the situation in the conflict arena of both battles was available to the international infidel media while there was almost no trace of it in the media that is supposed to be Islamic and Jihadist!!

Also, the people in charge of the media in both experiences had a higher goal, which is collecting the maximum amount of money from Muslims. The shortest way to do so was to

move Muslims' emotions to the highest level through an indistinct series of exaggerations and concealed lies, and unfortunately, texts from the Quran and Sunnah. Those politicians succeeded in their effort to collect enormous amounts of money but it's only a small price for selling the verses of God, betraying the Muslim nation, tricking it, and not offering it sincere recommendations. The results of this sinful action are dangerous, with grave long range harm to the journey of the Islamic nation.

In Syria: The experience ended in complete and destructive failure, and the politicians who handled the Jihad media made promises that victory is very close and the regime is collapsing, but they were never true. Furthermore, at the time they were saying these promises and tens of millions of dollars coming to them from the pockets of donors, military losses had already fell on the few Jihadis fighting inside Syria who never received a penny of that money but rather were targeted and blocked by those who claim to have adopted Jihad falsely and untruthfully and collected enormous money in the name of Jihad.

In Afghanistan: The picture did not change much although it had a broader impact, more harm, and a worse outcome since the experience was longer, tougher, and had a higher price in honor, money, and souls.

We must look into the reason for this catastrophic phenomenon so that we can avoid it in the future because any media like this is truly considered "the worst media for the best cause."

In brief, we hereby mention the most important reasons:

1. Engaging in Jihad without a command or unified organization:

The Jihad started in Syria with a group of faithful people that decided to break away from the Muslim Brotherhood in order to start the Jihad immediately and randomly with all available means. In Afghanistan, Muslims were taken by surprise by the communist coup and then by the Russian invasion, before their Jihad ideology matured or their organization was completed.

As it is known, one cannot engage in the Jihad war against a tyrant regime or foreign invasion without tight organization with competent leadership of religious, political, and military ideology that has an extraordinary level of development and maturity.

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The organization must be capable of handling the popular movement, resorting to the power of the Muslim population for help and being their pioneer. This is something both movements lacked, causing confusion, chaos, and failure, and the expected goal was not achieved despite the casualties and the blood [shed].

2. Separating the political action from military action:

In both experiences, Jihad was started on the shoulders of field leaders working independently without a unified plan, while the political action was overtaken by a command that fled the battlefield to a safe location outside the borders and took charge of some kind of political work that was small and despicable at the same time in exploiting the blood of Mujahideen inside the country and turning it into a stock of gold and personal glory. The media effort was the tool of the fleeing political leadership from beyond the borders; thus they turned it into a megaphone for lying and exaggeration to draw money from Muslims through various games and tricks, allowing themselves to lie and fraud, not refraining from attacking the true Mujahideen and distorting their picture, then blocking them and preventing them from getting money, and putting pressure on them while trying to impose conditions and issue field orders from outside the battlefield. Finally, they allied with the tyrants, working closely with the regime, acquitting them, and issuing forgiveness checks testifying for the Islam of those assassins and blood shedders who believe in infidel doctrines and sticking to them. Even with the Ba'athist holding on to his Ba'ath doctrine and the ethical holding on to his ethics, the run-away leaders challenged granting them forgiveness checks and faith testimonies first, and then they held political alliances with them. And the same story hardly changed in both cases.

3. Dispersion and the burning [falling] of lines:

The corruption of political leaderships that fled the field and their faithfulness to only themselves and their greediness, allowed the local and international infidel powers to control them and use them in the interest of their intents.

The fleeing leaderships succeeded in exporting the epidemic of discord to the inside fronts and took care of it and financed it with weapons and gold. All of this was under the supervision of great international powers and local agents. Some of the latter were faking Islam, and some movements alleging to be the followers of Islam and Jihad, ran businesses and owned magazines known as "Islamic magazines," which supported the fleeing leaderships by lying about their abnormal and squalid situation and spreading lies and misleading the ranks of Muslims who had blazing enthusiasm for Jihad and for supporting Islam.

But they fell in the claws of propagandists who tricked the nation, looted its money, and manipulated its emotions and doctrines. Moreover, with the money they stole, they owned media tools praising them day and night and giving them credit for things they did not do. "Think not that those who exult in what they have given, and love to be praised for what they have not done - Think not, they are in safety from the doom. A painful doom is theirs." [TC: Surat Al-Umran, Verse 187]

The aforementioned reasons are sufficient to destroy any militaristic and political Jihad action. Thus, the deviation that accompanied the Jihad media was a reflection of the deviation of the entire Jihad situation.

We go back again to emphasize that truthfulness is the foundation of the Islamic call, and the axis of an efficient Jihad media.

Objectivity is another characteristic of that media; this means it does not deal with fantasies and illusions, and is fair to everyone whether we like him or not. "O ye who believe! Be steadfast witnesses for God in equity, and let not hatred of any people seduce you that ye deal not justly. Deal justly, that is nearer to your duty." [TC: Surat Al-Maeda, Verse 8]

We acknowledge the fact that the standards of justice and being aware of it, have been greatly shaken in the Islamic circles; the personal or Party interest became the standard of justice, and everyone demands justice if he is right, but ignored justice and fairness to others even if they were Muslims. Therefore, Muslims and the Islamic media must reject injustice and oppose it even if the wronged was an infidel. This has great impact on people and is an influential tool on the call.

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While we emphasize looking into truthfulness and objectivity, we do not deny how important it is to approach the Jihadi emotions, evoke them and mobilize them. We do not ignore either that the main audience of the Jihad media message is the common people and not just the upper class; the population is the materialistic issue of our conflict with the tyrant.

Consequences of the Diversion of the Jihad Media

The media that accompanied both Jihad movements in Syria and Afghanistan was not in fact Jihadist since it did not stem from the ranks of Mujahideen, but from the ranks of the most hostile enemies of Jihad and the fake ones who fled the call of Islam and deceived the Islamic nation.

Although its immediate harvest of millions of dollars ended up in the pockets of the falsifiers, its future results, however, is going to be dangerous for the fate of the Islamic movement and its struggle with the international and local tyrant. Among these bitter results:

1. The Islamic nations lost trust in the Jihad solution or the violent revolutionary swift to the Islamic regime through fighting the tyrants, and now believe in establishing democratic parliamentary movement as one safe stream to coexist within the regimes with marginal embellishment procedures for the Islamification of the tyrants.
2. The Islamic young men lost trust in the suitability of Islam itself as an approach to life because, as the fake Jihad media alleged, the implementation of Jihad in Syria and Afghanistan was ideal, done by leaders on the same level of the Prophet's Companions may God be pleased with them, and purely supported by unlimited dignities, as the same media alleged; the implementation did not lead, however, to the establishment of the state of Caliphate that we have been promised or anything even close to this goal. Therefore, the only result that young men will find themselves forced to believe is the doubt in the soundness and authenticity of the Islamic approach. This is the most significant and flagrant result of all.

3. Distorting the picture of Islamic Jihadist pioneers, isolate them in the future from the Islamic nations, and make them sound doubtful by describing them of delusion and lying because of the disgracing truth of some leaderships whom the pioneers believed were loyal Jihadists dedicated to serving religion but then their corruption and falseness came to light after the disaster took place and the Jihad failed after blood was shed and the money of Muslims were looted and their lands were lost.

There is no need to mention that isolating the Jihad pioneers from their people, and making them and their approach sound doubtful, all of this makes it easier for the tyrants to defeat and exterminate these pioneers if they try to act in the future after digesting the Jihad lessons of the past.

So, do we wonder about the truth of this fake Jihad media, its curators, and the party they served by carrying out such an action?

When Will the Jihad Media Start?

Laying out a comprehensive strategy for Jihadi action is the first mission of the Jihad leadership; it is dangerous and must precede the establishment of the Jihadi organization itself, or must be almost complete when establishing the organization begins. The strategy of the media action is a part of the political strategy that is set up early from that time. Building the military apparatus is supposed to be set in a relatively short while before the real start of combat for security and psychological reasons.

Fighters cannot wait for a long time to receive the orders to engage in action, and fighting might break out before the set up time as a result of the moral and psychological pressure on the Mujahideen. Also, the security search of the tyrant intelligence may succeed in discovering the action, and forcing the leadership to engage in a battle before reaching the maturity phase. Building the political action apparatus and bringing it to a reasonable level of effectiveness requires some time that is longer than the time necessary to build a military apparatus capable of starting the armed fight.

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Building the media apparatus locally and abroad is considered a necessity to exploit the military effort of the Mujahideen to benefit their cause, before the pirates of the Islamic action adopt and exploit the same effort and also to allow the action to be out of media blackout locally and internationally.

The Jihad Media and Leadership

The Jihad media shall be the pulpit of the truth for the just cause, since it represents, first and foremost, a holy cause for which it calls and encourages people to join.

One of the forms of perversion is the transformation of this media into a megaphone for party-related propaganda, in a disgusting and strict way. Or it turns to a tool for glorifying the figure of a leader and exaggerates in praising him unjustly and for no good reason

turning him into an idol ready to be worshiped.

In the meantime, it is the duty of this media to highlight the efforts of the Jihad organization and its leading role in combating the tyrant, infusing trust in the foundation and capability of the organization and promoting hope in its victory.

As for the Jihad leadership and the supreme leader; the leader, in particular, must be given a special level of reverence showing his important and significant role for the future of Muslims since he is the leader of Jihad against all types of tyrants in that country. He is also the future leader, God willing, of the Islamic state for which people are fighting to establish its roots on that spot of the earth.

People, in general, and Easterners, in particular, are fond of being tractable for the figure of the leader who, for them, represents special meanings and a symbol. The meanings are related to their beliefs, hopes, ambitions, and fears. When people find their leader embodying these meanings, they will carry out unusual actions of sacrifice and redemption. Thus, the people will turn into a gigantic power that is impossible to counter and become capable of facing the strongest difficulties. History is full of such cases. However, such cases are generally considered exceptional in terms of finding a nation with sufficient capabilities and undermined hope similar to this extraordinary leadership personality.

In any case, all nations are in need for the best of their people to assume their leadership role in critical situations. Islamic nations, in particular, are in a dire need at the present time to find such leadership with loyalty, religion, and competence.

But, can the Jihad media play this role in this regard?

The media plays a key role in this field in terms of presenting the Jihad leader as the leader of Muslims in the Jihad region and presenting the Jihad organization as a pioneer, leading people in a bitter but victorious war against the tyrant. Despite its importance, the role of the media remains, however, an auxiliary and not a main role; therefore, there must be a real leadership personality fit for the true leadership position, and an organization capable of carrying out the strife mission. Only then is the role of the media effective and significant because it is based on irrefutable realities.

Let us imagine someone with a piece of chalk drawing the picture of a lion on a clay wall. No matter how good this person is in illustration, he will not be able to give people the impression that what they see is a lion living in a castle.

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And even if he is believed by some naive people, the truth will impose itself sooner or later and the reality will hit them with its conclusive facts.

There is a saying, "You may deceive some people for some time, but you cannot deceive all people at all times."

The problem with leadership, in particular, is a complex problem that the Jihad action faces based on multiple considerations including:

- The rarity of personnel qualified for this role.
- The tyrant regimes are assiduous in killing, imprisoning, and buying out the personalities fit to play such a significant role.
- The weakening of organizational, leadership, and ideological standards in Islamic organizations; thus taking away the chance for high standard leadership to emerge.
- The tyrant regimes are facilitating the way for weak leaders to assume power within Islamic groups. Even more, they intervene in changing Jihadi leaders in Afghanistan and Syria to ones full of weakness, corruption, and self interest making them unfit to carry out a Jihad role but destructive to the Jihadi action itself.
- Due the current circumstances, the Jihad leadership cannot be known and open in the battlefield because they will be killed immediately, especially in situations where it is difficult to provide secured regions that are easier to defend and be used to lead the Jihad action. Also, if the Jihad leadership is forced to leave the battlefield, its role as the field command will cease to exist and it must give up the command to another undisclosed leadership, or it must insist on giving detailed orders to the field action while it settles abroad not giving the chance for a true field command to emerge thus this migrant leadership itself turns into an obstacle for the Jihad.

So, can the true leadership of the Mujahideen remain unknown while the Jihadi movement adopts a figure accepted by the public as a symbol only with no power?

This solution proved to be non-practical and led to the division of the organization. It is also the same catastrophic situation where there will be two leaderships; one is formal [just a picture] that has the literary [symbolic] glory offered by the Jihad media tools and the financial support from donations and other various resources while another field leadership that is unknown to the public undertakes the battle. The first one will be swept by the current of political games and ignorance of the movement's facts, while the other leadership will be limited in the iron circle of military action, isolated and deprived of its political wing, financial support, and social services. The inevitable result will be collapse and failure.

Will the public stick to an organization and consider that a compensation for the absence of a leader?

It is a fact that the absence of a leader is a loss hard to compensate for. But from the experiences of other nations, including Algeria, it is proven that an effective Jihadi organization with a large public movement can alleviate the problem of the absence of a leader and fill the gap resulting from it along with putting media spotlights on the heroic acts of the organization and some of its figures that get uncovered either through martyrdom or arrest to be presented as honorable examples.

The magnificence of the examples the organization presents and their heroism is the best

proof for the great command leading them. Furthermore, this opens the door widely for the excessively exaggerating imagination of people to make this command a mythical legend, greatly surpassing the power and capabilities of the real command. This is going to be very useful for when the right circumstances allow the announcement of the true leader of the Jihad action.

As we mentioned before, the role of Jihadi media in this entire procedure is a vital rhetoric role; it remains, however, an auxiliary role where it cannot create something from nothing.

Written in the year ----- [blank]