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Manual of

The Tactical Use of Weapons of Mass Destruction

Volume 2 – Part 2

Basics of Using Nuclear Weapons in War

Army Staff Headquarters
Training Department
Chemical Corps Directorate

Third Edition
July 1988

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“Anyone who thinks they know everything is ignorant, while anyone who constantly wants to learn is the one who is dependable.”

President Leader
Saddam Hussein

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Order

This manual was published for the purpose of training Armed Forces associates. Thus, they all must strictly comply with its rules.

Ministry of Defense - Baghdad
July – 1988

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Special Forces Staff General
Nazar ‘Abd-al-Karim Faysal al-Khazraji
Chief of Staff of the Army

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Foreword

1- It is not unlikely that the Iraqi Army will participate in a future Arab-Israeli war, in which the enemy will resort to the use of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction.
2- Usually, there are no clearly distinct boundaries between the conditions of nuclear and non-nuclear war, as long as both of the fighting parties or one of them possesses nuclear weapons. The battlefield that lacks nuclear weapons in this case may turn into a field filled with nuclear explosions. Therefore, the presence of these weapons and the lack of practicing the required control of them will make them a dominant element on the next battlefield at all times.
3- It is necessary for all commanders, leaders, and staff personnel to know the characteristics, capabilities, and specifications of these weapons, in addition to their different impacts on the nature of works and procedures that make modern war unique.

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Chapter One

Responsibilities of Commanders and Staff Personnel

Foreword

4- The increase of mobility, great destructive power, and the speed and range of modern weapons firing tools led to the emergence of new problems in war, which required the following:

A- Quick and effective control.
B- Coordination and integration in firing support and maneuvering.

The completion of these works is the responsibility of the staff personnel, including the chemical department.
This chapter will discuss the work and responsibilities of the staff personnel to fulfill the tactical requirements of movements and the administrative measures required for their success.

Nature of Movements

General

5- When defining the missions or duties of his formations and units,

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the commander will allocate the weapons and means that secure the execution of these duties. Nuclear weapons are considered the most important of these weapons, as their numbers, caliber, and launching tools will be decided, in addition to imposing specifications on their use and expenditure rates when necessary in certain circumstances.

Usually, these specifications are imposed up to the divisional level where planning, coordination, and delivery means of nuclear weapons fall within their capabilities and authorities.
The army commander shall allocate nuclear weapons to the corps affiliated with him, either for a certain phase of the movement or enough for several days' use. In his turn, the corps commander will allocate these weapons to divisions while keeping a necessary percentage in reserve. In the same manner, the division commander will allocate what he has in his possession of these weapons to his brigades (although this procedure is currently something exceptional, unless the situation requires brigades to be working in the faraway fronts or in movements of fluid nature).

6- After analyzing the task received, commanders will specify the duties and materials available for the execution [*of the task*], taking into consideration when drawing the plans and conclusions that emerged at the time of evaluating the situation,

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that the degree of accuracy in identifying these duties and the anticipated success of the plan drawn depends, in the first place, on the information that the staff personnel were able to obtain, in addition to coordination and monitoring the staff personnel exercises during the planning and execution phases. Yet, among the most important duties of the staff personnel that require a high level of skillfulness are:

A- Handling of passing [*moving*] targets.
B- Exploitation of short opportunities.
C- Reaction toward quickly changing situations.

7- Actions of nuclear staff personnel emerge in two different cases:

A- When nuclear weapons are used by friendly forces.
B- When nuclear weapons are used by the enemy against friendly forces.

Friendly Attacks

Planning

8- In order to reach the proper use of nuclear weapons, and in order to achieve the maximum impact of their use, the following must be taken into consideration when drawing plans:

A- Providing accurate information at the right time.
B- Coordinating between the supporting fire and maneuvering to achieve surprise over the enemy in terms of time, direction, or the size of the force.

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Obtaining accurate information for this purpose and coordinating appropriately between firing and movement during the planning phase are among the most important responsibilities of the staff.

9- **Intelligence**
After being informed of the commander's task and any other instructions that might be issued, the intelligence staff gathers the following information on the enemy:

A- The force, structure, and potential locations of units and front-line formations.
B- The reserves.
C- Armor and artillery.
D- The nuclear weapons and their launching tools.
E- Headquarters.
F- Administrative establishments and communications lines.
G- The shape and size of areas occupied by the enemy's troops, and the likeliness of these troops to be changed or moved from their original locations.

10- In order for the intelligence staff personnel to acquire the required information, they need to use all available means that include:

A- Patrols and observation posts.
B- Aerial and ground reconnaissance.

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C- Electronic equipment and systems.
D- Local population and agents.
E- Groups left behind the enemy's locations.
F- Maps and aerial photographs.
G- Prisoners and seized documents.

However, in case of preplanning that includes counter attacks or readiness to handle passing [*moving*] targets that appear for relatively short periods of time, potential targets will be selected

from the intelligence situation report. Targets like these must be verified by direct means before being attacked.

11- **Target Evaluation**
As soon as the information required on targets is obtained, the intelligence personnel analyzes and evaluates this information for each target separately or the target area in general. The following factors are considered important in evaluating the targets:

A- Accuracy of information.
B- Points of vulnerability of the target.
C- The impact of target destruction on the combat capability of the enemy.
D- The ability of the enemy to compensate for losses and how quickly they can recover their combat capability.
E- The possibility of the target escaping before attacking it.
F- The weather, land, and political factors, etcetera.

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12- The relative value of each target will be decided, in terms of the impact that it has on the enemy's capabilities, in particular. This decision will be passed along with the related information to the Movement Joint Staff for discussion.
13- In addition to the intelligence staff personnel, commanders of the artillery, chemical [*corps*], and subordinate formations or units will also submit their recommendations about the targets to the Movement Staff personnel.

14- **Targets Selection**
Once the Movement Staff receives the aforementioned information, they will forward it to the Special Movements. In the procedure related to combining firing with maneuvering, the following will be taken into consideration:

A- Available duties and resources.
B- Capabilities and assignments of the assault units and the firing support available.
C- Maneuvering plan.
D- Points of weakness in every target with regard to the attack with traditional and nuclear weapons, assault units, or mixing two means or more in order to decide on the type of weapon that must be used on each target.
E- Accuracy, quantity, nature, impact, and the time available to provide firing support.

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F- Relative value of the impact caused by destroying or paralyzing every target in the commander's plan.

15- After that, the decision will be made to prioritize the targets to attack them with nuclear weapons to facilitate the maneuvering and accomplishing the commander's task. The movements' and intelligence staff personnel, commanders of artillery and chemical [*corps*], and air force personnel shall all cooperate in this regard. As for the drawing of the plans, it will take place mostly in a special conference.

16- After evaluating the targets and coordinating with the commander's plan regarding the maneuvering, the Movement Staff will provide conclusions to the commander along with the commander of artillery and chemical [*corps*]. The information provided will include the following:

A- Connection between the targets and the plan.
B- Desirable results from the nuclear attack on every target.
C- Priority of engagement.
D- Risks of radioactive contamination on the friendly troops (if present).
E- Time of explosion.

17- **Reserve Weapons**

Some nuclear weapons will be kept as reserves according to the commander's wish. Good preplanning to deal with potential targets with these weapons must be taken into consideration.

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Firing Plan

18- Once the commander approves the list of selected targets, details related to these targets will be passed on to the artillery headquarters along with the following information:

A- Priority of engagement.
B- Desired results to be achieved.
C- Time of explosion.
D- Security requirements of troops.

19- Details related to target analysis will be finalized at the artillery headquarters jointly with the chemical [*corps*] staff. After that, the firing plan will be completed, as well as the submission of recommendations about the following issues for each target to the commander:

A- Ground zero required.

B- Launching means.
C- Weapons and calibers.
D- Explosion altitude.
E- Time of launching.
F- Anticipated results.
G- Estimate of fallout and security measures of the troops.

The air force staff shall provide help in planning for the aerial fire support. The commander may approve this plan, or suggest implementing some modifications related to the acceptance of greater risks on the part of our troops, or request modifying the extent of destruction of enemy targets from a lower to a higher level.

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20- Details required to prepare the traditional firing plans will be done at the artillery headquarters. As for the nuclear firing plans, they are usually prepared independently. Appendix (A) gives a suggested example of the nuclear firing plan.

Control Measures

21- The movements' [*staff*] orders include the following special measures that must be taken to secure control and coordination:

A- Dividing Borders
The use of nuclear firing or allowing its impact to take place in the areas where units or formations are present on the wings [*flanks*] is not allowed without full coordination between them [*the flanks*]. Coordination includes issues related to the weak points of formations, their movement plans, their movements, and warning the formations present on the wings [*the flanks*] and their troops about nuclear attacks, so that they can take preventive measures.

B- Bombing Line
This is the line that allows the air force to work freely behind it without the need to coordinate with the ground forces.

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In case this line is not confirmed, the air force must coordinate prior to attacking any target.

C- Nuclear safety line
This is the line that:

First- Our troops present on it must remember to take some preventive measures.
Second- Clarifies the limit allowed for our troops to advance.
Third- Is immune against the firing of our weapons.

The purpose of this line must be specified accurately according to each case.

D- Firing coordination line
This is the line that enables the troops present on it to use nuclear weapons without the need to coordinate among each other. However, early coordination behind this line is considered necessary.

E- Air safety limits
In order to provide safety to the close support aircraft.

F- (N)-hour
Is the time when the use of nuclear weapons is implemented. All explosions that take place after this time are defined by (N) plus some minutes.

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Nuclear Firing Plan Warning

22- As the nuclear firing plan develops, the Movement Staff warns the friendly troops and air force of the plan when necessary. The corps headquarters is usually responsible for warning all of the corps' troops, formations on the wings, and the air force. In some cases, special flight runways may be assigned to the air force. In this case, there is no need to warn them ahead of time about the nuclear attacks that are happening outside these runways. Warnings of the divisions' nuclear firing plans are sent to the air force via the Air Support Communication Network.

23- These measures and others regarding control and coordination provide security for our troops, in addition to expediting the launching of nuclear weapons.
The detailed reports of the warning that must be sent to our troops and friendly troops may not be necessary in some cases, especially when the control measures listed in Article 21 are appropriately mentioned along with the orders. Contrary to this, the warning period may be reduced to the minimum level, so that they will have the chance to secure the withdrawal of mobile detachments in the specified time.

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Appendix (B) gives a suggested example of the nuclear strike warning.

Method of Request

24- Usually, the corps commander and sometimes the division commander reserve the right to issue the order to launch nuclear weapons, even if allocation was arranged at the subordinate formations level. A measure like this is deemed necessary in order to provide our troops with security and coordination.

A- In case launching systems are under the formations' control and nuclear weapons were allocated to them, the procedure after preparing the firing plan will be as follows:

First- The Movement Staff shall send an immediate warning of the nuclear strike to the corps headquarters, its formations, and our units.
Second- The artillery commander shall ask the corps artillery commander for the authority to fire.
Third- Once the corps commander approves the firing plan, the corps Movement Staff shall notify all units of the plan and inform the formation, while informing the originator of the request, at the same time.

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Fourth- If the firing plan is disapproved, the formation shall be notified of this, and the warning will be cancelled.

B- In case nuclear weapons are not allocated, the division artillery staff shall send a nuclear strike request to the corps artillery. At the corps [*level*], the artillery commander and Movement Staff personnel will study the request that will be reviewed by the corps commander. Once approved, the formation shall be notified of this [*decision*]. After that, the corps shall warn all formations and units, and weapons shall be released at the specified time. Appendix (C) gives a suggested example of the nuclear strike.

Communications

25- The severe impact of nuclear weapons on the battlefield has become one of the likely issues that requires continuous guidance on all efforts, focusing on the key targets' locations and handling [*destroying*] them before they disappear. The successful execution of this work requires the availability of communications with a high level of efficiency and speed. Since the distance is increasing between units in the nuclear field and the [*battlefield*] movement, as well, the communications problem gets more complicated and gains more importance [*over time*].

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Providing appropriate and efficient communications falls under the responsibility of the staff personnel. The following points are considered among the important issues in favor of the staff personnel in this regard:

A- Dual communications.
B- Usage of electronic systems.

Staff System

26- In order to secure a rapid engagement of the targets, it is necessary not to waste time scrutinizing the information, making decisions, and issuing orders. Therefore, having a suitable staff system within the headquarters is necessary to provide aid to the commander. Responsibilities of this system may be as follows:

A- Obtaining information on potential nuclear targets.
B- Analyzing the target.
C- Continuously drawing plans and identifying locations with coordination and integration of the firing support resources according to the commander's method and guidance.
D- Requirements evaluation.
E- Preparing and issuing the support firing orders.
F- Keeping the commander informed of the available resources and capabilities, and identifying them.
G- Safety measures.

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H- Strike aftermath analysis and estimating the extent of destruction.
I- Risk assessment.

27- A system like this one may include elements from the Movement, Intelligence, and Logistic Staffs' personnel, air force staff personnel, and representatives from the artillery, chemical and signal [*corps*], and engineering order when necessary.

Execution

28- Launching Attacks

Before launching the nuclear attack, we must try our best to make sure that the target is in its place by conducting quick reconnaissance. Once the target location is verified, nuclear weapons shall be released according to the time specified in the nuclear firing plan. Usually, the commander's maneuvering plan explains the estimated results of nuclear firing. Practically, these results are not achieved as expected due to some mistakes or other factors that take place. Therefore, it is necessary to write an immediate report of the post-strike

destruction before the troops start the assault.

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The information required about the nuclear explosion, such as the time of explosion, its altitude, and ground zero, can be obtained through chemical observers in the chemical and non-chemical units, other ground observation posts, aerial reconnaissance, electronic systems, agents, and groups left behind the enemy [*lines*]. This information will be analyzed to decide on the rate of losses, size of destruction inflicted on the enemy, and the possibility of contamination resulting from the remaining radiation or any other barriers created in the area because of destruction. Visual reconnaissance is conducted to verify these results. The movements' and intelligence staff personnel shall be responsible for this evaluation process that will be coordinated later on by the Movement Staff personnel, with the help of the chemical advisor and artillery headquarters. Ground observation posts shall be mainly used to report on nuclear strikes.

Assault

29- The destruction assessment process shall be done in a 20-30 minute period, from the time of explosion until troops start the assault. Once the commander receives the assessment results, and based on the likeliness of anticipated issues taking place, he will decide on the following:

A- Issuing orders to carry out the operation.

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B- Issuing orders to re-engage with some targets and delay the execution.
C- Issuing orders to carry out alternative plans that are mostly prearranged when the original plan depends to a great extent on the impact of nuclear weapons.
D- Postponing the operation.

Nuclear Destruction

30- The method related to the use of nuclear destruction is decided by the higher [*more senior*] commander of the area. In this method, targets are selected in consultation with the chemical corps commander, wherein these targets are tested and coordinated afterward by the Movement Staff personnel, in deliberation with the staff personnel of intelligence [*corps*] and chemical corps commander. The method used for evaluation and execution is similar to the method used for attacking ground targets.

Counter Attacks

31- We must give maximum importance to defense with regard to the destructive results of nuclear weapons that have a great impact on the nature of combat actions during the battle. Defense will take place in two intertwined phases:

A- The defensive measures taken to reduce the weakness of our troops to the lowest level.

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B- The compensation and repair measures [*performed*] as quickly as possible once the attack is over.

Defensive Measures

32- These measures are taken to stop the enemy from obtaining information on our troops, without which it will be difficult for him to launch accurate attacks on friendly defensive arrangements, and to minimize the impacts of such attacks even when they succeed.

Tactical Measures

33- Tactical measures can be summarized in the following points:

A- The appropriate deployment to reduce the potential destruction as a result of the use of our nuclear weapons. This requires coordination between the tactical requirements and security measures. The staff personnel must make sure there is enough space for the units to deploy at all times, while maintaining the ability to carry out their duty.
B- Camouflage and concealment.
C- Alarm system.
D- Training.
E- Deception.
F- Counterintelligence.

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Defense Measures Planning

34- The intelligence staff personnel continues in the process to estimate the enemy's nuclear capabilities, which include the location of nuclear weapons, calibers, their special delivery means, and targets against which these weapons may be used.
After that, in light of this information and in cooperation with the artillery headquarters, the intelligence staff will evaluate the points of weakness in our locations, troops, and other installations to decide on the extent of destruction that can be caused by the hostile nuclear weapons under current circumstances.

35- These reports shall be passed to the Movement Staff personnel who will take the necessary measures after that to eliminate the points of weakness or minimize them through the strengthening of locations or deployment or any other measure.

Counter Attacks Reports

36- When the enemy launches a nuclear attack, all units capable of recognizing ground zero and the degree or altitude of explosion shall submit reports on this information to the superseding headquarters. Units will open chemical observation posts for this purpose. In addition, units that are in the target area or nearby the area shall immediately send a wireless report on the strike. The reports will start with "immediate report" and include the information obtained on ground zero, degree, elevation of explosion, etcetera.

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37- The intelligence staff shall coordinate these reports. It would be preferable to form a section run by a small staff in every headquarters, all the way down to the brigade level, in order to analyze these reports. In the British Army, this section is called the "Chemical, Biological, and Radioactive Center," while it is called the "Chemical Tactical Center" in the American Army, and they are equivalent to the Chemical [*Section*] Headquarters of the corps and division in our army, and the Chemical Staff officer in the brigade.
This section will be part of the staff system that coordinates the firing support that was discussed in Article 26. The main responsibilities of this section are:

A- Evaluating risks.
B- Analyzing the weak points in our troops' locations.
C- Surveillance, monitoring, and fallout.

Information received in the form of an "Immediate Report" will be evaluated by the section. As a result, the staff personnel will send the information on the nuclear strike in the form of a "Nuclear File."

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Appendix (D) gives a suggested example of the nuclear file. The nuclear file will be distributed to the next higher up formation, formations on the wings [*flanks*], and all subordinate headquarters and units. This system has the following other tasks:

A- Documenting and thoroughly examining the information in the nuclear reports.
B- Maintaining the situation maps that show the locations of all strikes and contaminated areas.

C- Assessing fallout and the activity of remaining radiation.
D- Offering advice on fallout warning and preparing the tables related to it.
E- Controlling the monitoring [*of fallout*].
F- Providing the operation room with the radiation situation report.
G- Providing consultation and aid to the groups controlling destruction.

38- Units affected by the nuclear strike shall submit more reports following their nuclear reports, as soon as they get more information about the issue. Appendix (E) gives a suggested example of this report. The purpose of the following reports is to enable the superior headquarters to estimate the help required for the units to control the damage resulting from the nuclear strike.

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Combat Capability Recovery Measures

39- Preplanned activities must be carried out as quickly as possible, in order to estimate the extent of resulting destruction and then to recover the combat capability immediately after the enemy's nuclear attack ends. Measures taken in this regard must be confirmed in the regular work procedures of the unit and formation. In addition, officers, staff personnel, and troops responsible for the measures to control damage in the areas attacked shall be selected in the formation plans. Reserves will be quickly moved to the front in order to compensate for losses.

40- The ensuing counter attacks may require changing units entirely. Leaders or commanders may find it necessary in many situations to regroup two weak units and merge them into one unit with better combat capability. Sometimes the need to regroup the formations emerges in order to reinforce the units struck in the front or to replace them.

Fallout and Radioactive Contamination

Importance of Fallout

41- One of the unmeasured issues in the nuclear battlefield might be the impact of radioactive particles resulting from

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the surface explosion in the large areas subject to radioactive contamination that hinders the troops' movement there for relatively long periods of time, during which fallout is more dangerous on the tactical movements or administrative supplies. Therefore, it is necessary for the staff personnel to provide the commander with accurate and timely information about the fallout.

Fallout Estimate

42- Fallout affecting the course of movements is called “fallout of military importance,” which limits the ability of units to carry out their usual tasks. Before carrying out any other tactical movement, the pre-strike estimates must be done for all planned nuclear attacks.
The staff personnel shall also, when necessary, predict the hostile explosions in order to analyze their potential impact on friendly installations and defensive arrangements. These predictions are based on the information available from meteorology, the presumed ground zero, along with the magnitude and altitude of explosions.

43- After the attack, the after-strike prediction reports shall be prepared, which depend on the information related to the explosion’s altitude, magnitude, and ground zero as a part of the damage evaluation process.

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44- **Counter Attack Fallout Estimate**

Gathering the information required to estimate the fallout and assessing the destruction are the responsibilities of the intelligence staff, which will also be responsible for estimating the fallout of counter attacks and then distributing them. When estimating the intelligence process and ground analysis, the intelligence staff takes into consideration the impact of the areas of predicted fallout on our troops’ capabilities and the enemy.

45- **Friendly Weapons Fallout Estimate**

Estimating the friendly weapons fallout before and after the strike and distributing these estimates to the related parties falls under the responsibility of the Movement Staff with the help of the artillery headquarters. The Movement Staff shall also analyze the impacts of the estimated fallout on the maneuvering plan and develop any other applicable method. When such fallout is part of the plan to deprive the enemy of territory, its impact will be analyzed and estimated in the same manner.

46- **Estimate Reports**

Fallout estimates include a chart drawn with a scale for a piece of land where fallout of military importance may pass, while this fallout reaches the specified points.

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As the information becomes available, these estimates get finalized and take a much clearer form. These estimate reports are distributed to the formations and subordinate units in a way that may take place through overlays or letters or photocopies.

Monitoring and Radiation Scan

47- **Monitoring**

Monitoring consists of a person using radiation equipment to detect and measure the radiation, in order to show the presence or effectiveness of remaining radiation following the scan process of an important area where monitoring is taking place at regular distances. Monitoring is the unit's responsibility; it shows the fixed periods' procedures where the monitoring tests are taking place.

48- As soon as a unit detects radioactivity, it will send the preliminary report in the form of a telegram report. This report shows the place, extent, and time of detecting the radiation. Once additional information is available, the unit will submit the following reports or required reports according to the fixed work procedures.

49- The intelligence staff receives these reports at the headquarters.

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The intelligence staff, with the cooperation of the Movement Staff, analyzes the impact of these reports on the tactical movements to decide, after that, on conducting a scan when necessary.

50- **Radiation Scan**

It is the scan detachments' organized and coordinated use of the decision on the location, scope, and extent of the radiation in the contaminated area. The scan detachment consists of a radiation telescope [*observation post*] with an assistant, which could be the driver, and radio operator, etcetera. The scan process takes place on the ground or in the air, where the helicopter hovers at a minimum altitude and speed. (Chemical reconnaissance in helicopters supplied with a radiation detection device is considered appropriate for this purpose.)

51- Scans will be centrally conducted under the supervision of the intelligence staff and in consultation with the chemical staff or within the units. After receiving the information from the scan detachments, the intelligence staff, with the cooperation of the chemical staff, will confirm the extent of radiation in the points selected on the map and then distribute this information (such as the current contamination table) in the form of overlay or photocopy.

Administrative Tasks

Administration Staff Personnel

52- Once the administration staff receives their copies of the fallout estimates reports and contamination tables, etcetera,

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they will analyze the points of weakness in their installations and affiliated services. The potential impacts of estimated fallout may lead to taking some measures, such as the necessity to change the location of units or administrative installations, or the need for providing additional medical effort or controlling the traffic, decontamination, and burial actions, or any other effort to deal with the prisoners of war. In order to conduct preplanning and predict potential losses from radiation contamination, mainly the scan and monitoring reports will be relied on.

Supplies Staff Personnel

53- Responsibilities of the Supply Staff personnel are defined in monitoring, supply, and storing and distributing weapons. The Supply [*Staff*] benefits from the information mentioned in the estimates reports and contamination tables to analyze their impact on the administrative matters and maintenance related issues of formations.
Areas contaminated with radiation may affect the following:

A- Maintenance
B- Rationing and Supply
C- Evacuation and rescue of required equipment.
D- Usual works inside the administrative installation.

As for the impact of fallout, it will be in the contamination of reserve supplies. Troops are frequently cut off from communications lines, bringing out the need to use alternative means [*of supply*], such as aerial [*re*]supply.

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54- The supplies staff will also participate in providing help when implementing the measures required for the control of damage in the rear areas. The administrative units will deploy in accordance with the fallout estimate reports, in order to achieve as much security as possible.

Command and Control

55- In the extended area of the division's movements, it is difficult for the commander to secure total control of the battlefield. In nuclear circumstances, it is usually more preferable to issue recommendations and guidance than detailed orders. This way, subordinate commanders will rely on their personal creativity while assuming greater responsibilities.
56- Thinking flexibly and acting boldly are among the most important characteristics that the commander can exhibit in tough nuclear situations. As for the battle control, it takes place at the headquarters, where efficient communications along with the required means to receive

and evaluate the information are available. Usually, the commander monitors the work and supervises the battle, as well as visiting the sensitive areas in order to create trust and boost morale.

57- Since nuclear firing is crucial and targets are quick [*moving*] most of the time, the commander or his deputy must therefore be present at the headquarters at all times in order to empower subordinate commanders to launch nuclear weapons. The staff personnel must keep the commander informed of the latest developments of the situation.

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58- Because the command and control system is entirely affected by the nuclear attacks and counter electronic measures that put the system under intense pressure, the plan must therefore be simple, known to everyone, and applicable without the need for constant guidance.

59- Most activities, especially the defense against nuclear attacks, will be routine. Therefore, they must be known to everyone and mentioned in the regular working procedures.

Alternative Headquarters

60- Losing control of the entire battlefield would be a critical [*blow*] should the enemy succeed in carrying out nuclear attacks on the headquarters. This highlights the need to establish alternative headquarters at the brigade level and higher.

61- In the brigade, one of the regiments or battalions headquarters may be selected as the brigade's alternative headquarters, while in the division, one of the brigades or artillery headquarters may be selected as the alternative headquarters.

62- The location of the artillery headquarters must be selected near the main headquarters whenever possible.

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The artillery commander or the battalion commander remains with the division or the brigade commander, and an officer will be assigned to work in the movements' [*staff*] room.

63- Headquarters' associates who are not required to be in the same area as part of the regiment signal [*corps*] must be an independent group in a place somewhat far from the headquarters.

64- **Command in Alternative Headquarters**

At all levels, a deputy commander must be appointed, and if he is not the one assigned to be the commander in the alternative headquarters, the senior officer will be in control until the appointed commander assumes responsibility.

The Movement

65- Controlling the movement is going to be one of the most important tasks of the staff personnel in the nuclear battlefield. Because of advanced nuclear scan equipment, it is no longer possible to rely on the night movement, as it was in the past. Therefore, vehicles must move either individually or in a 4-5 vehicle group for the entire 24 hour period.

66- Units move in groups from one hideaway to another through the routes assigned to them and within the specified timings. Because of the presence of reserves at a faraway distance in the rear, moving them to the front when the situation requires it must be done according to an integrated plan.

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All efforts must also be made to improve the mobility of the forces outside the routes.

Movement [*Staff*] Orders

67- Additional details that must be included in the Movement [*Staff's*] orders issued under nuclear circumstances are explained in Appendix (F).

Conclusion

68- The emergence of nuclear weapons had a great role in bringing forward new components and impacting elements in war, which the commander and his staff personnel must take into consideration at every phase of the plan's execution. The staff personnel must make sure that information gathering and cooperation are not only available to the commander, but [*are*] also quick and accurate. In addition, the staff personnel must make sure to take all measures to minimize the rate of losses and the amount of damage to our troops because of the counter-attacks and equally [*because of*] friendly attacks and that in case of a counter-attack, the formation is capable of recovering its combat capability as quickly as possible.

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Chapter 2

Essence of Nuclear War

General

69- The gigantic destructive power of nuclear weapons and their capabilities to create barriers over vast areas form strict limitations on the mobility and maneuverability of ground forces. The use of these weapons in war creates new and unusual conditions on top of the consequences that affect the nature of military movements of the corps. The new nuclear conditions are different and vary based on the standards of the use of nuclear weapons that are categorized as follows:

A- The standard of unlimited use of nuclear weapons.
B- The standard of medium use of nuclear weapons.
C- The possibility of using nuclear weapons in non-efficient nuclear conditions.

70- As the war develops, it is possible for the fighting troops to face any of these conditions during the different phases of the battle. For instance, it might be a non-nuclear war at the beginning,

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but it will turn into a nuclear war at certain phases, or the war might start with the standard of unlimited use of nuclear weapons but turn into a situation where a limited number of weapons is used when the capability of both fighting parties to produce and deliver nuclear weapons decreases.

The Standard of Unlimited Use of Nuclear Weapons

71- The two strong blocs [*US and USSR*] that possess enough nuclear stock to destroy one another with supersonic delivery means are able to, unless they voluntarily refrain from using nuclear weapons with limited standard, in [*a*] few hours destroy cities, factories, mines, production centers, military equipment warehouses, and communications, etcetera, that are in the territories of both parties. This destruction also applies to the military troops on the battlefield, although some of them may escape as a result of deployment and other protective measures taken. What is left on the battleground in the first couple of days after [*such an attack*] are two destroyed powers that will be difficult to save or reinforce.

72- As soon as the preliminary nuclear bombing exchange on the targets deep in the territories of both fighting countries ends, the fighting groups enter the power recovery phase, where all efforts must be focused on recovering the effectiveness of vital targets as quickly as possible.

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At the same time, measures must be taken to hinder the enemy's process to [*re*]build his forces through continuous attacks. Once the nation is done rebuilding with the required capability, it will refocus its efforts toward winning the war.

73- The results of nuclear weapons explosion and the remaining rays and fallout, have a great impact on forming barriers in the battlefield. These barriers may be built according to a plan set by one or both fighting parties. A state of nuclear saturation over vast areas can also be created through the unlimited use of nuclear weapons. When the number and caliber of nuclear weapons used in the battlefield increase, the ability of assault troops to maneuver will be identified to the extent where their importance becomes irrelevant. Under these circumstances, the high priority work of the armed forces might be survival and after that, whenever possible, exploitation of the nuclear superiority.

74- Under these circumstances, the battle shall be entirely defined within the offensive/defensive framework, where once both forces achieve contact following a short preliminary advance, the defensive party is going to find itself facing a barrier, or it will build a barrier with the intention to enter behind it in a hideaway and not in a defense location. The only purpose of this hideaway is to avoid being discovered by the enemy's monitoring and exposed to destruction because of the use of nuclear weapons.

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This hideaway is 48 kilometers behind the barrier that the troops had built for this purpose, thereby minimizing the enemy's chances to successfully discover the troops.

75- Screens used at the barrier line may be equipped with scan systems to detect the movements of the enemy and its concentrations. In addition, all means available on both sides of the barrier will focus on gathering information, on spotting the locations of the enemy, and monitoring its movements. The following means can be [*utilized*]: continuous aerial reconnaissance, photographic reconnaissance, controlled television photography, groups left behind the enemy, agents, etcetera.

76- The force trying to advance through this barrier is going to find itself limited by crossing the barrier and overcoming it. This will give defensive troops a chance to stop the force or hinder its movement. Once the defensive party succeeds in spotting and stopping the enemy, it might launch an immediate attack with nuclear weapons to isolate and destroy the enemy's forces on both sides of the barrier. After that, the force [*located*] in shelters or a part of it will launch a quick sweep to eliminate whatever is left of the enemy on the side of the barrier facing our troops and to recover the screens.

77- In such circumstances, it is possible to maneuver using small and mobile forces, which, through the surprise and quick movement,

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gain territory to hide behind another barrier or a chain of barriers farther toward the front. However, such movements may lead to a possible exposure and destruction, which does not encourage the commanders to carry out many of them [*movements*].

78- The phase of exploiting nuclear superiority achieved by one of the forces may be mainly by the airborne troops that control major intersections, until the ground troops accomplish their task of destroying the blocked enemy.

79- In circumstances of unlimited use of nuclear weapons, it is suitable for the party who lost the maneuvering capability to refrain from carrying out its traditional role in war. In addition, the destructive impact of the unlimited use of nuclear weapons that cause a high rate of losses among the troops and civilian groups of both parties, whether it is on the battlefield or outside it, may be a tool to stop the use of nuclear weapons, as any one of these powers will not want to accept such losses.

80- Therefore, it is not possible to use nuclear weapons without restrictions after that [*attack*], but rather [*it is necessary to*] impose some limitations on it. Limitations may include identifying the geographic areas where practicing nuclear activities is allowed

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or confirming the maximum number of nuclear weapons that may be used in the form of aerial explosion only.

The Standard of Medium Use of Nuclear Weapons

81- Under circumstances of the standard of medium use of nuclear weapons, maneuvering will be controlled in general. This phase may emerge as the result of restrictions imposed on the use of nuclear weapons, or the shortage in stock resulting from use, destruction, or lack of production. The troops that regain their maneuvering capability can carry out their traditional role under the circumstances of the standard of medium use of nuclear weapons.

82- In general, nuclear and non-nuclear firing is used to support maneuvering; however, under the circumstances of the standard of medium use of nuclear weapons, the relation between the maneuvering and firing support may change to the maximum, where firing would control maneuvering that supports the firing force.

83- Under these circumstances, nuclear firing is usually used in the same manner and for the same purpose as non-nuclear firing was used for. In both defensive and offensive movements, it will be necessary to take into consideration the increase in the mobility, deployment, the use of small mobile forces with striking capability, and relying on the independent or semi-independent movements taking place over vast areas.

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As for armor, they might be used on a larger scale due to their capability to move, their firing power, and the partial protection they provide against nuclear impacts. Even as small forces, they might possess nuclear firing power.

84- However, the essence of the battle will be similar to the past conventional concept. Like other artillery firing, nuclear firing will be used to destroy or paralyze hostile locations, hinder or thwart the enemy's attempt to recover its combat capability, inflict losses and stop the attacks, and facilitate the penetration of friendly troops or maneuvers on the wings [*flanks*]. Maneuvering will also be necessary to locate, stop, and destroy the enemy's forces. However, the difference is that the available level of firing will enable the troops to carry out the penetration operations with a faster [*speed*] and deeper range than before.

Inefficient Nuclear Circumstances

85- Usually, there is no clear distinction between a nuclear and non-nuclear war. As long as one of both fighting camps possesses nuclear weapons, the threat of using them continues.

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This threat or the potential use will create and maintain the same circumstances in the inefficient battlefield, as is the case in the efficient nuclear battlefield characterized by large fronts and deep defense against farther targets for offensive and mobile striking forces fighting with fierceness and maneuverability, in order to achieve maximum benefits.

86- Even if nuclear weapons are not used in the battle, the commander will still possess a number of non-nuclear weapons of high destructive range and power even if they are not equal to that of nuclear weapons, such as guided missiles and free flight missiles loaded with a high explosive charge.

87- During efficient nuclear circumstances, both parties will resort to the use of nuclear and non-nuclear weapons equally.

88- It is hard to predict, even roughly, the standard of nuclear weapons used in this broad range of circumstances faced in future war. The main form of war may be an exchange of nuclear weapons between both parties trying to survive by relying on concealment and evasive maneuvers (attack and retreat activities). At the same time, efforts are made to stop the opponent from maneuvering. Nuclear weapons may alone control the battlefield, while mobile troops exploit the success that nuclear firing achieved.

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As an alternative, the army that uses nuclear weapons to support its maneuvers may carry out the movements in their traditional role.

89- For these reasons, troops must train in order to fight in such circumstances that require the maximum level of skills and competence to win the war.

Other Factors

Potential Important Nuclear Targets

90- The range and destructive power that characterize nuclear weapons will turn the interdiction process into a faster and more efficient [*process*] than before. The administrative echelons will be forced to work under a tremendous amount of pressure and rely mostly on aerial [*re*]supply. The key targets, which the enemy will make his best efforts to locate and destroy by nuclear attacks, are the nuclear weapons launching systems and armored formations.

91- Since the impact of nuclear weapons can also hinder the movement of friendly troops, using them in offensive movements must be appropriate and accurate.

92- **Command**

The conventional form of command will mostly be adopting decentralization while giving greater responsibilities to subordinate commanders.

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In addition, and to benefit from the sudden and violent changes resulting from the use of nuclear weapons, the commander must be capable of moving from the battlefield to sensitive areas [*moving*] at the required speed. Also, headquarters will be separated without changes and deployed over vast areas.

93- **The Land**

Controlling barriers will be possible targets of nuclear weapons and easily destroyed. Territory like this will sustain its tactical importance due to the monitoring it provides. Barriers will also be important because they force the enemy's force to divide and stop for a period of time that is [*long*] enough to launch an attack on [*the barrier*] with nuclear weapons.

94- **Reserves**

In tactical battles, nuclear weapons will represent a valuable reserve for the commander, through which he will be able to control the course of events. Large reserves of nuclear weapons will minimize the need for strong reserve units.

95- **The Air Force**

When exchanging the preliminary bombing, the air force will be among the high priority targets for the counter nuclear attacks.

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Once both parties recover their combat capability, their main duty will be destroying the nuclear weapons launching systems and achieving and maintaining suitable air superiority. It is doubtful that the close air support will be available in the early stages of the battle. Also, all efforts must be made to provide the appropriate reconnaissance resources, to obtain the required information about the target.

96- **Administrative Affairs**

During the preliminary phase of unlimited nuclear war, the destruction level is going to be high to the extent that it will be hard to move the supply materials, and rely on the regular communications lines for maintenance purposes. If aerial [*re*]supply is not available, formations will be forced to withdraw to their reserve stock that will be big and stored in suitable places. To face this, it is necessary to adopt any suitable means without being restricted by a particular form.

97- **Morale**

The morale factor is going to be extremely important in the nuclear war. The following issues will have a great impact on the morale:

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A- The destructive impact of nuclear weapons.
B- The large number of losses.
C- The fear of radiation.
D- Deployment.
E- Isolation and possible impact of our weapons.

The following points will help maintaining the morale:

A- Command
B- Discipline
C- Training
D- Education
E- Faithfulness

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Chapter Three
Security of the Back Area and Control of Destruction

Destruction

General

98- In modern war, the threat resulting from the enemy's activities to intervene in the administrative support will have more of an impact than it had in the past. The presence of large fronts and big gaps between the formations and fighting units increases the weakness of rear areas to the threat of the movements of guerilla forces, airborne troops, and infiltrators, which require more emphasis on the security of these areas. Long-range deadly weapons and chemical and nuclear attacks can cause big losses that must be reduced by taking the appropriate security measures.

Security of the Rear Area

General

99- The purpose of the movements related to the rear area security is to reduce the danger resulting from the enemy's activities that affect the administrative support, such as the raids of airborne troops and the work of guerillas and infiltrators.

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100- The main threats that can be addressed against security are:

A- The ground activities, including reconnaissance, firing, ground forces' attacks, infiltration, guerillas, supporters [partisans], and airborne forces.
B- The aerial activities, including reconnaissance, bombing, and ground attack.
C- Spying, sabotage, and surveillance.
D- Psychological warfare.

101- The main requirements to counter these threats are:

A- Continuous reconnaissance.
B- Good alarm system.
C- Efficient communications.
D- Timely reaction.
E- Available resources for quick action.
F- Deception, cover, and concealment.
G- Barriers and mines.
H- Controlling civilians.

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Responsibility

102- Usually, services are responsible for the security of units and related installations. In some cases, it might be necessary to provide help to units like these, especially when securing additional units.

103- Coordinating and organizing the security of the rear of any area is the responsibility of the formation assigned with this task. In some cases, the area might be divided into sectors, and commanders are appointed to coordinate the security issue of these sectors.

104- The threat of the enemy may develop in an area to a degree that exceeds the capabilities available in that area, or might form a threat to the entire army or corps command. In this case, the entire formation would participate in the defense against this threat; yet these movements do not fall under the definition of the rear area security.

Planning

105- Plans related to the rear area security shall be prepared by the related units and formations. Plans will be based on the intelligence report on the capabilities of the enemy and his potential activities. The plans include the following:

A- Coordinating with the local security of installations and units and dividing the area into sectors when necessary.
B- Road patrols and convoy protection.
C- Monitoring the potential bases for the guerillas and infiltrators' movements.

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D- Depriving the enemy of potential landing areas and aircraft landing areas.
E- Rescuing the installations and units attacked, as well as the alternative method to continue the supply [*of materials*].
F- The alarm system, communications, reports, and their submitting method.
G- Deception and counterintelligence.
H- Barriers related procedure.
I- Control of civilians.
J- Friendly forces available and their capabilities.
K- Orders related to finding the location, formation, and destructive power of the enemy's forces active in the area.

Forces Available

106- The only force that is usually available in the area is the one formed of administrative units. In addition to it, the reserve units and reinforcements might be present, and in some areas and emergency cases, units passing in the area might be assigned to carry out this duty after obtaining the commander's approval.

107- It is necessary to train and prepare all individuals of different ranks at the service units in order to engage in an efficient and coordinated battle against the airborne troops, infiltrators, and guerillas, etcetera, and destroy them. Also, plans to train and use local troops in the area to carry out this duty must be drawn up.

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Destruction Control of the Area

General

108- Controlling the area of destruction includes taking these measures to minimize the instant impacts of mass destruction, or the destruction resulting from natural disasters, and then the restoration of the combat capability and administrative support for affected troops. These measures are applied toward the fighting units and administrative installations equally.

109- One of the most important conditions required to recover the administrative support capability as soon as the enemy attacks the administrative installations is the availability of quick and accurate information on the warehouses and equipment affected by the attack, and the stock situation of the [*troop*] formation. In case there is any damaged equipment, it must be repaired or replaced, while warehouses that are not fully equipped will be replenished.

Responsibility

110- Controlling destruction is, to some extent, the responsibility of the unit commander.

111- Anyway, in case of excessive destruction, help will be requested from other units. At that time, the formation will be responsible for organizing and arranging the operation.

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Planning

112- Considerations directing the control of the area destruction can be narrowed to two parts:

A- **Part one**
Includes the measures taken to minimize or prevent the impact resulting from the counter attack development.

B- **Part two**
Are the measures taken after the attack or disaster to recover control of the equipment

and living individuals and to isolate the critical areas, in addition to stopping more destruction from happening?

113- **Part One**

Plans of the first phase of movement include the orders related to the following:

A- Assigning all units with duties and responsibilities.
B- Communications and alarm system, including the fallout alarm.
C- Correct deployment among and within the units. This must be planned and checked constantly.
D- Regular action procedures of the formation and unit.

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E- Organizing, preparing, and training all individuals regarding the tasks to control destruction.
F- Covering and concealment.
G- Alternative plans to overcome the firing support obstructions resulting from the destruction occurring in any unit.

114- **Part Two**

The first phase can be mainly summarized in the planning, preparations, and positive measures, while the second phase includes the actual movements following the counter attack. The orders of this phase include the following:

A- The methods and actions taken to have quick assessment of destruction and its impact on the administrative support.
B- Controlling the traffic.
C- Preventing and fighting fires.
D- First aid and evacuation of losses.
E- Protection against chemical and biological contaminations and radiation risks.
F- Emergency [*re*]supply and preparation of food materials, clothes, and water.
G- Saving equipment.

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H- Assigning the units to carry out the duties of those attacked.

Available Forces

115- The headquarters in charge in the area shall identify the units that require help, as well as allocating the resources to provide help. All units in the area must be trained and prepared to provide help to other units. These units shall be mentioned in the orders issued from the headquarters in charge.

The Group Controlling the Area Destruction

116- The control of destruction or the attack is done by the group in charge of damage control; the group will be provided by the closest unit to the area. This group will be in charge of supervising the measures to control damage in the area. The group in charge of destruction control will be provided by all units including the administrative ones and their headquarters, in particular.

117- The damage control group consists of a commander with the rank of officer along with 1-2 assistant officers, in addition to an appropriate number of other ranks in order to accomplish the group's duties. The damage control group's duties are the following:

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A- Identifying and establishing the group's headquarters.
B- Evaluating the destruction and the nature and type of help required.
C- Leading all damage control detachments.
D- Supervising all damage control measures in the area.
E- Preparing and supplying food materials, water, and clothes in case of emergency.
F- Coordinating the evacuation and treatment of casualties.

118- The structure of the group controlling damage in the area shall be mentioned in the regular work procedures, along with the type of unit that will form the group. In addition to the individuals mentioned in Article 20, this group must include an officer doctor, an officer from the chemical corps and military engineering, along with a representative from the mechanical engineering. The destruction control group shall immediately head to the incident location should a disaster happen or should the enemy attack. The responsibility to send these groups to the enemy's potential targets and important installations must be identified in advance. This can be done by early reconnaissance and planning.

Detachments Controlling Damage in the Area

119- Detachments from all units shall be assigned to provide help in controlling the damage.

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The power of these detachments depends on the size of units from which they are taken. Upon receipt of the damage control group commander's request, some detachments are sent

to the damage location. These detachments will inform the damage control command headquarters upon their arrival. Duties of these detachments include the following:

A- Traffic control.
B- Fire fighting.
C- First aid and evacuation of casualties.
D- Rescue operations.
E- Identifying prohibited contaminated areas.

Works and Pre-Strike Analysis

120- The time of response and reactions to the post-counter attack work must be reduced to the minimum. This can be possible if the damage control plans are built on the information available on the general weakness points in the installations and units toward the enemy's nuclear weapons. Therefore, it will be necessary to have a system that will evaluate the pre-strike fallout.

121- The information obtained from the process of evaluating the pre-strike fallout facilitates the drawing of alternative plans for the [*re*]supply, selecting evacuation routes and scan paths, communications maintenance, and other control measures, in general.

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Radiation Scan and the After-Strike Analysis

122- Immediately after the attack takes place, the decision about the likelihood of having [*nuclear*] fallout will be analyzed. The direction of the contamination cloud must be identified in case there is fallout.

123- Based on the fallout plan, units and installations that are within the contamination range area will be alarmed, so that they can take cover required for protection or evacuation from the area. This information is also used by the damage control group while accomplishing their duty. In this case, the headquarters will be responsible for identifying the contaminated area, controlling the traffic, and stopping people from entering the danger zone.

125- The information obtained about the after-strike fallout estimate is incomplete; therefore, it must be verified as soon as possible through the radiation scan. In order to do a radiation scan, all units in the area must be trained to use the radiation detection systems.

126- In order to protect the damage control detachments and groups from the radiation contamination risk, radiation monitoring must be done before these groups start their work and provide them with the radiation gauges.

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Chapter Four
Defense Movements

Defense

Purpose

127- Defense is one of the combat phases that take place for a period of time by the party looking for:

A- Circumstances that are most suitable for carrying out the offensive action.
B- Economy of force in a certain area in order to use a larger force in another area.
C- Trying to destroy or trap the enemy, or minimize its capability to launch offensive activity.

Mission

128- The mission assigned to the defensive force may be for the purpose of stopping the enemy from seizing vital territory, or to protect the flanks or to repulse the enemy's force and exhaust its power, or to hinder its organizational process in preparation for carrying out the counter-attack.

General Considerations

129- Under the circumstances of nuclear war, it will be difficult in many cases to distinguish defensive from offensive movements except for slight differences.

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Planned switching from offense to defense will be the most common form of nuclear movement. In addition, defensive [*troop*] movements are more offensive by nature through the attack and deception actions and firing that the defensive force elements practice. This way, the defensive movements based on deception might be more preferable than the offensive movements to destroy the enemy.

130- In defensive movements, the defender will try to find and maintain a certain level of initiative. Therefore, he [*the defender*] selects the battle location and tries to force the enemy to act according to its plan. Nuclear weapons will provide the defender with the main tools to change the relative force of both fighting parties and gain initiative as quickly as possible.

131- The defensive [*movements*] characterized as being offensive will be more necessary in the future to seize opportunities and destroy the enemy. The area to be defended will be in a state that allows the commander to get maximum benefit from using his weapons with the least requirements of ground features that must be controlled. In movements where nuclear

weapons are used, defensive troops might be more directed toward controlling an area than being required to control ground features. Yet, there are important defensive features, for the most part, that must be controlled by special components, on the condition that this takes place within the general concept of the mobile form of defense.

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Main Requirements

132- The main requirements of traditional defense will remain in effect under nuclear war conditions, with the possibility to emphasize them more in certain cases. With the increase of deployment, deep penetrations of the defensive area will be repeated, which requires more depth to absorb the enemy's attack. As for the exchanged support, it is going to be necessary to stop and block the enemy in certain areas, in preparation for destroying it with nuclear weapons. Achieving an exchanged support between the widely spread defensive areas is going to be difficult, of course. In order to overcome the disadvantage of deployment, the need to establish alternative locations emerges. As for controlling the infiltration and frequent penetrations, the defense in all directions will be of great significance. The offensive's ability to work and reserves for both nuclear weapons and troops that [*can*] take advantage of the enemy's weakness and gain initiative will be another important matter.

133- **Security**
In defense, measures must be taken to obtain an early alarm and information on the enemy, to deceive him, stop his advance, and destroy him so that he cannot intervene in the administrative support process.

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134- **Coordination**
In order to confine the attack, coordination will take place between the barrier plan, which includes natural barriers, mine fields, and radiation barriers, and the defensive plan. Detailed firing plans must be also drawn to disperse and hinder the enemy's attacks supporting the counter-attacks.

135- **Flexibility**
The defender must be extremely flexible by being already prepared for the swift exchange process of the defensive forces and by keeping as many nuclear weapons and troops as possible in reserve to be used at the decisive moment.

Forms of Defense

136- **General**

There are two main forms of defense: position defense that is based on controlling the land, and mobile defense that depends on firing and movement to achieve the goal of defense. As for the land, it is used when the need for gaining some tactical advantages emerges.

137- **Position Defense**

When there is a need to control a certain territory [*position*], troops will be divided and firing is arranged so that the attacker will be stopped within the defensive location, and the enemy's attack will be thwarted through the counter-attack.

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Strong troops will open in the front areas of the location, to secure the control of these areas. The land will be controlled by relying on the defensive locations. In nuclear war circumstances, the important land may be strongly controlled prior to the counter-attack, and sometimes this may not happen. In order to prevent losses resulting from the hostile nuclear attacks, few troops will be placed deep in the locations [*enemy territory*], after being fully prepared. These locations will be occupied by the troops that are in shelters after the counter-attack develops. Controlling barriers and lands will be extremely beneficial to the reinforcement of the defensive location. As for the reserves, they provide depth to the location and [*the ability to*] stop the infiltration of the enemy, carry out the counter-attack, and recover the location. Appendix (G) offers an example of the position defense arrangement.

138- The characteristics of defensive position strengthen the nearby locations that complete the defensive location. It is preferable to adopt the following form of defense when:

A- The nature of the terrain does not help conducting the maneuver.
B- Mobility of the troops is limited, such as when infantry is the prevailing element.
C- The enemy's air force limits troop movement.
D- Time is available to organize the defense.

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E- Suitable mobile reserves of high levels are available to recover or exploit opportune situations.

139- The weakness of troops in the defensive position toward the enemy's nuclear attacks represents an unusual factor that may determine the adoption of such defensive positions. Except in the case of low standards for the use of nuclear weapons or in inefficient nuclear

circumstances, it is necessary to use precaution when organizing the defensive locations, so that the effect of nuclear weapons will be reduced, while providing an exchanged support and defense in all directions.

140- **Mobile Defense**

In the mobile defense, a large part of the force will be kept in the rear as a mobile striking force, while the remaining part will be placed in the defensive front [*forward*] positions. The defensive position may consist of strong points or widely spread areas exchanging support among each other. These areas, along with small mobile forces, will stop and block enemy infiltration in the area. After that, the mobile striking force will destroy the enemy. Appendix (H) gives an example of the mobile defense.

141- In this case, defensive locations will be selected in areas that allow for blocking and stopping the counter-attacks, while facilitating the maneuverability of the mobile striking force.

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The positions will also be organized in a way to provide defense in all directions. These locations must be vast enough for a regiment or tank battalion to establish a defense. Areas between the widely-spread regions will be controlled by small mobile forces, listening posts, and patrols, where the mobile forces hinder the enemy's advance using the delaying combat [*tactics*], while the listening posts will be used to give information on the enemy. The small mobile force might be the size of a company or something equivalent.

142- It will be preferable to resort to the mobile defense in the following cases:

A- When there is sufficient depth [*area*] to run the battle.
B- The terrain is suitable for maneuvering.
C- The mobility of our troops is equal or even better than the enemy's.
D- The air status [*situation*] allows for movements.
E- There is not enough time to take a defensive position.
F- The enemy has the capability to use a large number of nuclear weapons.

143- The armored division is a suitable formation to run this type of defense.

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144- In the mobile defense, and frequently in the defensive position, centers of resistance which the enemy crosses and surrounds must be capable of resisting and putting pressure on the enemy until they receive reinforcements.

145- **Differences**

There are no clear differences between the position [*static*] and mobile defense, and most movements fall under either one of these two forms.

Maneuvering in Defense

146- Maneuvering in defense takes different forms, including thwarting attacks, counter-attacking, infiltration resistance, and mobile forces occupying the prepared defensive locations or elements from the defending force that are fighting in alternate positions. Thwarting and counter-attacking are necessary to take advantage of the nuclear firing support. Also, firing and maneuvering must be used according to an appropriate coordination at the time of execution.

Firing Plans

147- There will be planning for the firing of nuclear and non-nuclear weapons to kill the enemy's attacks and support our counter-attacks.

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Therefore, there will be coordination between the barriers plan and firing plan. Both of the nuclear and non-nuclear firing must be used on targets that are most suitable for their characteristics.

148- Obtaining information on the target in a continuously offensive manner is necessary to provide timely information on the successful use of nuclear weapons against the attacking enemy. Plans are built on targets that are extracted based on the assessment of the enemy's capabilities and potential work methods.

149- **Air Support**

The main task of the air support will be to obtain a suitable aerial control [*superiority*] and stop the counter [*opposing*] air force from intervening in the reserves' movement. Planning for the execution of close air support in an integrated manner with the firing plan must be done whenever possible.

Organizing the Defense

150- The position defense consists of the following three regular echelons: covering troops, main defensive position, and reserves. In this case, the majority of troops may be used, of course, to occupy the main position and secure its direction. This will be followed by the decrease of the force assigned to be the reserve duty, which will be completed by nuclear firing. The general arrangement and organization of the main position and other components must be done with enough details to accomplish the intelligence process.

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151- In nuclear circumstances, and in addition to the regular role of the covering troops, their main role will be to detect and identify the locations of nuclear targets. Some components of the covering troops will be assigned to work, such as the groups left behind the enemy, on getting information on the enemy. The firing support that includes nuclear weapons will be available to the covering troops in order to engage the located targets.
152- The main position will be organized as a chain of defensive areas that are selected based on reconnaissance and considerations of natural barriers, in order to cover the approaches while using the natural and artificial barriers for this purpose to the maximum extent. The duty of the troops in the main position is to disperse, repulse, and stop the counter attack.
153- Reserves are used to launch the counter-attack, hold a deep position, and reinforce the locations or resist infiltration. Also, pre-plans must be prepared to handle all unexpected situations.
154- In most cases, the mobile defense is organized on the line of a natural or artificial barrier. Covering troops deploy before the barrier line.

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Within this defensive zone, the land shall be controlled to defend against an enemy's counter-attack or to cover the axes for the counter-attacking troops. The land between these locations will be controlled by small mobile forces, patrols, mobile observation posts, etcetera. At the time, the troops occupying the defensive locations control the land, mobile forces, patrols, and mobile observation posts, and they engage in delaying combat under the pressure of the enemy, conducting monitoring, and obtaining information.
155- In light of the information obtained by the mobile forces and observation posts, targets will be attacked with nuclear weapons in order to isolate the enemy and inflict losses upon it. The mobile striking force in the rear moves in order to take advantage of the impact of this firing, destroying the infiltrated enemy and then recovering the original [*defensive*] line.

Planning

156- For this matter, factors related to the mission, land, enemy, our position and relative mobility, etcetera, are going to be necessary to reach a sound plan. The relative nuclear force must also form a prominent factor in the process of evaluating the significance of the mentioned factors. As for the procedure adopted in drawing plans, it remains as it is without changes.

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157- There will be planning for the use of firing support to destroy the enemy's forces, coercion to make them stop, and support for the counter-attacks. The decision related to the long-range firing, nuclear firing in particular, or postponing the launching process, in order to achieve the highest level of surprise and impact within a close-range, will be important and must be taken [*into consideration*] for each case separately by the commander.

158- Obtaining information on the target is going to be more difficult in defensive operations despite their importance because the defenders do not have the initiative, and they lack reconnaissance and air support. Therefore, we must benefit from the means available for this purpose as much as possible. Night surveillance equipment can be used to implement the security measures along the entire front. In addition, patrols and surveillance sites are used to cover the gaps. In most cases, the commander's expertise and his accurate conception of the battle provide an appropriate tool for the targets that are in different areas, and to adjust the nuclear firing used against these targets.

159- The counter-attack plan will be prepared to face all potential enemy attacks. During the counter-attack, firing plans will be drawn to isolate the enemy's forces, to inflict losses on them, to stop the aid from arriving, and to retreat.

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Nuclear firing plans will be prepared to destroy the enemy that has infiltrated the defensive areas, taking into consideration the safety of troops and the remaining radiation, so that it does not hinder the counter-attack movements. Also, the counter-attacks are launched with nuclear weapons only. Appendix (I) explains the method of counter attack at the division level.

160- If the use of chemical and biological weapons is necessary, it will be coordinated with the barriers plan, firing plan, and counter-attack plans.

Running the Battle

161- Among the most important factors in the success of the defensive battle is providing information on the enemy: its potential force, structure, and direction and time of its attack. Also, the continuous offensive reconnaissance, which includes aerial reconnaissance, the use of guerillas, groups left behind the enemy, and long-range patrols are going to be necessary to obtain timely and accurate information.

162- If the surprise [*attack*] does not grant a better chance for success, firing shall be opened on the enemy's attacking forces by aircraft and long-range weapons as early as possible. The enemy's headquarters, artillery, located weapons launching systems, and its [*troop*] concentrations will be targets for this firing.

163- Once the location and direction of the enemy's attack are identified, troops will be moved to face the threat. Reserves that were assigned to occupy the deep locations, who were until

then in shelters, will move toward the pre-selected and prepared positions. The enemy's attack will be repulsed and dispersed by launching counterattacks whenever suitable.

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164- As soon as they get the chance, troops occupying the main defensive position will use nuclear weapons on pre-selected areas suitable for destruction, thereby inflicting losses on the enemy, which will be forced to halt [*its offensive*]. Repelling and blocking the enemy can be facilitated by using barriers within the area allowed for the infiltration of the enemy, occupying prepared positions, destructions [*sabotage*], [*nuclear*] firings, and counter-attacks.

165- To prevent the dispersion of fire power and reserves, it may be possible to allow the enemy's plans to infiltrate and reach the heart of the [*defensive*] positions according to the plans designed for the infiltrated enemy. This will help determine the locations of the enemy and its force that will subsequently be destroyed by the counter-attacks supported by nuclear firing. In any case, counter-attacks like these must not be delayed to the point where the enemy is able to organize its force, and destroying it will not be within the reserves' capabilities of nuclear weapons and troops.

166- Local counter-attacks may be used to repulse and block the enemy and create the appropriate conditions for the main counter-attack. When nuclear weapons are used toward the infiltrated enemy, all units in direct contact with the enemy shall switch quickly from the defensive to offensive position, making every effort to put pressure on the enemy blocked in all directions, to destroy him and to recover the lost land.

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167- As soon as the counter-attack is launched, it must be done quickly and violently to make sure the enemy is destroyed. Also, the force used to carry out the counter-attack must be capable of destroying the enemy in any situation that the force may face. Final coordination will be necessary for the counter-attack, and troops in the counter-attack area are usually placed under the control of one commander who will be responsible for making the decision for these troops to approach the enemy. Whenever possible, the counter-attack force commander will launch his attack toward the shoulders or flanks of the enemy's penetrating force. In case nuclear weapons are available and used, they may be launched on the front targets. Ground targets of the counter attack force will be selected.

168- If several penetrations occur to a large front defensive position, the reserve must be prepared to cut the contact immediately after launching the counter-attack and be ready to attack in another area.

Other Defense Requirements

169- The nuclear battlefield creates suitable conditions for the movement of airborne troops, guerillas, and infiltrators. The efficient use of these movements by the enemy will have a decisive impact on any unprepared force.

170- Plans to protect the rear areas in the direction of these threats must be prepared. For this purpose, all available forces including the administrative units, loyal supporters, popular army forces, and civil defense must be mobilized.

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The nature of such threats often requires the presence of forces with high mobility. Plans required to defend the installations and administrative area must also be provided. Once the enemy's location is identified, these forces will deter the enemy and then destroy him with a decisive action.

171- Using airborne troops, including forces transported in helicopters, is going to be the prevailing form of aerial tactics in the future. For this reason, the fighter must take into consideration that the enemy may possibly use airborne troops and prepare his forces to counter the resulting threats. The fighter shall use, whenever possible, nuclear weapons to destroy such forces or support the counter-attacks that will be launched.

172- Mountainous regions limit mobility, minimize the impact of firing power, and make communications or [*re*]supply more difficult. Nuclear and chemical weapons can be used in mountainous regions to limit the mobility there.

173- Defense in the direction of nuclear weapons in mountainous regions is more difficult than it is in open land, where deployment is limited due to the lack of routes and tracks. It is also difficult to establish trenches and other field defenses to protect against nuclear impacts, as the land is rocky for the most part.

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174- In mountainous regions, weather conditions characterized by high winds lead to the irregularity of fallout residues. Natural shelters such as caves, sharp slopes, and deep cracks provide covers suitable for protection against radiation and fallout. The position shall not be left, in order to avoid the fallout before finishing the scan of the area.

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Withdrawal

General

175- **Purpose**

Troops may coercively or voluntarily withdraw for the following reasons:

A- To get rid of or avoid fighting in unfavorable conditions.
B- To drag the enemy into an unsuitable position.
C- To gain time.
D- To give the chance of using forces in other areas.

176- In nuclear circumstances, certain forms of defensive maneuvers designed to inflict losses on the enemy may take place during mobile movements of great depth, by relying on the maneuvering capability of the force and the release of nuclear weapons in the first place. Such movements may be called the delay defense.

Basic Requirements

177- The main requirements of withdrawal will remain as they are. Secrecy and security will have extreme significance for a successful withdrawal. Although it may not always be possible, it would also be preferable for the withdrawing forces to have mobility equal to, if not more, than that of the enemy.

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All available forms of movement must be used to the utmost. Helicopters and other aircraft are used to secure quick withdrawal for the troops and evacuate the equipment and supplies.

Destructions and Barriers

178- Nuclear weapons can create wide barriers and deep holes, not to mention the radiation and areas covered with fallout. There must be coordination for the use of these barriers at the highest levels, taking into consideration the possibility of our troops carrying out counter-offensive operations.

179- To trap the withdrawing forces, the enemy may also set these barriers at the rear of these forces. In order to overcome these barriers, equipment specific to these barriers must be placed in the appropriate locations in addition to taking into consideration and planning for withdrawal via alternate routes. Even though these barriers can be crossed by tanks and armored personnel carriers, in many cases the airborne movement is the most likely scenario.

Planning and Execution

180- Withdrawal may take place at night or during the day. In any case, contact with the enemy must be maintained in order to stop him from achieving rapid advance, deceive him, and ensure security.

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In case of strong enemy pressure on the retreating troops, contact shall be cut by carrying out counter-attacks supported by traditional firing or nuclear firing alone.
The capability of cutting contact from the close engagement in a short period of time might limit the withdrawing force commander in making the decision to engage the enemy in close combat prior to withdrawal.

181- Factors that affect making the decision whether withdrawal should take place at night or during the day shall remain the same as they are in the traditional withdrawal. The procedure adopted to carry out the withdrawal itself will also remain the same as it is in traditional circumstances. However, nuclear weapons give the commander the capability to stop the enemy that is tracking the troops from approaching the withdrawing troops during the day. If this capability cannot be exploited during night withdrawal, it would be better to withdraw during the day under a great amount of the enemy's pressure.

182- When executing the medium [*defensive*] positions and while covering troops and other forces are carrying out their duties, they will find hostile targets that can be suitable for big losses and forced to use precaution if they were assigned nuclear weapons, not to mention that nuclear weapons minimize the need for troops in such positions.

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Delaying Action

183- As long as the defending forces possess a sufficient amount of nuclear weapons, they will be capable of retaining control of the positions in which they face [*the threat of*] withdrawal, and withdrawal may not be a necessary procedure for the defenders under these circumstances. However, troops often start withdrawing as a form of maneuvering to drag the enemy into an unfavorable position over an area where all of his communications are stretched, or over an area that we selected. In situations like these, or when the withdrawal of mobile troops that have sufficient amount of nuclear weapons is necessary, delaying withdrawal will be better than the traditional [*withdrawal*].

184- In a type of action like this, most of the troops will be pushed in the front areas with a decentralized control of firing, where every position will be given a certain depth. Units engage in withdrawal combat through the successive delay areas while continuing to

impose delays between these areas. Reserves and nuclear firing will be used to help the forces break contact. The entire operation represents on a large scale the action of covering troops.

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185- This type of withdrawal may be used to trap the attacker and diminish his power through attrition. When the enemy tries to penetrate the defensive area, he will be isolated and destroyed. The armored division is the best formation suitable to accomplish a battle like this. If there is a need to use the infantry division for such a duty, it must be from the mechanized infantry.

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Chapter Five
Offensive Movements
The Attack

186- **Purpose**

The purpose of the attack is to destroy the armed forces of the enemy, impose the commander's will on the enemy, or seize the areas that facilitate the development of future movements of these forces.

187- Mobilizing a sufficient force at the right time and place is considered one of the necessary requirements of the attack phase. Firing and maneuvering must also be utilized to the utmost in order to achieve the goal of the attack. Anyway, the allocated part of nuclear firing increases, in comparison to the part allocated to the maneuvering element. Offensive movements tend to be force-driven reconnaissance processes, where the main duty of the attacking troops is to find targets suitable for nuclear attacks, and exploit the nuclear firings at the time and place of using them.

The Battle Atmosphere

188- Offensive movements taking place under nuclear circumstances will definitely result in serious losses, and as long as the enemy has nuclear superiority, the attacker usually tries to carry out important duties only.

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In any case, it is better to launch an offensive once the traditional nuclear force of the enemy diminishes, by carrying out a series of defensive and successful interdiction actions. Although this cannot be done in all situations, the offensive must take place while the enemy is still incapable of securing nuclear superiority.

189- The threat resulting from the nuclear capability of the enemy will remain the reason for the main limitation imposed on the attacking troops' capability. Because of this threat, maintaining troops on the battlefield is going to be very difficult. Therefore, the attacker must do the following:

A- Reduce the nuclear power [*capabilities*] of the enemy to the minimum in the early stages of the movements.

B- Minimize the troops' exposure to the enemy's nuclear weapons, which requires having more intense nuclear weapon attacks, rather than carrying them [*conventional attacks*] out using the troops.

General Considerations

190- Offensive movements can be conceived based on time and distance factors. The attacker decides on the method of action after taking into consideration the time and distance requirements to deploy and mobilize. He might take the following two methods into consideration:

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A- Attacking by deploying over a large front, using joint forces of small mobile ground troops with high mobility and small airborne forces or helicopter airborne forces. These forces will destroy the strong points of the enemy either by firing or going behind them and then continuing to advance. The enemy's forces will split as a result of this movement and become isolated from their support, as they will be destroyed by firing after that.

B- Launching an intense attack. This type of attack requires rapid mobilization in a selected area and then deploying at the same speed after finishing a successful attack. To minimize the damage against nuclear weapons, the periods and procedures for such mobilization will be specified. To secure the execution of a quick attack, tactical transport means will be exploited to the maximum extent.

191- The attacker must move as fast as possible to exploit the situations resulting from the movements of the enemy, who is trying to acquire tactical advantages.

Key Requirements

192- The key requirements of the traditional attack will also be implemented in nuclear war circumstances with more emphasis on the following:

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A- Obtaining information on the nuclear capability of the enemy and launching methods and locations in particular.

B- Always preplanning to seize the opportunities resulting from the use of nuclear weapons. In addition to seizing targets, available troops and reserves will be assigned to exploit the benefits acquired from seizing significant targets.

C- High ground features that provide monitoring, covering, concealment, and firing fields must be controlled in the early stages of the attack, in order to provide security and facilitate future movements.

D- Achieving firing superiority and maintaining it from the early stages of the battle. Also, the attacking troops must immediately exploit the impact of nuclear and non-nuclear firing.

E- While the attack toward a part of the enemy's position is being developed, we must control as many of our troops as possible, including the reserves, and stop him [*the enemy*] from maneuvering toward the attacker or dodging and evading.
F- Allocating a large proportion of nuclear weapons to reserves, who will keep this proportion to settle the battle and snatch and exploit victory.

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G- Attacking with violence provides natural security to the attacking troops. In addition, measures must be taken toward the misleading counter-attacks of the enemy and other actions.

Fronts and Depths

193- The front must have sufficient space that allows subordinate formations and units to maneuver. The front must not be too large to the point that it requires allocating a large part of the forces to control it. Usually, formations and units fight in the form of groups in areas and sectors that rely on the nature of the land with gaps between one and another. In nuclear circumstances, targets are much deeper and will not be identified until there is a need for coordination and administrative support.

Meeting Locations

194- Even though it is possible to better organize and coordinate the attack at the meeting location even in mobile warfare circumstances, when speed becomes a necessary factor at work to maintain tactical attributes, the commander may manage without the meeting locations and entrust subordinate units with conducting the movements with a decentralized method. Efforts must also be made to benefit from the best coordination, for which having meeting locations will be more suitable and appropriate.

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It would be important under active nuclear circumstances to take into consideration the factors of camouflage, concealment, deployment, air defense, and coordinated timings in order to keep the troops in the meeting locations for the shortest amount of time.

Infiltration through the Lines

195- The requirements of active formations and units' infiltration through the front line units remain necessary. Diligence and coordination will also be necessary to make sure that friendly troops are not targets for the enemy's nuclear weapons during this operation.

Types of Maneuver during the Attack

196- All four types of maneuvers will be implemented during the attack. They are: surrounding, encircling, penetrating, and infiltrating. Usually, penetration is carried out only when the situation does not allow maneuvering by surrounding or encircling. The attacker also avoids carrying out frontal attacks when the number of nuclear weapons in his possession is limited. However, it is preferable to maneuver by penetration over the other types of maneuvers when there is a sufficient amount of nuclear weapons to find a gap in the enemy's position that allows the mobile forces to rush through it toward weak [*points of*] resistance.

197- Deployment in the nuclear battlefield creates suitable circumstances for an infiltration attack. In this type of maneuver, the infiltrating forces will launch the firing in support of the main attack along with the secondary attacks or holding attacks from the fixed base. Forces may be given [*the following commands*]:

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The attack duty, communications, supporting firing units, means to launch nuclear weapons, and to occupy vital lands or passages. In this situation, based on the distance between the forces and the enemy's troops, the weakness of infiltrating forces toward the enemy's nuclear attacks will greatly diminish.

Planning

198- Upon evaluating the situation and drawing up the plan, the commander must take into consideration the use of nuclear weapons and decide on the following:

A- The amount of nuclear weapons that the reserve must keep.
B- The targets or the types of targets that must be engaged and the desired results.
C- Safety of troops.
D- Limitation of nuclear weapons use.

199- Understanding the correct concept of nuclear weapons use is necessary to reach a prudent plan. Most efforts must be focused on the point selected as a target and the specified time to attack, along with the measures that must be taken to deceive the enemy regarding the target location to be attacked. In mobile nuclear battle conditions, doubled and balanced penetrations may equally develop to force the enemy to take shelter in a defensive position or barrier that will be destroyed by nuclear attacks.

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200- The nuclear weapons reserve provides the commander with efficient means to impact the course of movements. These reserve weapons are used to handle collision targets.
201- The planning for nuclear weapons use will be done in a timely manner where weapons are released based on a specific program, and firing is launched on demand toward the targets that may emerge at the time of the attack. In order to gain time, the allocated nuclear weapons will be ready for firing on selected targets upon demand. When planning for preliminary nuclear firing, the possibility for barriers to emerge, such as radiation, falling trees, and other debris, must be taken into consideration, as this may affect the selection of the avenues of approach.
202- Nuclear firing does not substitute for traditional firing at all; traditional firing will remain necessary, as there will be plans to use it on the targets that are attacked with nuclear weapons, and to paralyze and stop the reinforcement of targets that were attacked with these weapons. Coordination to use this type of firing will be necessary.

Running the Battle
203- All three elements of the attack: firing, maneuvering, and shock action will be properly mixed together and controlled, in order to secure more power in the decisive area and to launch strong and powerful assaults. In nuclear circumstances, when the enemy is under a lot of pressure, the major weight of the assault will come from using nuclear weapons.

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204- Before the attack, units will deploy in the rear areas, and the enemy's defenses will be subject to nuclear and non-nuclear firing and possibly chemical attacks. The assault units will rendezvous at any possible time in the meeting locations, which will be at a distance from the starting line, and mobilize until the correct time to start the attack arrives. When leaving the meeting area, the units pass by the starting line in a continuous movement without stopping. After that, the troops supported with firing or just nuclear weapons firing will penetrate the enemy's defenses or finish penetrating allowing the exploitation forces to pass through. As for the gaps [*in the line*], they will be widened and kept [*open*] by the troops.
205- The reserves will spread out in locations so that their weakness toward the nuclear attacks diminishes. At the same time, their [*forward*] deployment will be easier at the speed required.
206- As soon as the attack is launched, flexibility and speed in using the firing and troops will be of great importance. The assault units shall track closely the supporting firing, while the infantry and armor units advance toward the secondary positions using cover and concealment.

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The attack will be characterized by a series of advances and quick assaults that are carried out with the movement power and nuclear and non-nuclear firing until reaching the last target. When necessary, the weight of the attack will be moved toward the areas that offer more chances for success.

207- The firing, reserves, and, in most cases, nuclear weapons are used alone in order to maintain the attacking momentum and counter unexpected threats.

208- The assault troops will advance toward their target as quickly as possible, bypassing the enemy's [*points*] of resistance, except when they can be quickly destroyed, or when they are so strong as to the extent they hinder the development of the attack. Before making a decision on bypassing [*points*] of resistance like these, it must be taken into consideration that the assault troops may possibly get trapped in areas that form targets for the enemy's nuclear weapons.

209- The commander must always be aware of the situation, because as the attack develops, subordinate commanders will have more decentralized control to enable them to take instantaneous measures. Therefore, the idea of the commander and his plan of the battle must be well known to subordinates.

210- Immediately after occupying medium [*strength*] targets, they will be organized so that they will be used for defense. The commander will fulfill the security requirements without sacrificing the attacking momentum. The enemy's pockets of resistance will be approached under the firing cover, and they will be destroyed with quick attacks characterized by violence and good coordination.

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As an alternative, nuclear weapons can be used alone to destroy pockets [*of resistance*] like these. When the enemy's resistance is bypassed, it will be also controlled in order to destroy it. Immediately after seizing the targets [*positions*], some units will move as quickly as possible toward the preselected deployed areas, leaving the least amount of forces to control these targets [*positions*].

211- In general, the fewest possible troops will be assigned to secure targets [*positions*], using as much firing as possible. The remaining force will remain deployed and ready to continue the attack.

212- When gaps occur because of troops supported by firing or nuclear weapons alone, the exploitation troops will pass through these gaps in a fully controlled manner. Usually, the movement of the regiments or battalions takes place in the form of echelons. Such movements will be carried out better at night.

The Night Attack

213- In nuclear and air superiority conditions, night attacks will have the following disadvantages that must be taken into consideration when deciding on the time of the attack:

A- Reconnaissance cannot be conducted before the strike and a destruction assessment [*cannot be conducted*] until after the strike.

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B- The lack of close air support.
C- The difficulty in locating the enemy's nuclear weapons launching systems when firing at night. The air force will be able to identify the locations of these systems and suppress them during day time only.
D- The exposure of our troops to the flash risk and vision loss at night.

214- Infiltration will have an impact on the night movements, in particular. Also, the nuclear weapons used in the night attack will secure the occupation of targets that are in depth. It is necessary to take into account the effects resulting from the flash and loss of vision at night. Therefore, the implementation of protective measures must be planned, as well as ensuring the safety of our troops with regard to being totally impacted by the flash. Based on the range of the night vision loss, this firing must be coordinated with the formations on the wings [*flanks*].
215- When drawing up plans, the availability of the enemy's night monitoring equipment must be taken into consideration. Also, in special circumstances, the illumination and monitoring of the battleground is going to help the movements of the battle and the use of fire; it is also necessary to observe the enemy's use of nuclear weapons and the loss of night vision of our troops that may result.

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The Advance

General

216- The advance takes place mostly during the mobile movements [*phase*]; it may take place to achieve or reestablish contact, or acquire superiority over the enemy by putting pressure on the enemy to become a target for our nuclear weapons.

Planning and Execution

217- The aggressive advance will continue forward to occupy the targets before the enemy is able to show any resistance. Therefore, all available means must be used to obtain information that ensures deployment of the main force under the best circumstances.
218- The force will be mobilized as if it were in a traditional war, where the main considerations that affect the execution of the advance will not be different than what they were in the past.

219- The advance takes place mostly at night in nuclear circumstances or over periods with low visibility in order to prevent the enemy's detection.

Reconnaissance by Force

220- In nuclear circumstances, the advance may not be a series of transportation and movement procedures, because reconnaissance movements conducted by force are mostly used as a tactical measure, while the majority of the force remains open and deployed behind the [*defensive*] barriers or in the selected areas of defense.

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Strong mobile groups will advance forward in several deployed columns that will seize their targets, destroy the enemy, maintain momentum, and launch the attack with nuclear firing. After occupying the targets, the main force will move toward the defensive areas behind which it is deployed. In such movements, seizing the targets becomes a secondary issue that will be accomplished only when the groups assigned for such action have the capability to do so. As for the main force, it cannot be pushed to this duty for security purposes.

Exploitation

221- The firing and administrative support must be provided in the exploitation plans prepared for the rapid and continuous advance operations, in addition to identifying key targets that can disrupt the continuation of the advance. These targets will be deep [*behind enemy lines*] in order to cut off the enemy's communications lines and disrupt its command and control system. Nuclear weapons will be used in this case to destroy the enemy's forces that cannot be bypassed or controlled. Also, security will be reinforced toward the nuclear counter attacks by a rapid advance, in order to upset the balance of the enemy's forces and immobilize its intelligence and surveillance capabilities.

Firing

222- When using nuclear weapons to stop the enemy's withdrawal, we must take into consideration the obstacles made from such usage on routes of the advancing forces.

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223- Helicopter airborne forces are used in most cases to block the routes of the enemy's withdrawal, set up traps, and put pressure on him to become a nuclear target.

Mobility

224- The duties imposed on the engineers while advancing will be numerous, not to mention that preparing the equipment for these duties takes a long time. Therefore, preparation for the engineering plans must start at an early stage.

River Crossings

General

225- Large rivers that are difficult to cross have a great impact on military movements. They also make the defensive force more sustainable. As for the aggressive movements taking place along the river line, they require the mobilization of troops and the stock piling of large amounts of equipment. In nuclear circumstances, such mobilization leads to great risks. In addition, the capability to maneuver and launch [*nuclear*] weapons will be limited at the river line, and it will also be difficult to withdraw the forces or change them once they start crossing. In such circumstances, and under the threat resulting from the nuclear weapons destruction,

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it will be necessary to draw detailed plans before the troops start the crossing. As for traditional assaults on the river line, for which preparations were made for few days and are, in most cases, under the enemy's observation, they cannot be carried out in a situation like this. Limitations imposed by the threat of nuclear counter attacks can only be overcome with bold planning built on a realistic conception of the situation.

226- There are two types of river crossing movements; they are:

A- Accidental or hasty crossing.
B- Deliberate crossing.

Accidental Crossing

227- In most cases, river crossing plans are drawn early and before the forces start the crossing. These plans include the supply issue for both types of crossing: accidental and deliberate, in addition to the manner of providing equipment, gathering engineers, training, and implementing exercises for all troops. Advanced formations will be organized in a manner that secures the availability of crossing means when approaching the river line.

228- The advance will take place at a high speed over a large front. The speed and power of the attack must be secured to occupy bridges before the enemy is able to destroy them. The true crossing of the river is one of the movements' phases and not the only goal of the force.

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229- Nuclear or chemical firing may be used to affect or immobilize the troops assigned to protect the bridge or the bridge location in preparation of seizing it. Immediately after [*that*], the bridgehead will be established and the main force starts the crossing. When advanced forces are unable to seize the bridges, they will launch an assault through the river in selected points in order to occupy a bridgehead. The frontal elements cross the river using assault means and equipment, and then set up the pontoons immediately after, to be used for the transport of heavy equipment, guns, and vehicles. As for the reserves, they will pass through the bridgehead to occupy the targets in depth, while the assaulting force dashes during the bridgehead development phase. Speed will be of extreme importance in order to occupy deep targets before the enemy is able to carry out the counter attack.

230- Forces that have amphibious tanks and personnel carriers will cross the rivers with these means during the primary assault. Reserves cross at the level of division and corps by air and at the same time through the transport aircraft and helicopters to occupy targets in depth. The forces communicate one with another, while the assault forces rush as the bridgehead is being established.

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231- Using the airborne troops, helicopter transported forces, armored personnel carriers, and amphibious tanks make the accidental crossing efficient with noticeable ease and speed.

Deliberate Crossing

232- Before planning the deliberate crossing, it is necessary to acquire detailed information on the enemy, river, barriers, nature of the ground in the far bank, and pontoons and crossing locations.

233- As a priority duty, the attacker must minimize the nuclear capability of the enemy by destroying and immobilizing his reserves of these weapons. At the same time, the attacker must have sufficient nuclear capability to achieve penetration and rush through the counter defensive area, relying mainly on the nuclear attacks without the need to mobilize his troops or stop the launching of attacks. This requires having mobile forces of high mobility with the possibility of a rapid crossing of the barrier.

234- The main requirements of a cross-water barrier attack are as follows:

A- Preventing the counter attacking forces in the defensive area from intervening at the time of crossing or when the assault force moves forward.

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B- Penetrating the restraining counter-force as quickly as possible.
C- Approaching the barrier at the last possible minute, crossing as quickly as possible along a large front, and continuing the cross-water attack without waiting to finish routine procedures.
D- Providing close firing support and silencing the hostile reserves.

235- Two parts of the crossing still remain: establishing the crossing over the barriers and the launching of the assault force. Ideally, both parts must be completed in one night, and when resources are available, crossing may be established with mobile forces that will continue to advance after crossing.
236- The primary crossing may be done in the normal procedure where the infantry carries out the assault. As soon as the pontoons or bridges are available, these troops must be reinforced with a mobile force including armor.
237- The bridges are going to be vulnerable to nuclear counter-attack, while a number of pontoons spread over a large area will be less vulnerable and therefore, more preferable. The decision to establish bridges in the early stages will depend on the following:

A- The resources available to the enemy to destroy these bridges.

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B- How important it is for some tanks and vehicles to cross in a short period of time. Bridges that are built in the dark, lifted and deployed before daylight may be ideal. Also, we must not rely only on bridges.

238- We must try to carry out the deliberate crossing on a large front and on as many crossing points possible, as a small number of crossing points jeopardizes security with regard to the enemy's nuclear capability. Also, at the time of crossing, continuous movement along the entire front line must be maintained. All equipment available must be used in the assault and bridge establishment, including the reserve formations in addition to securing as many of the possible crossing points, pontoons, and other crossing means when carrying out the crossing process.
239- The enemy shall be isolated and immobilized on the far bank with nuclear, non-nuclear, and chemical firing. The assault will be carried out with a mixture of airborne forces and helicopter airborne forces, amphibious [*forces*], and armored and mechanized units, whenever possible, in addition to other assault elements of infantry crossing in a large front. This way, these forces communicate with each other, and at the same, the bridgehead is established at an appropriate depth. As for the deep defensive locations, they will be

suppressed at an early stage with the airborne forces to stop them from conducting surveillance and counter-attacks.

240- In nuclear circumstances, the bridgeheads will be wider and deeper, and must be established as quickly as possible along with the construction of as many bridges as possible to reinforce security toward the nuclear counter attacks.

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When planning for the required equipment, some reserves will be retained, in light of the rates at which they may be destroyed by the [*enemy's*] counter-attacks. The following factors are necessary to carry out a successful crossing: surprise, speed, flexibility, and boldness of action; however, it would be preferable to cross at night or in limited vision circumstances.

241- It is very critical in such circumstances to attach importance to securing the control of bystanders. Also, the capacity of the crossing area requires securing more resources than previously. It is also necessary to study the requirements of communications, liaison, and methods, etcetera, so that they can be reliable, avoid excess mobilization, and expedite the crossing wave with a maximum use of available means.

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Chapter Six
Administrative Affairs of Nuclear War

General

242- All military movements rely on administrative support. Therefore, the main goal of administrative organizations is to provide sufficient and continuous support to formations at the right time.

243- The principles of administrative support in nuclear war will be the same principles as in traditional war circumstances, except for the implementation method and means of carrying out the administrative affairs.

244- The circumstances prevailing in the battlefield may be different and range between the standard of unlimited use of nuclear weapons to the standard of medium use and even the non-efficient [*limited*] nuclear conditions. The impact of these circumstances on the administrative support will be noticeably different.

The Standard of Unlimited Use of Nuclear Weapons

245- If no restrictions are imposed on the use of nuclear weapons, it would then be expected that, during the primary exchange of fire, the production means, warehouses, communications, bases, and airports will be destroyed, and the administrative and civilian facilities will be immobilized.

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In such circumstances, the regular administrative support of formations in the field will definitely be very difficult. The only practical plan for the formations will be to rely on the large dispersed warehouses until the required repairs are done and the administrative system resumes its function again.

The Standard of Medium Use of Nuclear Weapons

246- In any case, the circumstances will soon be back to normal once the nuclear stock is reduced and only a limited number of weapons will be available for field use.

The Circumstances

247- The circumstances resulting from the use of nuclear weapons, which have an impact on administrative affairs, are the following:

A- **Deployment**

Large fronts and deep positions in the battlefield will lead to the strain of administrative resources, communications, and transport in particular.

B- **Capability Recovering and Replacements**
Many people and a large number of warehouses and equipment will experience the impact of nuclear explosions in a short period of time.

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In order to recover the capability of these individuals and equipment, they [*the individuals*] must be treated, and the damaged equipment must be properly repaired. However, most of the individuals and equipment must be replaced. Also, these procedures require securing a large number of resources and [*material*] reserves and will encounter complicated problems during the transport.

C- **Mobility**
The increased mobility and firing power will require an efficient and continuous administrative support. In order to keep the battlefield empty for maneuvering, the administrative echelons must be deployed at a far distance in the rear.

Requirements

248- To face these circumstances, it is necessary for the administrative plans to be simple, flexible, and tightly coordinated with the movements' plans.

Planning

249- **Considerations**
Some of the main considerations of planning are the following:

A- The maximum use of available human power to minimize the size of administrative units.

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B- Self-assistance in all possible fields, such as first aid, rescue, and repair of small equipment.
C- Keeping a sufficient stock in the warehouses that are within suitable areas to alleviate the loads of the front formations.
D- The least possible number of echelons in the supply and preparation chain.
E- Reducing the different types of warehouses and equipment and their spare parts.
F- The quick and easy repair in the field for a maximum number of materials.
G- Communications and alternative supply means.
H- Suitable reserves in the front areas.
I- Concealment to avoid nuclear counter-attacks.

250- **Planning for Higher Echelons**

The administrative support plans for higher echelons [*of administrative support*] to provide the following:

A- **Organization**

Small areas must be self-sufficient as much as possible and organized in a way that they are able to have effective control over the administrative systems that are in their areas.

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B- **Stockpiles**

Suitable stockpiles will be kept in the front inside the warehouses that are evenly spread to provide security. Extra consumption will not be the only result of security negligence, but also the exhaustion of administrative systems with the possibility of bigger losses depending on the enemy's attacks.

C- **Communications**

Maintaining the minimum level of necessary stockpiles in the front increases the possibility of having large losses in a short period of time; therefore, the system of receiving, stocking, demand, and distribution must be simple and supported by efficient and quick means of communication. The automatic [*communications*] system for getting information will be very useful in this regard.

D- **Transportation**

All available means of transportation must be used and maintained so that they will be extremely efficient. Air transport will be necessary and may be the only reliable means. This requires having widely dispersed airports.

E- The need to have hospitals, recovery and comfort camps, and reinforcement camps emerges to a great extent. It will also be necessary to secure the air evacuation of casualties.

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F- There must be planning to use the reinforcements on a larger scale, whether in the form of individuals, units, or full secondary units such as companies and batteries with all their equipment.

G- Equipment that is not on the list of demands will be directly supplied from the warehouses to the units, as these materials are not kept in the corps or divisions areas in the front.

H- Suitable repair tools will be kept in the corps and divisions areas in the front.

I- The use of automatic systems for testing and evaluating the intelligence will be useful.

J- Security of the rear area and controlling of the sabotage of the area.
K- Confirmation of the sizes of equipment.
L- A large amount of engineering equipment will be kept [*in reserve*] to compensate for the bridges and building roads, etcetera, which are subject to destruction mostly because of our attacks or the enemy's attacks.

251- **Corps and Division Planning**

When planning in the corps and division:

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A- There will be emphasis on reducing the formations' supplies in order to achieve [*greater*] mobility. As for the larger reserve [*forces*] handling the interference of the enemy in the communication lines, they will also be in demand. However, they will be kept in the rear, and this may not be truly necessary if the air supply is available.
B- To avoid detection and nuclear counter-attacks, reinforcement and resupply in the short [*term*] will take place at night. Deployed vehicles shall move in the form of a single [*vehicle*] or group of vehicles (4-5) at night or during the day without abandoning the starting and launching areas.
C- Providing alternate transport means must be taken into consideration. Whenever possible, new landing runways for the transport aircraft will be built in the divisions' and brigades' movement areas.
D- All troops will be trained in first aid and will carry the necessary bandages and treatments. Companies and platoons have medical equipment and warehouses that provide the maximum amount of first aid to casualties.
E- A small number of warehouses and equipment, including engineering warehouses, will be kept in the front.

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These warehouses have the equipment that will be distributed based on normal requests. Warehouses and equipment are distributed in the corps' and divisions' areas. The easiest repairs will be done to the vehicles and equipment using the units' capabilities, while avoiding withdrawal as much as possible.
F- Divisions will keep additional reinforcements. As for the reinforcements organized in the form of full secondary units, they will be kept at the division level and higher.
G- Measures for security and damage control will be taken at all levels.
H- In some cases, the administrative areas in the corps may be divided in two or three echelons, so that it will be easy for the forces deployed in large fronts to reach these areas. However, this system has disadvantages that must be taken into consideration.

Impacting the Administrative Tasks and Future Tendencies

252- **Maintenance**

A- In order to save individuals and reduce the [*number of*] maintenance echelons, maintenance must be done directly starting from the army warehouses, and even bases, [*and moving*] to divisions.

B- To avoid the repetition of manual handling, trailers [*trucks*] must be used frequently.

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Also, trailers loaded with supply materials must be handled from the base warehouses all the way to the road leading to the divisions and brigades. This way, the majority of work for major movements can be done.

C- Light and canned rations must be used.

D- All types of vehicles should take any fuel available, whether it is gasoline or kerosene, etcetera. This way, the issue of providing the required type and quantity of fuel for every area will be eliminated.

E- The need for greater use of air transport emerges. Helicopters are used to transport the supply materials and troops to and from isolated units.

F- Building large warehouses takes place outside of cities and in rural areas. Civilians living in these areas will be in charge of security.

253- **Replenishment Method**

Complying with the complete and detailed work procedures will minimize the need for recurrent demands and repairs, etcetera, and provide simplicity to the method used. Also, the information provided must have enough details at the right time to make sure that the required materials have been moved forward upon request.

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However, neither the time nor the sufficient accurate preparation will be available for the movement [*of supplies*] to carry out an accurate and skilled replenishment attempt. It may be possible to adopt the following practical system:

A- Keeping the ammunition, fuel, oil, and grease automatically at the levels specified for every echelon [*of command*]. When organizing the procedure to transport materials to the front, a number of vehicles loaded with every item will move forward in a routine manner.

B- Delivering a certain number of rations daily or every two days.
C- Units/formations will submit reports on any unusual requests or changes in the next 24 hours, in the specified time to the higher echelons [*of command*].
D- Requests shall be delivered in a number of vehicles loaded with materials and not in the form of quantities [*of supplies*].

254- **Medical Service**

The primary problem of the medical units will result from the treatment of a large number of casualties in a very short period of time. The possible means, even partially, to overcome this problem will be:

A- First aid administered by the troops.
B- Immediate air evacuation from the units' rescue locations and advanced bandaging stations to the rear areas.

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C- Organizing the process to gather casualties by the units or groups specialized in the formations' arrangements.

255- **Supplies**

The amount of materials to be kept in the frontal areas will be reduced by the supply units. The dimensions of all equipment will also be confirmed. As for the materials that are not constantly in demand, they will be moved to the front immediately upon request.

256- **Repair and Rescue**

There will be a tendency to gather the equipment and keep it in small quantities. The repair of this equipment must be prevented as much as possible since they will be replaced instead by the units and field factories. As for the non-usable and worn away parts, they will be eliminated without withdrawing them to the rear area. Non-technical individuals will carry out duties like these.

257- **Individuals**

It is necessary to fulfill the comfort requirements for individuals, except for large reinforcements. On the other hand, high radiation doses require the replenishment of individuals physically fit to accomplish the duty.

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There might be many cases of missing or lost individuals as well as the emergence of chaotic actions.

258- **Decontamination**
A large number and quantity of warehouses and equipment, and most individuals in full units, may require immediate decontamination. Therefore, chemical units specialized in decontamination must be present in all areas.

259- **Communications**
Communications used to fulfill the requests for supply must be quick and efficient, in order to maintain the formations in the proper way under pressure. There will be more demands for communications related to the administrative issues than before [*the nuclear war*].

260- **Decentralization**
Deployment and decentralization minimize the potential risks toward the nuclear counter attacks. However, they result in inefficiency, command and control difficulties, and duality along with the waste of effort. In addition, they make the region vulnerable to the raids by airborne units and assaults of guerillas and [*their*] allies. Therefore, a type of balance must be created, while decentralization and deployment are at the minimum level.

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261- Security can be achieved through the following actions: proper camouflage and concealment, good discipline, counterintelligence, alarm systems, correct organization of the rear area security, and damage control.

262- However, the brigades and units will be destroyed to the extent that they will expose the central administrative area to danger, or it may not be possible to perform this maintenance. For that reason, it may be necessary for the brigade's echelons [*of command*] to establish middle positions between the administrative areas and units. When positions like these are established, they might include positions for the supply of materials and any necessary reserves, in addition to the subsidiary medical units and the stock piling of reserve parts for urgent requests for the required materials to complete the small field repairs, especially those that resulted from the nuclear attacks.

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Chapter Seven
Nuclear Weapons System

263- **Nuclear Weapons**

In general, this name is given to any weapon where an explosion is caused by the power released from the interactions of the nucleus of atoms, whether by fission, fusion, or the combination of both.

264- **Launching System**

This is the means by which a nuclear weapon reaches its target. These means can be one of the following:

A- **Artillery**
There are short, medium, and long range artillery.

B- **Free flight rockets**
They can be small or big.

C- **Guided Missiles**
There are light, medium, and heavy ones.

D- **Aircraft**
There are fighter, bomber, tactical, and strategic ones.

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E- **Nuclear Destructive Mine**
These weapons will be placed at ground zero, requested by the engineers or other individuals qualified for this [*task*].

365- **Nuclear Weapons Family**

The nuclear weapons available during any period of time are known as the nuclear weapons family. For educational and training purposes, one family from the nuclear weapons system will be presumed. To learn about it please go back to Appendix (J). There are differences between the real stock of American weapons and the weapons family presumed in appendix (J). These differences are approved and designed to maintain the security of real weapons; however, the facilitations to use presumed weapons will provide the same facilitations for the use of real weapons.

266- **Nuclear Weapons System**

The nuclear weapons system can be recognized by both the weapon and the launching system used. The specification of a certain number of fully operational launchers are called the launch and caliber system, such as two small free-fall 10 kiloton missiles or three 8 knot

arc 2 kiloton artillery launchers. The important characteristics of the different systems consist of:

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the weapon caliber, range, type of explosion, accuracy, response, and success rate. Also, every system has its own capabilities and specifications that must be taken into consideration when selecting a certain system to attack a target.

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Appendix (A)

Suggested Example of the Division Nuclear Firing Plan

Secret

Copy No… of…
1st Infantry Division
Al-Qadisiyya
140600 February 1971
H/16

1st Division Nuclear Firing Plan
(Issued with the 1st Infantry Division movements order)

1- Nuclear weapons allocation
   A- Period
   B- Quantity - number allocated – launching means - calibers
2- Nuclear firing
   A- Table

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Target number	2001	2002	2003
Target description	A rifle company		
Weapon	Babil 1 kiloton Onset [*illegible*]		
Time of burst	150451 February		
Ground zero required	568928		
Presumed results	[*Illegible*] for the troops' instant casualties inside trenches covering half of the target. Destroying the infantry weapons covering half of the target.		
Barriers	Falling trees secondary barriers on the road.		
Fallout	None		
Half of the remaining radiation's diameter	300 Yards		

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B- On demand
(As mentioned above, with the exception that the time of burst shall not be given)

3- **Coordination**
A- Coordinating with the formations on the wing.
B- Reports on the locations where the troops reach different lines.
C- Identifying the locations for subordinate units.

4- **Identifications**
Of the locations and traveling of troops, etcetera.

5- **Communications**

Please acknowledge distribution.
Remark: plans confirmed on the overlays containing the following traditional codes:

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

A- The code center represents the ground zero required.
B- “2001” represents the target number.
C- “120 meters” represents the explosion altitude (it can be defined in meters, yards, or feet).
D- “7 heavy” represents the artillery battalion firing nuclear weapons.
E- “Babil” represents the caliber of nuclear weapon, which is 1 kiloton here.

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Appendix (B)

Suggested Example of the Nuclear Attack Alarm
(For Training Purpose Only)

No.	Code letter	Meaning	Given details
A	B	C	D
1	Arab	Required ground zero	Six digit coordinates
2	Faris	Time to hit the target	Combination of time and date
3	Sabah	Identifying the target	The name of the city or village follows the target number.
4	Quraysh	A- Nuclear safety line	A- Whether it is a series of map coordinates or range in meters from ground zero.

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		B- Anticipated time for the troops to cross through the safety line.	B- By minutes following the explosion.
		C- Special protection measures.	C- None.
		D- Medium [*illegible*]	D- For the first aid group.

Example

Secret and Immediate Telegram

Time of composition
232345

From: 1st Infantry Division
To: 1st Infantry Brigade – 2nd Infantry Brigade – 3rd Infantry Brigade
Number of composer (.) H/919 (.) nuclear attack alarm (.) Arab (.) 243301 (.) Faris (.) 340700 T1 (.) Sabah (.) 2001 Qadir Karam (.) Quraysh (.) A (.) 3500 Yards (.) B (.) 30.

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Appendix (C)

Nuclear Attack Request
(For Training Purpose Only)

No.	Code letter	Meaning	Given details
A	B	C	D
1	Arab	Required ground zero	Six digit coordinates with above sea level elevation in feet.
2	Faris	[*Planned*] time to hit the target / latest time acceptable to hit the target	Combination of time and date.
3	Sabah	Identifying the target	The name of the closest city or village will follow the target number.

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4	Quraysh	Weapon information	A- Launching unit. B- Required caliber. C- Fission elevation (in meters).
5	Rabab	Commander's remarks	(Target capacity, its importance, and the closest location to our troops).

Example

Secret and Immediate Telegram

Time of composition
211300

From: 2nd Infantry Division
To: 1st Corps
Number of composer (.) H/920 (.) nuclear attack request (.) Arab (.) 765432 at 950 altitude (.) Faris (.) 211600 T1 not after 211700 T1.

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Appendix (D)

Suggested Example of Nuclear Record
(For Training Purpose Only)

No.	Code letter	Meaning	Given details
A	B	C	D
1	Adam	Number of the strike	
2	Babil	Presumed ground zero	Six digit coordinates.
3	Jalal	Time of the strike	Combination of time and date.
4	Dawood	Presumed fission altitude.	High, low, or on the surface.
5	Hashim	Presumed caliber	

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Appendix (E)

Suggested Example of the Following Report
(For Training Purpose Only)

No.	Code letter	Meaning	Given details
A	B	C	D
1	Zamzam	Number of the strike	
2	Hasan	Losses	
3	Yassin	Vehicles and equipment destroyed	
4	Kamil	Road destruction	
5	Laymoun	Required aid	
6	Muhammad	Indirect impacts	Impacts on movements, administrative issues, spirits, etcetera.

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Appendix (F)

Additional Details for Implementation
of the Movements' Order

In nuclear circumstances, the following points may be added to the movements' order:

1- **The Situation**

A- **The enemy's forces**

The enemy's nuclear capabilities: the caliber and type of weapons that might be used, the number [*of nuclear weapons*] that the enemy might use in a certain period of time, targets that are most likely to be attacked, and the possibility of using surface explosions.

B- **Our forces**

The nuclear capability (when necessary).

2- **Execution**

A- **General**

Nuclear firing use concept, whether primary nuclear firing was planned or not.

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B- **Coordination Recommendations**

First- The nuclear firing plan appendix must be mentioned.
Second- Control measures (see article 19).
Third- Troops' security measures, including using the highest level of alarm possible.
Fourth- The N – hour

3- **Administrative issues**

A- When necessary, nuclear weapons allocation will be given, the ones available in general at the army and corps level.

C- Nuclear weapon supply points and stockpiling recommendations.

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Defensive Position Configuration Plan Appendix (G)

Protection Detachments

[*Configuration illustration*]

Reserves

15,000 to 25,000 yards

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Mobile Defense Configuration Plan Appendix (I)

Protection Detachments

[*Configuration illustration*]

Reserves

15,000 to 30,000 yards

No.	Lunching system	Standard American system	Type and caliber of weapon													Min/Max range (in KM)	Explosibility	
			Adam 0.5 Kton	Babil 1 Kton	Jalal 2 Kton	Dawood 5 Kton	Hashim 10 Kton	Wadi 20 Kton	Zamzam 50 Kton	Hasan 100 Kton	Tariq 200 Kton	Yassin 500 Kton	Kamil 1 Megaton	Laymoun 2 Megaton	Muhammad 5 Megaton		on the surface	under the surface
1	Short-range gun		x	x												2/10		
2	Medium-range gun	8 knot arc		x	x											2/20		
3	Long-range gun	175 mm gun			x	x	x	x	x							3/30		
4	Smal| free flight missile (non-guided)	Little John	x	x	x	x	x									3/25	x	
5	Big free flight missile (non-guided)	Onset John				x	x	x	x	x						7/40	x	
6	Light guided missile	Lacrosse	x	x	x	x	x	x								10/50	x	
7	Medium guided missile	Corporal/ Sergeant				x	x	x	x	x	x	x				50/150	x	
8	Heavy guided missile	Redstone /Pershing									x	x	x	x	x	50/300	x	
9	Fighter aircraft	Phantom F-4				x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x			800=	x	
10	Tactical bomber or missile	B-57								x	x	x	x	x	x	1200=	x	
11	Strategic bomber and ballistic missile (free flight)	B-52											x	x	x	2000=	x	
12	Nuclear destruction mine		x	x		x	x		x	x							x	x

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An Illustration of Division (C) Attack Plan with
One Penetration that the Division Attacked and
Another One that Was Stopped

Appendix (J)

[*Attack illustration*]