

# **“Saddam Hussein and the Revolutionary Command Council Discussing the Iraqi Invasion of Kuwait and the Expected U.S. Attack”**



**Document Date:** 29 Dec 1990

**CRRC Record Number:** SH-SHTP-A-001-042

**Saddam:** Good morning.

**All:** Good morning, Sir.

**Saddam:** How is the north?

**UM1:** Sir, [*inaudible*].

**Saddam:** [*Inaudible*]?

**UM1:** Sir, everything [*inaudible*] in the north, Salah al-Din and [*inaudible*]. The amount of rain was very good, Sir, [*inaudible*] in the north. [*Inaudible*]

**Saddam:** What about Kuwait?

**UM2:** Sir, the Prime Minister says hello to you. Fine, thank God.

**Saddam:** Is everything going well at your end?

**UM1:** Fine, thank God.

**Saddam:** Are the defenses properly set up?

**Ali Hassan Majid:** In fact, Sir, like I explained to Your Excellency in the last meeting, I mean, we were successful, and I say it one more time, we were successful with regard to the men whom Your Excellency chose for this mission. As of yesterday, we started imposing a blackout in the areas overlooking the sea, so that the fighters can live [*there*] and get used to darkness. We will start a series of incremental and full preparatory steps to confront the enemy. We will start with civilians and military [*personnel*] as of the 10<sup>th</sup> onward, including [*implementing*] the curfew [*for civilians*], engaging in military action involving explosion [*for the military*], and how to discuss at the morning conference the events of the previous night. We will tackle all the drawbacks and the negative aspects of wireless and wired communications. In fact, we found out, I mean, we discovered the night before last, Comrade Kamil and I, that we have the issue of rain water drainage in the city for very long distances, and it is possible that our opponent may use that against us during the flood tide, not during an ebb one [*tide*]. This way, the enemy will be able to infiltrate through it and surprise us at the airport or other places.

**Saddam:** Good morning. Hello Abu Ziyad [*Tariq Aziz*].

**Ali Hassan Majid:** And we started to address this issue from two aspects: from the enemy's aspect and how to respond to such [*infiltration*], and the other aspect is the possibility that this [*ebb and flow of rainfall*] could be used by our fighters during the extensive bombings and cause leakage to these tunnels which will weaken our position. Some have suggested that we pollute it with chemical material. Frankly, I did not agree with this, because, as you know, such [*chemical*] pollution requires a great deal of time to prepare for how we will sanitize, how we will clean, and

then I do not know when it is going to run down, as it is possible that it will wash down, and thus its benefit will almost be nil. Consequently, this will hurt us at sea, especially if it is used in larger quantities than what was previously determined, or more than expected. Starting on the 10<sup>th</sup> and until the 14<sup>th</sup>, we will start, Mr. President, running efficient and swift practices. We did not start with the citizens as they were originally scared from the get-go, and we did not want to scare them more. I fear that this will negatively affect the fighters' morale when the citizen is frightened and with the citizen's [negative] reaction. So we decided to wait a period of two weeks, I mean this period is for us, for the fighters, so we can begin the first dry run or the first practice to inoculate our comrades and associates. As a matter of fact, we decided to give the last two days of the other four days for the soldiers to rest, I mean for the fighters. This way they can be prepared for the night of the 15<sup>th</sup>. [Time Stamp: 04:58]

Even before, our preparations, thank God, are almost [done]. I do not want to say that our preparations are very good, but we are comfortable with them, God willing. As for the preparation of locations, they are excellent—excellent and almost complete. I can say we have accomplished over 90% of what we aspired to achieve in terms of foxholes, struts, shelters, lines of communications within the... I mean now all the shore has direct lines of communication between one picket and another. We have manufactured a hexagonal shaped picket, and it is well secured and mounted on concrete slab. We have benefited from – as our brothers the soldiers say, we are very happy in this location, because in reality we have the chance to benefit from what is available in the city and so forth. So thank God, Sir, we pray to God almighty to protect us from our enemy's evilness. However, if they come—thank God for our situation—I can assure Your Excellency that we have great hope in God that our position is strong, and our situation is according to your wishes. Rest assured that our situation is fine and my warmest regards to all the brothers. Our situation in the city is getting better every day. I mean if we want to mark the daily progress, we can mark one or two check marks. There is no day that passes by and has no check mark toward the best. Our situation is good.

**Saddam:** But they definitely expect something on the 15<sup>th</sup>?

**Ali Hassan Majid:** Truly, Sir, they are certain.

**Saddam:** The Kuwaitis, they are certain that the attack is going to take place on the 15<sup>th</sup>, right?

**Ali Hassan Majid:** Yes, Sir, they are truly certain, and I have told our brothers, the more we work on our readiness the better the chance we will have over our enemy, and maybe the war will be delayed. When he [Bush] sees how well prepared we are and how he cannot break into the city -- [Interrupted]

**Saddam:** Yes that is correct, that is why the war is delayed until now.

**Ali Hassan Majid:** Because the enemy has his eye and is watching inside Kuwait, for sure. The enemy has numerous eyes inside al-Kazma city that report everything to him directly. We intend to send our message directly to the enemy. Honestly, we watch and see anything that happens. Our work is clear, and maybe no one from the Arab world believes that we can resist America;

therefore, the Kuwaiti people have the impression that America is their lifesaver. So, not only are they foolish, but some of them are scared. Others started coming to Baghdad now, wishing to buy an apartment and so on. They brought their cars and parked them in the garage and used airplanes for traveling and so on. I mean some of them had a good start, in fact. Thank God. One more time, our readiness is great and [*there is*] nothing that we need.

**Saddam:** How about the other corps as far as humanitarian needs?

**Ali Hassan Majid:** Honestly, Sir, although I have no direct contact with them, they are just as I said, they need nothing and they are ready. As Your Honor explained and as the comrades from the military leadership explained to you, Sir, if you ask anyone, the answer will be why are the Americans not here yet? Some of them are afraid that the Americans will not come after all the hard work, readiness, and willingness to fight -- [*Interrupted*]

**Saddam:** It might be all for nothing.

**Ali Hassan Majid:** So, if you told the soldier, the fighter or the officer, because of your readiness the U.S. troops will not come, then the soldiers will regret their preparation because some of them wish for the U.S. troops to come. Now, if you want to analyze the situation as far as their relation with God almighty, our soldiers are neither in love with the U.S. troops nor are they looking forward to making them [*the U.S. troops*] happy. Therefore, they see it that God almighty is preparing their destiny and His Majesty [*Saddam*] sent the U.S. troops so we can be forgiven of our sins. This is to bring back the glory of Arabs, our nation, mankind, and Islam. If we are the reason behind such magnificent deed, what else do we dream to be than the tools in the hand of God? Praise be to God that we are living in this era and we are in a glorious position under the leadership of a great and brave man. Sir, as a matter of fact, they started to watch Iraqi television, and they are purposely watching the Iraqi news and listening to Mr. President. I am not exaggerating; this is the truth. But before, I swear they used to delete channels and some still do, but the majority are watching and following up because when I ask someone, he answers me with the correct answer. If I were to ask a person about the ongoing news, he starts telling me exactly what the Chief-in-Command Mr. President said in the speech. Therefore, you know for sure they are following up and well informed. Their following up to the conference of the Gulf [*Cooperation*] Council was in our favor.

**Saddam:** Yes.

**Ali Hassan Majid:** It was very much useful. We hear them on the phone cursing the group [*the Gulf governments*]. So the situation has changed, and, God willing, it will be much better.

[*Time Stamp: 11:12*]

**Dr. Sa'doun Hammadi:** Sir, at the beginning in Kuwait, the financial activities such as withdrawals were much higher than deposits but now the deposits are much higher than the withdrawals. I mean this -- [*Interrupted*]

**UM4:** This will create life.

**Izzat al-Duri:** This is a good thing.

**Dr. Sa'doun Hammadi:** The amount of money that is deposited in the banks is much more than the money that is withdrawn. Although we have limited the withdrawal amount, of course, but there were only withdrawals at the beginning. No one was depositing a penny at all, whereas [*now*] deposits are greater than withdrawals. Also, there is demand for deposits in foreign currency, so this is a sign that supports Comrade Ali's statement.

**Saddam:** We have discussed the Kuwaiti society, along with the bad situation that the Kuwaiti society has reached, with the Jordanians in a polite manner and with an objective method. Have you followed up the effect of this on them?

[*Inaudible; attendees respond in the background*]

**Saddam:** Yes, the Democratic [*inaudible*].

**UM5:** Your Excellency, it is not harsh.

**Saddam:** No, it is not harsh, no.

**UM5:** Not harsh because his average education accuses it of being [*inaudible*] only. While he denied that the decision is [*inaudible*]. So they do not have much negativity.

**Saddam:** The fighter Abu Khalil, who is holding the gun and hand grenade, is he psychologically stable?

**Ali Hassan Majid:** At the present?

**Saddam:** Yes.

**Ali Hassan Majid:** Sir, the majority [*of Iraqis*] started to act as if it were their own city. Through their respect for the surroundings while walking on the streets or their respect to anything on the street, they talk about Kuwait as if it is Iraqi now with good knowledge and not randomly. The educational process played its role inside the typical Iraqi fighter who started talking about Kuwait [*City*] as this is his own city and part of him. During the first days, Sir, this was not the case. Before, all he [*the fighter*] wanted was to destroy and break, but now everything has changed. Destruction is almost nonexistent. In regard to fighting readiness, this is a different issue; it is in the highest degree. So now the fighter is adopting the situation as if Kuwait [*City*] is his city.

**Saddam:** So the fighter understands the war, based on your explanation, as if Kuwait is ours and we are defending it. How about the cultural and spiritual framework?

**Ali Hassan Majid:** Sir not everyone has the same idea really. We can find this picture among the officers, especially among our comrades in the [*Ba'ath*] Party.

**Saddam:** The field officers have the same picture also.

**Ali Hassan Majid:** It exists, Sir, and among the [*Ba'ath*] Party comrades too, although they need more of that educational process, the picture still exists but not the way we like it to be. I mean there is no comparison to their readiness for combat and sacrifice. It is not identical but slightly different. [*Inaudible whispering*]

**Saddam:** Send for comrade [*inaudible*].

**Izzat al-Duri:** [*Inaudible*]?

**Saddam:** Yes.

**Ali Hassan Majid:** So overall, I can say the situation is good times two, for example, since the last session and nothing more.

**Saddam:** You are saying times two in this short period of time?

**Ali Hassan Majid:** Yes.

**Saddam:** So that means consistent improvement.

**Ali Hassan Majid:** Yes, thank God in all its details.

[*Time Stamp: 16:09*]

**Saddam:** Well, even if you reached the top [*level of readiness*], it does not mean this is the final positive phase, even at the top [*level*].

**Ali Hassan Majid:** Yes.

**Saddam:** If there is no other challenge after that, it means nothing and is not necessarily the final positive phase.

**Ali Hassan Majid:** Yes.

**Saddam:** A positive phase at that moment, but it may not be final.

**Ali Hassan Majid:** Yes, correct.

**Saddam:** The development process to a better situation is a great consistent positive process. Yes, Comrade Abd al-Ghani.

**Abd al-Ghani:** Pardon me, Sir. In regard to Comrade Ali's statement and to your explanation of our understanding that the fight should be [*about*] more than Kuwait being one of our provinces, I believe we now need—as Comrade Ali said about the situation of Kuwait—we need to prepare an intensive and comprehensive awareness campaign that focuses on the scope of national ideology of human culture. Sir, it is important that we focus after the great transitional move of the Iraqi soldiers who started handling the situation differently from the first days [*of the invasion*]. So the educational process in this framework is useful and also reduces... awareness and faith, as Your Excellency knows, is consistent for the soldiers and officers as a tactical case regarding the present cultural extent [*inaudible*], especially with regard to connecting these ideologies with the Palestinian cause.

**Saddam:** [*Inaudible*] Comrade Hasan.

**Hasan:** Sir, we cannot separate the situation that Comrade Ali explained from the great combat and psychological readiness spirit that our people have and their great enthusiastic rush to face the American aggression. In addition, the continuous speeches of Your Excellency, where every speech is a continuation of the previous one, provide a clear picture of the situation to every citizen, whether he is in Iraq, in the Arab world, or, to a greater extent, in the Islamic and rest of the world; therefore, I believe the situation is mutual and intertwined. When people have great psychological and combat readiness, which is a program that gets complete through the mobilization and enthusiasm of citizens, this will have an impact on fighters on the front. When the fighter goes back to his family and then back to the front, I believe this will impact the program. Your Excellency called for an increase in the mobilization process at all levels to make sure no citizen was left behind and not included in the battle. This has a great impact on achieving victory over American aggression. Thank you, Sir.

**Ali Hassan Majid:** Sir, I have a quick comment.

**Saddam:** Go ahead, comrade.

**Ali Hassan Majid:** The war is full of technology and the Americans are an industrial nation. Sir, we have a suggestion that we wish our brothers in the military to look into. We have such a large number of vehicle bodies, [*broken armored vehicles or non-operational armored vehicles*] and in my assessment, if we wanted to place them in locations -- [*Interrupted*]

**Saddam:** Scattered.

**Ali Hassan Majid:** Scattered locations, and we gather [*dirt*] around them just like the defensive position. This will show up on the [*enemy's*] radar for the aircraft, for the laser guidance system, for the missile guidance system, and we can benefit from them if they [*the enemy*] want to raid, but I hope that it will be at night. Three, four, five, or six vehicle chassis with dirt around them, and we even reveal part of them on the radar screen if a tank or aircraft becomes visible to me [*on my radar screen*], because it [*the chassis*] will appear on the enemy's photography and radar coverage. The other comment, Your Excellency, is what is happening here near us in Baghdad

with regard to civil defense awareness. There will be an explanation about the effects of atomic, nuclear bombs, its efficacy, what they do, how many people will they kill and how many people they will decimate. All of this is frightening and will instill fear in our people. [*Time Stamp: 21:00*].

The professors who come and lecture at the ministries, the schools, and other places, they present details of this war or this bomb. We do not have to do that, we only have to provide awareness about preventative measures of such bombs. But when we talk about the effects of these bombs we will scare them and terrify them [*speaker laughs*]. Honestly, Sir. The other comment is, and perhaps our brothers at the civil defense are not paying attention to it, whether the evacuation usually takes place to the north or to the south, as I am sure they know. However, as you know, the north of Baghdad is hindered by the Tigris River that comes down from al-Tharthar and we only have one bridge, and if that bridge is hit, Baghdad will be entirely at a standstill. We have to acquire a group of bridges and we have to quickly mount bridgeheads now, so that whenever the need to erect them exists, we could do so. This matter worries me a lot, as I am concerned and fear that the right side of the Tigris and not the left side will be completely severed. In this case, the exodus will take place toward the south, which means heading in the direction of the chemical attack or contamination, and this is a dangerous case. But this fear factor, I urge you to stop it! I wonder why we study, all of this nonsense about the effects of nuclear and atomic attack, these are scare tactics. It frightens the children, it frightens their parents, and it frightens the fighter when he confronts the [*enemy*]. I understand that an evacuation plan is required, and we have to practice evacuation, and everything has to be excellent. But to explain everything, God have mercy on us please, just a little bit, we have to calm down, and another thing: we have fifteen days left, we have to have peace of mind and calm down, to ease our psyche during this period, because if we approach this period and we are in a state of fear, then our hand will not be balanced and will be shaken. I thank you.

[*Inaudible; several attendees speaking simultaneously in the background*]

**UM6:** Thank you, Your Excellency.

**Saddam:** Yes, Comrade Izzat.

**Izzat al-Duri:** Your Excellency Mr. President, what Comrade Ali has explained with regard to the impact of a chemical attack is correct. It is true that it causes a state of fear in society; I mean, this could create a state [*of fear*], and even now some circles are in an unbalanced state of [*fear*] with regard to their thinking about how to handle the war. We cannot segregate the society and the soldiers on the war front. If the society is in a state of fear, it will affect the fighters, and I agree with what Comrade Ali has stated, they go to their -- [*Interrupted*]

**Saddam:** Families.

**Izzat al-Duri:** Families, [*inaudible*] and they hear that their families will be in this miserable state, being subjected to bombing, high temperatures, poisoning and other effects, which weakens their morale. So I suggest and I support Comrade Ali that our awareness explanation



will be limited only to preventative measures, like where do we go, which bunker, how to be safe, and so forth. We do not have to explain what the bomb will do; we do not have to explain what the effects of chemical weapons are, or what is the diameter of impact is, or how much poisoning will occur, or even the type of poison. We do not have to explain any of these matters; we can explain only the preventative measures. The other point, Mr. President, we have to work on two areas: the family area and the frontline area. It is essential that we work on constantly lifting the spirit of the soldier because this will reflect on the mood and the spirit of his family when the soldier returns to see his family every now and then. By doing so, it will protect the soldier from the external and the internal elements. It is a full process such as awareness, education, training, as well as the technical explanation of his military duties, and his constant contact with the commanders while at his location. [*Time Stamp: 26:05*]

I have seen the Northern Branch Organization Office, [*inaudible*] the spirit. I have seen in al-Sulaymaniya... this is Mosul [*inaudible*] two of them and we do not praise Mosul as the situation is different there... al-Sulaymaniya is number one as far as the spiritual status. The spirit of the party in al-Sulaymaniya is equal to the spirit of the party in Mosul, Irbil, Dohuk and then Kirkuk. I sensed that the situation is good in Kirkuk, they were listening and observing during the lecture like birds standing on top of their heads [*they were very interested in the lecture and observing each word*]. They were very proud of the history of Iraq and the glory of Iraq. The courage is apparent throughout [*Iraq*], and as Comrade Ali said, [*it is*] unlike other people to whom we have to explain the way we want the war to be launched when we have no other choice but to engage in war. And the [*inaudible*], but because of the long experience we had as party members and our party history. It seems as if the Iraqis or everyone in our party, or every party in the Arab world needs a renewal process or spirit renewal. When the primary official of that party keeps lecturing, informing its members of everything, explaining everything to them and getting everything from them, such process will lead to a boring situation, or create a routine one that has nothing new. [*Inaudible*] is going to visit them and explain to them. So if we can have a tour, let us call it that, like we used to do in the [*inaudible*]. The comrades started to visit each other, like Comrade Hasan visits Salah al-Din's offices and visits him at the branches in Egypt, the comrade in charge of the middle [*region*] would go visit the north, attend symposiums there, and give talks. We discuss the goals of these visits and we specify a topic to discuss within this framework. Maybe during this period, I saw the advanced party cadre and another part connected to it. The talk goes to the party directly, because Mr. President, if we do not have the party, we just cannot control society when the time comes. But when the party fights under very tough conditions, we can change everything including the stone [*perform miracles*] when the party is well structured and under our control, so I suggest things to be this way.

With regard to the strike and Comrade Ali's suggestion that evacuation should be to the north, now such an attack at the present time differs. We have specified times. Today, it is better to have the evacuation to the south instead of the north. Now, from now until the end of March or April, the wind will be 85% easterly and southeastern, and less than 20% is northwestern. So in my opinion, evacuation will be... of course this depends on the availability of the areas that we have specified, as some areas are designated for higher absorption. However, if there are areas to the east or southeast that would be better than areas situated in the northwest.

**Ali Hassan Majid:** Sir, [*inaudible*].

**Saddam:** Fine.

**Ali Hassan Majid:** May God protect you. Now we have decided to move all of the government offices to the city of al-Ramadi in case an attack or evacuation takes place, but is that the correct solution to being under fire from missiles and artillery, to go to al-Ramadi? Is it right that all the government goes to al-Ramadi?

**Izzat al-Duri:** Even al-Ramadi city might be attacked.

**Ali Hassan Majid:** Why should we go to al-Ramadi? We have made this decision when we were at the eastern borders with [*inaudible*].

**Izzat al-Duri:** With Iran.

**Ali Hassan Majid:** But is it right now that all of us, and the entire government, must go and stay in Al-Ramadi?

**Izzat al-Duri:** That is not right.

**Ali Hassan Majid:** Is it right for the civil defense to be like this?

[*Time Stamp: 31:12*]

**Saddam:** No, this is not right.

**Ali Hassan Majid:** This was my remark.

**Saddam:** It is not right and it should not be positioned in one place.

**Ali Hassan Majid:** Why should we place the entire government in one place?

**Saddam:** Not in Salah al-Din, or Mosul and not in Basra.

**Ali Hassan Majid:** I am aware and so are the government and citizens, including all the employees, aware that the Presidency took over the district office. Everything was like a mass where everyone was just moving everywhere in the region, villages, provinces, even schools or any other place.

**Saddam:** Yes, Comrade Sa'doun.

**Dr. Sa'doun Hammadi:** Mr. President, I have brief notes. I remember that Your Honor said in the last part of the war against Iran, "In the process of education and awareness, we need to be more analytical in our thinking than just being enthusiastic." I think this is very true. Therefore,

during this period of time left, our guidance and educational process and our media should all be directed to the method of analytical thinking. So our media must highlight certain clear points, such as answering question 1, 2, 3, et cetera, in an analytical way so that the enthusiasm of the citizen will be supported by information and analysis. My second note, Mr. President, I feel that our citizens are deeply convinced that our morale is strong against the enemy. However, when it comes to the weapons, armament, and means issues, it seems as if our citizens think we want to hit [*exclusively*] on the morale issue, which is not true. Therefore, Mr. President, we must educate our citizens that we are not facing our enemy without weapons or with canes. We have weapons and an army; therefore, any information broadcasted by the enemy about our armament power does not harm our military. I think it is important to broadcast it to our people so they will understand that in addition to our strong morale, we are well equipped, and we are not fighting with empty hands. For example, today Mr. Taha Ma'ruf said there is discussion among the international media about the effects of the Iraqi biological weapons, how powerful, and how much they can damage, kill, and so on. We did not provide such information, but the other side did. Therefore, rebroadcasting it in our media will not reveal military information, but will inform our citizens that we are not fighting our enemy with empty hands but with weapons. This will support the morale side of the war. Our citizens are psychologically convinced that our morale is high, but on the other hand, it is essential that they know about the weapons' capability too. Thank you.

**Saddam:** Comrade Mizban.

**Mizban:** Sir, I have a suggestion. If Your Excellency sends a message, on the New Year occasion, to the Iraqis and our armed forces, I believe this will be faster and more efficient for Iraqis. As you know, the Iraqis believe in you and your influence on the Iraqi individual, and the response of Iraqis to your instructions. It may be inevitable to meet with a cadre, but I believe delivering a quick, comprehensive, and efficient message will do the purpose, whether it is to a high ranking, educated person or just a farmer. Thank you, Sir.

**Saddam:** Comrade Taha Ma'ruf.

[*Time Stamp: 36:10*]

**Taha Ma'ruf:** Mr. President, with regard to Dr. Sa'doun's comment regarding morale, I frankly agree with him on this matter. However, and at the same time, there are some matters and rumors. I mean, such rumors have been going on now for three days that were broadcast by Voice of America. The rumor is about a smart initiative by the President at the last minute, deciding to withdraw from Kuwait, to withdraw from Kuwait and leave the American administration off-guard and so forth. The same rumor is spread throughout the country. I mean we hear from various sources that the Party...that there are demonstrations throughout all the cities of Iraq calling on the President to withdraw from Kuwait to avoid war. Almost everyone is convinced of this, it is [nearly] irrefutable. Also, the people come and ask us...they ask us...they inquire whether such a rumor is real. So this is really what I am saying here, since we are talking about morale here. The question that I have is: do some of these rumors fall in our interest or against our interest for these matters to happen? From one position, if people were assured that

nothing will happen...but the fact is that war was in full swing. I mean all this mighty American Navy force has deployed to the Gulf, entirely. I mean they do not have anything left. They had three aircraft carriers in the Far East, which they also sent to the Gulf; they did not spare [*any ship*]. They are in full swing, and the war is an established fact. With regard to biological warfare, of course, they have published this report for some reason, but it has created a state of fear among the American forces because how is it possible to inoculate this large number of forces within a short and remaining period of time, and they do not know the types of diseases that will result. Is it cholera? Is it typhoid? Is it this or that? So, I am not sure what their motive for posting this report and creating this state of fear within the American and European public opinion is, with regard to their troops.

**Saddam:** They probably have smart people like us.

**Izzat al-Duri:** This way war will not take place.

**Taha Ma'ruf:** This way war will not take place...

**Saddam:** [*Inaudible, voices overlapping*] Israel and the [*inaudible*] threatening with.

**Izzat al-Duri:** Maybe in order not to allow [*inaudible*].

**Taha Ma'ruf:** Raising the morale or?

**Saddam:** If we conduct a survey now to assess two or three issues, we will realize how much damage we have done to the morale of our people over the last period. Do you want to tell me that they do not have experts on damaging the morale of their enemies?

**Izzat al-Duri:** Maybe [*inaudible*]. I say, Mr. President, this is maybe [*inaudible*].

**Taha Ma'ruf:** Anyway, with regard to these rumors, this is a fact that there are large segments of our people who are convinced that there is an Iraqi initiative, or something of the sort, to avoid the war and that such initiative will be announced at the last minute. Such rumors were broadcasted by outside [*foreign*] radio stations, especially Voice of America, which broadcasted such news for three consecutive days, for three days this is what happened. Today they broadcasted it too, the same thing: that this is a last minute initiative that leaves the American administration in a critical situation, because they are prepared to launch a war and, at the same time, [*inaudible*] the American public opinion to be convinced of [*inaudible*]. So is it in our interest to fight this rumor? Is it in our interest to keep it? This is the issue. Other than that, our preparations are very good with regard to civil defense and others, and now our brother, the Minister of the Interior, was speaking before the meeting about the successes, which is indeed a good omen. Our people are cooperating and abiding with the new procedures and instructions, in a good manner. Thank you.

**Saddam:** Comrade Latif.

[Time Stamp: 41:00]

**Latif:** Your Excellency, with regard to rumors or international media, Mr. President, these rumors exist every day in the world on television screens. Almost every other day, if not every day, and every day, there are assurances in the media that Kuwait is the nineteenth province. Also, there are assurances that if this war takes place, America will be crushed. This is reiterated in the newspaper, on television, and on radio. So if all of this is taking place simultaneously, is there any room for rumor? I find that to be strange, I find it strange, because this means that the 5<sup>th</sup> column is stronger than us, and this is impossible, just impossible. The other thing, I mean, every day we see media people. The country has a huge number of television networks. We reiterate on a daily basis that the nineteenth province exists and its policies are stable, there will be no change in this regard, and we do not have anything new to add. This is being broadcasted to Voice of America, and this morning, if Your Excellency has listened, also last night, however, there are rumors. For example, last night, it was broadcast from Egypt that there are secret communications between Iraq and the Americans, and that there is an initiative. Two minutes after that, I repeated the news that was captured by the entire world. We are not sleeping, what is this governorate thing, withdrawal and so and so says this and so and so says that? We have adopted an existing policy, our direction is clear, and once the [Ba'ath] Party hears rumors like that, it should hold a meeting. For the purpose of refuting such innuendos, this is a sort of sabotage; it is a sort of demoralizing factor. Such rumors must be refuted and its flame must be put out in its place. We should not compromise or be lenient with those rumors; we should not give them credibility just because they were broadcast by Voice of America. We can easily counter those rumors because Mr. President is visible on international television screens, and they talk a lot about him with comments about him. You always receive such comment; it is available in the newspaper every day and every other day. So this has to be reflected and presented to the people at a suitable level.

Sir, with regard to civil defense, I would like to present the same comment. This is in regard to what happened at the educational circles among both male and female teachers and the approach on how to present them the facts. My suggestion is that this is not the first time we have gone to war; we have gone through an eight year war. We have practiced civil defense, and we have used aircraft, and we have seen our war with Iran. Let us concentrate on the simple aspect which is first aid, et cetera, and evacuation. I believe that when it comes to evacuation, people will not rely on us. Everyone knows that he has a house or a friend's house, relatives, acquaintances, so the person will evacuate himself naturally without even sensing danger. He will not wait for our vehicles to evacuate. The citizen will not rely on the country to evacuate him, and the country does not have the resources to evacuate the citizen. However, it is important and it is necessary that, at this period, and as we are approaching expectations, that we hope to be positive without anything happening. We need to calm the people and not agitate them or worry [them], even if, effective as of today, we had to completely stop all civil defense procedures. That is enough, the people have understood, we have given signal to the world, and we should rely on calm and well composed television programs that are free of fear tactics, because I am supervising them. We should limit our announcements only to [the treatment of] wounds and first aid, and stop all announcements in schools. We should also stop the work of these four thousand committees that we have formed because they create a state of anxiety among the public. And you know anxiety

and enthusiasm are types of weaknesses, stability and peace of mind is a morale matter, and we have to confront the coming days, and our people are relaxed. This does not deserve a lecture from me and I apologize.

With regard to the media situation and the psychological one, if you allow me to say, Sir, the entire world now is living in a predicament. I mean, this is a fact, and we should not be surprised with this plethora of rumors. We should be surprised if you hear rumors of hope, et cetera, and so forth. The entire world is going through an impasse; the entire globe is in a gridlock. Bush takes a vacation and goes to Camp David. They say he was so bored, and he returned to the White House to refute a rumor of that sort. Bush is also subject to one of these rumor campaigns in an open liberal atmosphere that circulate and twist the talks. The whole world now lives a state of hysteria, but I wonder who wins the round? And I have said, Sir, that this month will be the war of nerves; he who wins the round, is the one who holds himself steady first in the psychological state, because the psychological state is linked to morale. I do not mean here submissiveness, being inactive, et cetera. I mean we should reduce any wasting of our psychological state and excitement, because also the excitement procedures are frightening! Mr. President, when we have a symposium...

[Blank audio from 46:31-46:46]

**Latif:** ...On television, there is no need for the party to have symposiums, there is no need to gather the people every day. I do not want to give instructions to the [*Ba'ath*] Party, but we can mention it in a meeting. I mean, they can listen to the symposium, and we can tell them that the symposium is going to be on the air at 8 o'clock and will discuss Kuwait, America, the morale, the future, and everything, and also includes answers to the questions and even a rebuttal to the rumors. There will even be a rebuttal to the rumors, as he will hear the response from Mr. President, the highest source in Iraq. For these remaining days, I believe, Sir, with all my support to the comrades and their enthusiasm, we all want to make sure of our great potential for success in our mission under your command. We even wish to vanish before making a single mistake; therefore, my request is to work all together in order to reduce the tension of the people in this [*inaudible*]. Even the symposiums, we should reduce them if there is no valid reason for them, because any symposium and talks in addition to the television and newspapers are all playing a big role in making the people tired, and the upcoming days are a war of nerves, and it is still a war of nerves. I expected this right at the beginning, Sir, and I said it. This war is not like the one with Iran. It is a war of nerves and requires a more delicate and precise way to deal with it. Therefore, even with poetry, enticement, and song, we need to deal with them with extreme caution because we do not want [*people*] to hear about it from radio stations and media.

**Saddam:** Yes. How many of you heard that there will be a demonstration on the 12<sup>th</sup> or one day before or one day after, calling for... under the slogan of "We want our President, and we do not want Kuwait"?

**Izzat al-Duri:** [*Inaudible*] Sir, I heard it from the [*Ba'ath*] Party, but I have received a hard copy of the text.

**Saddam:** When?

**Izzat al-Duri:** By God, few days ago, I have received a written text.

**Saddam:** And what have you done about it?

**Izzat al-Duri:** What did I do? These are rumors and they are usually reported to the [Ba'ath] Party meetings through the meetings of the organizational committee, fighting rumors, this is the 5<sup>th</sup> column...

**Saddam:** You could have made a direct statement about them in the media, directly and indirectly, stating that some of the foreign media is promoting such rumors and laugh it off by saying that such rumors exist only in the minds of traitors and so on. We must not say it is rumor, but rather say it was in the foreign media and reject it.

**UM3:** [*Inaudible*] they said if you please... which one is more important to you, is it Kuwait or President Saddam Hussein?

**Saddam:** No, Kuwait is more important to us.

**UM3:** I told them -- [*Interrupted*]

**Saddam:** I say Kuwait is more important to us.

**UM3:** I told them President Saddam -- [*Interrupted*]

**Saddam:** They are both important and both exist [*voices overlap*]... is Saddam Hussein a bird that the cat wants to catch [*prey*]?

**UM3:** Both of them are present and important. I said the same thing.

**Saddam:** Comrades, give me leeway to speak frankly with you. At the present, he who does not want to contribute in raising the morale, I urge him not to contribute in lowering the morale. It is not right that I speak in this manner at the command level, but let me be frank and talk this way with you. What are we, a bunch of kids? First, we have undergone a war that lasted for eight years, every one of us. Some of us have passed fifty years of age, while others, there is no way that any one of you — from all of you sitting — is less than forty years of age. So, don't we know how to deal with the public? Don't we know that when we commit errors in our processes that we should review it immediately? Or is it as simple as one, two, three, four, five, and give it to the people? [*Time Stamp: 51:48*]

In other words, the civil defense did not connect properly with the people. The civil defense has brought us back — at least in Baghdad — to period when the public opinion was agitated in Baghdad, that when we were engaged with Iran. Why did this happen? I have said to Comrade Izzat from the beginning, “You have to swear on your moustache [*traditional Arab saying in*

*which the speaker challenges the integrity of the other man to perform a task*] to pay attention to civil defense; isn't that so? I had a hunch that the civil defense will not be up to par." So why, why is this happening? Our people are united, excellent, their morale is high, and if you spoil the population, you might as well throw it away in the garbage. Is this the way to preserve our people's morale? What is wrong with you? Don't you listen to the people? What is this? Are the people considered a burden on us? Should we treat the people like robots? I have only scared you once throughout my entire life before a war and I have rectified my action in the manner of which you already know. When I scared you and told that we will be hit by atomic bombs. One time you say we want Kuwait, and after that if something happens like this rumor, then you adopt another opinion. I asked you, are you ready? And you responded, "Yes we are ready." And then I have rectified my [*scare tactic*] action, and started erasing all of what I have said, because once a leader makes a decision and corrects what he has done, it proves that he is stronger than a lion. It is not right to deal with people in such a manner. The people have the doctor, have the philosopher, have the poet, have the singer, have the sensitive person, and have the one who, I mean, the one who is whipped, have the weak, and have, etcetera. Weak and unwise people want to rely on something meaningful today to weaken strong people. So do we let them get away with this, giving it to them in a simple manner for free? Well, we have not agreed that this is the correct approach for evacuation. Comrade Izzat, you supervise evacuation. I have told you that evacuation — we are not the ones who will evacuate people, I have said that at the command meeting...

**Izzat al-Duri:** The written plan.

**Saddam:** But — no problem — after the plan, I told you, "Comrade Izzat, the evacuation should be carried out through the citizens acquainting themselves with the countryside, and you told me that this will facilitate many things for us, and will expedite evacuation." I have also talked with Comrade Sa'di.

**Sa'di:** [*Inaudible*] you informed me and told me, "Do not move them, just inform them."

**Saddam:** Just tell them.

**Sa'di:** And we applied this to a section of Baghdad.

**Saddam:** And this will make me comfortable. Those who want to go can go, and those who do not want to go, do not have to go. Fine, with regard to evacuation, this war is not our war with Iran, not even with Israel, because Israel relies on American satellites in order to photograph us. And the Americans sometimes cooperate with them and other times they do not, depending on their existing policies. Right now, when we have identified six areas designated for evacuating Baghdad, did these areas become known or not? People, is it better for them to be bombed in tents, or to be bombed while they are in their houses?

**UM5:** If they intend to attack them.

**Saddam:** If they intend to attack them directly, they will bomb them while they are in their tents.



**UM5:** Easier.

**Saddam:** Because one bomb can destroy an undetermined number of humans. So during this period, under the mantra of zeal, zeal is not always the determining factor. Sometimes if enthusiasm is overemphasized, it yields opposite results, and [*listen*] comrades, we are not far from each other. I am surprised to see that some of you are distanced from the people. And the proof of this is that some of you do not correct your errors when you commit them or when your organization commits it. This is not right. Is transferring [*evacuating*] two million people our goal? The mission is preserving the morale of those two million people after we have completed the evacuation. I place emphasis that when the Iraqi remains in his home, to continue maintaining his high morale, this will be better than moving him through a practice [*evacuation plan*]. If the Iraqi loses his morale, he is defeated. Perhaps I may not venture into war, but it is possible that I might win the war without fighting; this is possible, even if you give it one percent, one per one thousand, this is still a valid possibility. However, if the Iraqi loses his morale, I lose the war before fighting. Now do you see how this phenomena yields opposite results? So now I am not satisfied with the morale of the citizens of Baghdad. Namely, I am not satisfied with civil defense measures that contribute to such low morale.

[*Time Stamp: 57:40*]

**Izzat al-Duri:** [*Inaudible*].

**Saddam:** Why, Comrade Izzat, why do we have to do it this way? We should decide on the evacuation plan and tell them that every citizen should befriend a rural citizen, just in case the war expands and we are forced to evacuate. We should not explain to the citizen what the atomic bomb will do, or tell them what is happening. This talk about the atomic bomb is futile, [*inaudible*] and the talk by Iraqi scientists, no scientist has ever fought throughout the entire world. So creating scientists means you cannot fight. [*Can anyone tell me*] why America has not ventured to a war for a long time now? Because they see our preparation and realize that they will suffer a great [*number of*] human casualties. After that, the decision maker would say that he does not want to remain; he states that whether he wins or fails he will not remain. That is what their newspapers are stating, and I read their newspapers. Also, if Baker [*U.S. Secretary of State James Baker*] decides with him [*Bush*], he will lose his chance for reelection in the next period, because he wanted to become the President after President Bush finishes his term. I did not come with this information; it is them [*the Americans*] who state such information. So, I just want to understand, why this happened... Yes, Comrade [*inaudible*] why did this happen? What is going on, my dear? Also, any measure, when we say the evacuation was successful — I hear this as if we are dealing with pebbles, so let us say we have moved them, transported them and then returned them back, and then we can say the evacuation was successful. I consider the evacuation to be a failure if it will diminish the people's morale. These are the things that do not make us lose.

To inform you the citizens of Baghdad, the citizens of Karbala, the citizens of Tikrit, to befriend a farmer in the countryside, we want to reduce casualties. When the bombing intensifies on you,

instead of giving two hundred, we should give five [*hundred*]. What will make us give five [*hundred*] is the deployment in the countryside. For those who do not have vital work in the city with the exception of youths who are capable of operating a weapon, as per your plan, isn't that the plan? [*Speakers in the background agree*] Fine. They will go, and who among them will not be able to take a taxi or... perhaps some of them have already made up their mind and have chosen a place, a small village, a small governorate, or a small district, et cetera. So who are those demonstrating and saying, "We need our President not Kuwait?" You know that when this rumor spreads, it has the same effect as giving up Kuwait. The person who concocted this mantra is very smart, smarter than all of us combined, all of us sitting down. He was able to take Kuwait back through a rumor. The good Iraqis would say, by God, Kuwait came to us after the 2<sup>nd</sup> of August. Before the 2<sup>nd</sup> of August we acquired all what we have within the shadows of the men who rule us. So if we lose those men, what will we do with Kuwait? No, we do not want Kuwait. They can take it. Where would Kuwait be in the middle of these rumors? A demonstration that is orchestrated by twenty traitors who drag with them all people on the street, they hear slogans praising Saddam. They join in, and they repeat, we need Saddam and do not want Kuwait. They repeat we do not care about Kuwait, are you going to fire at them or join them? This was stated by a newspaper in England, the French paper *Le Monde*, and the French paper *Le Figaro*, that is also going to publish it. We should not simply watch; we should go to the radio station, get four or five of our newsmen to ask us. They ask us and so on, and we say that *Le Figaro* newspaper was the one spreading the rumors. We should prepare what to tell them: that such rumors will be instigated by disloyal agents and traitors, and our position is firm and stable and Kuwait is Iraqi, and he who does not like that can bang his head on a mountain. When we are firm like that, the good Iraqis will realize the facts, and the five people who fabricated the rumor are standing alone and the other ten thousand leave and evaporate, and the rumor will be buried instantly. I tell you, this is not permissible, I did not hear this rumor except for, not the last night but the night before.

[*Time Stamp: 01:03:05*]

**UM6:** Thursday.

**Saddam:** Thursday. I have written to the comrade immediately, I have heard it from a citizen. He told me this is what happened: we are hesitant to inform you but this matter is worrying. But for a number of people to go out and come up with the rumor, this would incite other people to march with them on the street. People will say, "Yes we need Saddam Hussein." If the whole matter is presented that way, if you give people a choice between Saddam Hussein or Kuwait, they will say, "No we need Saddam Hussein." This is the first time that I deal with such great urgency to confront this type of rumor, because I realized its danger, and therefore, I immediately wrote to Comrade Sa'doun. Last night, Abd came to me to inform me that someone, the son of [REDACTED], who is he?

**UM7:** No Sir, Dr. [REDACTED].

**Saddam:** [REDACTED], a citizen from al-'Ujah, is that not so?

**UM7:** No Sir, [*inaudible*] Baghdad, [REDACTED] is [*inaudible*].

**Saddam:** What?

**UM7:** His father is a martyr of the 41[*inaudible*].

**Izzat al-Duri:** His father was a pilot.

**Saddam:** You mean [redacted] not [redacted] like you just said. He said that rumors could get out of hand, and all the women will hit the road and join in the demonstrations. The situation will be difficult. So I said gather all the leadership, we cannot just listen to the rumor and remain quiet. I mean, this rumor will lead to another. One subject will lead to another. To hell with Kuwait. When you portray Kuwait in that manner, Kuwait will be worth zero, and when Kuwait is worth zero, it is true that we emphasize various aspects: the cultural, national, spiritual and whatever else the international aspect, but this matter is vital, it is in our hand, and it affects the enthusiasm of our fighters. There is a connection now between all of these aforementioned aspects—the nationalistic, ethnic and humanistic—but the nationalistic aspect is within our grip, it exists, and if it falls from the hand, nothing will remain. I mean the ethnic and nationalistic [*aspects*] are worth fighting for except for a few types of people, and our people and army are not like them, and we cannot fight without our entire people and with all our army in this type of battle. Because, if such awareness existed, we would have seen all the Jordanians at the war front, all the Algerians, and all the Palestinians; however, the local and direct issues continue to play their role in the large collective preparedness for sacrifice and martyrdom. Fine, how come our party was negligent in detecting such rumors? I mean, when Comrade Sa'di found out and took actions et cetera, but as soon as the rumor emerges and spreads in a manner that I would find out about it on two consecutive days and from various individuals and not from the [*Ba'ath*] Party chain of command, this means the issue at hand [*inaudible*] let us say that this has spread to one fourth of the people, one fourth of this number is one million people, one million [*inaudible*]. Thank you. They become five million.

**UM6:** Sir Pardon me, the number -- [*Interrupted*]

**Saddam:** Do you think five million people is a small number? Our people are running in demonstrations calling for the relinquishment of Kuwait and to preserve our president. Who is their president, a bird that the cat wants to eat [*prey*]? Isn't that a shame? This means that the Party is not effective; this is how I understand it. What do you mean that a party has a membership of one million and a half and is not even showing [*up*]? This is not awareness. The women should even assist in the awareness; she should say shut up this is not true. [*In*] a situation like that, ten people could spread ten rumors while we are fighting. This is not the way to fight battles. This war needs adequate preparation. You are all smart folks, but this rumor requires quick reaction that is aimed; it does not require emotional reaction. The most important point is that the commander must know exactly what types of tools are in his hand and to use them at the required moment, the commander knows that he has a newspaper; he knows that he has a television; and he knows he has radio; and he knows he has a party; and he knows he has members and people; and he knows there will be a symposium at al-Mustansiriyah; and he knows etcetera. [*Time Stamp: 01:08:40*]

But this approach of "learn as you go," by God, my comrades, if it is a matter of conferences and education, what we have done here, has never been done during the Iraq- Iran war, and not during all the [Ba'ath] Party fights. Every day we connect with our people through the television, for what, to talk to the Spaniard? Didn't we talk with him at al-Imarah, but what is important is what the [Ba'ath] Party has done with regard to the conversations that took place with the Spaniards. This is better than [Ba'ath] Party section members conducting awareness campaigns—just as Comrade Latif said—let him first understand the words of Saddam Hussein and come up with lessons learned and to concentrate on the psychological aspect as well as corrective measures. That is why I go back and say that this chaos occurs and is expected to happen because our enemy is the official world, the official world, and our enemy's capabilities are great, so this chaos is expected to occur, but is not expected to continue—I mean, for the rumor to continue. People circulate the rumor as if we do not have a party, in a totally convincing manner. I mean, there are people who suspected the rumor but were afraid to mention it and embarrass me, as if I have planned it all up as a tactic and do not wish to respond to them. This is considered a defeat, a defeat in the science of mobilization, which means that awareness and defenses within our people are unstable. Our people are not concerned about the high profile issues, but they were concerned about the phrases that sickened them the last couple of weeks. It is possible that we were very harsh in describing [*the actions*] of Comrade Samir since he was the one following up this matter, but frankly, you have frightened people Comrade Samir. Your duty as a command member is not to frighten people. Your duty is to enlighten them and build up their morale. But as for fright, by God, I can defeat them with one story, stronger than yours tenfold...defeat them. Besides comrades, is your number correct? Do we have one million and a half party members? Is that so?

**UM6:** Of course.

**Saddam:** So is there any family that does not have one Party member? Let us see how far our circle will extend, if the interaction between the supporter and command member takes twenty days, and if in twenty-four hours it reaches the [Party] supporter as a different matter, even if it is necessary, and we need to focus our efforts. We can allocate a segment at the radio, a segment for Party instructions. There is nothing wrong with that [*a speaker is interjecting in the background, however his voice is inaudible*]. Huh? But if I have a rumor today and I respond to it after twenty days, it is over; it has already filtered through and became effective. For some rumors if they circulate for forty-eight hours, the opponent plans for its rumors to remain for forty eight hours. These are the rumors. This is how the Americans think; they concoct rumors, and some of them plan rumors for seventy-two hours, and some plan for twenty-four hours. Such rumors are supposed to be put off immediately. Put off! We have a manual about rumors and how to tackle them. Return it to the Party [*headquarters*] so that you can study it. We have a manual. Don't we have a manual like that issued by the Party? [*Speakers say yes in the background*] Then bring it back! We have a manual that has been issued ten years ago, review it one more time. Aren't you organizational leaders? [*Saddam is rebuking his associates, his tone displays displeasure and anger*]. Comrade Izzat, have you issued an analysis on why the people in Kirkuk are different from those of Al-Sulaymaniyya, or is this just a phenomenon? This is not right. You know that I do not sleep at night when I see the soldier [*inaudible*], Comrade Izzat, I

urge you -- *[Interrupted]*

*[Time Stamp: 01:13:45]*

**Izzat al-Duri:** *[Inaudible]* I will explain to you the picture.

**Saddam:** No, dear brother, do not explain to me. You are responsible for the organization, and you have to involve the Party there and find out, investigate the matter with the people of all classes, the worker, and the farmer, until we discover the reason. Comrade Hassan, have you conducted an analysis as to why?

**Hassan:** Yes, Sir.

**Saddam:** What is it?

**Hassan:** Yes Sir, my information says that the practices and mobilization in Kirkuk are all good. We noticed that just the Turkmen are not open, only the Turkmen. So I addressed the branch and said the Turkmen might be listening to the Turkish media, and based on Turkey's position the Turkmen build their negative position. It is not one hundred percent negative, but there was a phenomenon in the Party's command which they reported and therefore, I arranged a plan with the Party so we can get the Turkmen involved with us in the war. Although, honestly Sir, there have been some activities right after midnight of the national defense and not the civil defense for occupying some targets or starting fires. The response in the province was a great one, no one was absent. As far as the Popular Army volunteers, it was good, and so were the Fedayeen. The Party activity among the people was excellent, but the Turkmen situation is under our examination and we are planning to hold constant meetings with them.

**Saddam:** But aren't the Turkmen Iraqi too?

**Hassan:** Sir, in order to feel -- *[Interrupted]*

**Saddam:** If someone does not feel like an Iraqi why is he in Iraq then?

**Hassan:** Sir, this is exactly our point.

**Saddam:** This is the land of Iraqis whether they are Kurds, Turkmen, Arab, M'aidi *[referring to the people who live in the lakes area]*, or Sheikh. This is not class related war, but rather a national war if you look more carefully at the national side of it.

**Hassan:** Sir, the talks of Your Excellency are the foundation to strengthen the patriotism of Iraqis, especially for the Kurds and -- *[Interrupted]*

**Saddam:** No one is hurting the Kurds although they feel that they need to pay more *[do more]*. Why Sulaymaniyya, or Sulaymaniyya and not Irbil? Because Sulaymaniyya felt that they were unjustly treated because they drifted away from the march. Therefore, they are trying to remedy

the past and move on to the future. We have explained to them, and you have explained as well, but I do not believe it is about explanation; rather, the communication means it is not working the way it should. It is about the march and the communication of mankind. Well, why would the Turkmen come from Kirkuk now and *[inaudible]*? They just described the Turkmen? How many Turkmen are in Kirkuk? The phenomenon that Comrade Izzat saw was not this way.

**Izzat al-Duri:** The Party, Sir, *[inaudible]*.

**UM7:** No, Sir, Mr. Deputy did the evacuation.

**Saddam:** At the Party.

**UM7:** Sir, Mr. Deputy did the evacuation through the civil defense committee and the agriculture committee. I mean *[inaudible; voices overlapping]*.

**Izzat al-Duri:** Pardon me, comrades, members of the People Council, *[inaudible; voices overlapping with UM7]* the Party and liberal cadre of the governorate. *[Inaudible]* people's leader and Party command. The Party and liberal cadre.

**Saddam:** Comrade, once you receive the -- *[Interrupted]*

**UM7:** Yes, Sir.

**Hassan:** Sir, we are following up on this and we made a study, and we are following up on it through conferences, meetings, visits and other methods. Sir, about the rumor that says, "We do not want Kuwait but we want Saddam Hussein," we did not receive it from all provinces, but from Irbil. I personally turned it back, did not report it to the *[Party]* command, and called the Party official and told him, "The branch has to respond immediately in a conference, meeting or other way. The district of Kuwait is the nineteenth province based on the instructions of the chief in command and the leadership as well. Now Kuwait is back and Kuwait became Iraqi and it was an Iraqi *[province]* historically." *[Time Stamp: 01:18:41]*

Sir, based on your teaching and instruction, we are studying it and analyzing it and understanding it. Even the symposiums, Sir -- *[Interrupted]*

**Saddam:** Abu... Abu-Falah.

**Abu-Falah:** Yes, Sir.

**Saddam:** Well, we now have two comrades who emphasized that we need to think analytically more than having enthusiasm about Kuwait being an Iraqi province. Well, a law has been issued in this regard, and we are done with that. Now, the essential part is to implant such a law in the hearts, conscience, and minds of the Iraqi people. How do we do that? By analysis...analysis. I will explain it to you. We will not protect the security of Iraq if we give back Kuwait. We will not protect the economy of Iraq if we give back Kuwait. We will not protect the morale of Iraqi

society if we give back Kuwait. This is not enthusiasm either, but I will explain it to you. The security of Iraq was threatened before, so how about after all that has happened? They made the price of oil five dollars [*a gallon*] in order to hurt the economy of Iraq. Why? Because they have the ability abroad to invest it, even when the oil costs five dollars [*a gallon*], and make it work and benefit their investment globally, especially the profits they made from the oil derivatives. So by lowering the price of oil, that helps their production and the cost of their products. They will buy low-priced oil and then sell it as oil products [*derivatives*] at higher prices, making a profit as well. Thus, reducing the oil prices makes it economically cheaper for them. However, if we have only 5% of the global oil reserves, the conspiracy will be against us. But if we have 20% of the global oil reserves, there will not be a conspiracy against us. We can control some aspects with the 20%. So if we kept Kuwait with us, the oil prices are going to be in a good condition, but if we lost it, the oil prices will fall down, and the poor people in Iraq will be in a state of poverty for long time.

**Izzat al-Duri:** [*Inaudible*] divided, [*inaudible*] underdeveloped.

**Saddam:** This is on one hand. So returning Kuwait to us is to the best of our interest. This is the way that I need the command members to explain it—not just listen to what they said that Kuwait is an Iraqi city or Kuwait is the nineteenth province. This is not enough. We must educate our citizen and make it clear that he gained something big. It is his glory and his children's glory; it is his security and his children's security, and all are connected together. Once this leverage takes effect, Israel will not strike Iraq, because Iraq is going to have a high level of deterrence power if the means were available, but if the means are not available, Israel has the U.S. power and always has deterrence power that can be used against Iraq, while Iraq does not have [*inaudible*] America to spend on it. Therefore, Iraq needs to spend in order to protect itself. If we did not explain it in such a way, then we would not be leading the people because the member or supporter may repeat this and say that Kuwait became an Iraqi city and that the Revolutionary Command Council issued a resolution supporting such a thing. Therefore, the leadership member shall be an educator in order to convince the public of the reason behind the resolution, the essential part of the resolution, and why the resolution shall continue. Go ahead, Comrade Hassan.

**Hassan:** Sir, I want to assure Your Excellency that we are following your method of explanation or analyzing the issue historically. We are explaining in detail the importance of the security of Iraq. I believe that the enthusiasm that you see in the region is because of the deep understanding of the citizens. We are not just explaining that Kuwait is the nineteenth province but the important matters that related to returning Kuwait and the impact of returning Kuwait on the future of Iraq. So the citizens are aware, Sir, that in case Iraq withdraws from Kuwait, Iraq will be destroyed. Citizens started to -- [*Interrupted*]

**Saddam:** They put a plan [*in place*] now to control the oil fields even in a peaceful situation. Even the suggestion lists that they are going to present to us, they want to be involved and specify numerous tactics on how to produce oil and how to manage the oil fields. The current lists and the project run by France have this proposal and here we are still discussing who accept what, the French and the Americans. This means that the West is thinking of controlling the oil,

producing oil, how much to produce and how much to use, where and into what products the oil will be made, and [if] it is authorized, how many oil derivatives you are allowed to produce, while marketing the rest. All of this is going to be enforced upon us one day by the Western mentality, unless the Arabs are able to confront such mentality.

[Time Stamp: 01:25:06]

**Hassan:** Sir, be confident of the method that we are following I assure you that -- [Interrupted]

**Saddam:** I swear that I am not confident.

**Hassan:** Sir, the educational process -- [Interrupted]

**Saddam:** These are issues in front of me, and with an ongoing rumor that was once there, I do not feel assured even if you fight it for five days. However, I was hoping that the Party should have killed this rumor immediately, on the same day...an atmosphere that kills the rumor. The other part is how can we feel assured if the people of Baghdad are frightened like the people of Salah al-Din, [inaudible]?

**All:** In Mosul.

**Saddam:** And the people of Mosul were frightened. I do not feel comfortable. How can I feel assured? Yes, you are telling me to have confidence, but how can I feel that way when the people of Kirkuk are not cooperating?!

**UM7:** [Inaudible] I do not know, Sir.

**Saddam:** Having confidence does not mean giving it up this way to the Americans. If all Iraqis were frightened [inaudible]. This is a final decision, and it became final from the time we made it. All the ongoing discussion and flexibility about doing our part in the region, our part in keeping the security of the region and not giving Kuwait back! We have nothing to negotiate with the Arabs; Arabs were always giving away their rights. We have nothing now; we have our role to contribute to the security, but to bargain, we have nothing to bargain with. Yes Comrade Izzat.

**Izzat al-Duri:** Mr. President, first I would like to apologize if I am going to say any impolite words, and also I want to apologize to Comrade Hassan and others as well. As far as my following up with the Party, I see that all comrades are hardworking and struggling with great spirit, and I did not see a single hesitant one [comrade]. But recently, I heard that my words became offensive against our comrades or that I may have said something that hurt them, but my intention is that I do not want to say something that might hurt or destroy the revolution in Iraq or hurt the great principles and the great role of Iraq or our journey in the region. What I am saying is that we all need to support each other, as one comrade needs to be supported by his comrade, the Party, and the leadership in order to achieve our mission. Do you all think that



Comrade Hassan alone can come up with people in the north and make them all supportive and fight in Um-al-Maarek [*The Mother of All Battles*]?

[*Several attendees reply, "No way."*]

**Izzat al-Duri:** No way, so I must help you. The leader must help you, and so must the comrades. I am positive that the people of Kirkuk have less than any province of Iraq. Why? Because there are indications that say so, which are all documented in my files. [*Inaudible*] I read the situation through the Party; the reflection of my people is the Party. Mr. President, until this moment, we have treated the Kurds in Kirkuk as second class citizens. The Kurds in Kirkuk are not like the Kurds in Sulaymaniyya, Dohuk, or Irbil. We agreed to make the original Kurds a part of Kirkuk's people, if you remember when I told you four months ago to lift restrictions off them. Up to this moment they have not conducted any selling or buying transactions in the province. They are prohibited from buying or selling anything. They cannot buy a house or land in the province or conduct business like other citizens. And now, the Kurds have become --  
[*Interrupted*]

**Saddam:** This is a logical reason.

**Izzat al-Duri:** Honestly, the Kurds are now the first to report among the fighters. Truly, I see this point through the Party. We don't [*inaudible*] the Kurds because I see the Kurds, the counselors, business men, and scholars. I mean, their position is much stronger than the Arabs' [*position*] and better than many Arabs' [*position*]. However, Kirkuk is always like that, and we talk about it so much so that we can run away from our responsibility toward such a city. Regarding one of the meetings that took place yesterday, I would like to apologize to Comrade Latif because I said harsh words and first of all to Mr. President. I consider myself [*inaudible*] and promise, God willing, that I shall not say a harsh word against any comrade from now on. We have five million and four hundred thousand volunteers, and the way I see the volunteer is as a volunteer, because he is coming to fight by his own free will. Now they form support to the Public Army—two or three million Popular Army volunteers. Now we do not have one hundred thousand Popular Army volunteers and we cannot chase people on the street to volunteer for the Public Army. Do you call that volunteering? The commandos—you asked us for two thousand commandos but we have four hundred and sixty thousand commandos and they are volunteers for commando's mission—some of them escaped today from the training camp. They brought them by force to the training camp, from which they escaped. Also, each province has its own share of the commandos and volunteers ready with their weapon just waiting for the command. This is for the training. I think when it comes to the real fight, with regard to a commando's fight, the level of readiness for action will be less. In this meeting, I am sorry to say that, and this is the first time I say, if I did not say it before, that I have wronged you, Mr. President. I say wronged because I did not show you part of my work and neither the nature of my relation with you nor the nature of my work were presented to you. I mean, you did not receive anything from me. You do not hear anything from me and no one bears responsibility like I do when I report things to you about Comrade Hassan, Comrade Sa'di, or others. No one reports anything about me. I want... [*Audio is cut off mid-sentence*].

SH-SHTP-A-001-043

[*Time Stamp: 01:33:18*]

**End of Recording**