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# The Sweet Years And The Bitter Years

(1)

*[Signature]*

*Barzan al-Tikriti*

*July/ 2001*

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I was born in late 1951 to a family, you could say, belonging to the middle class in our region, the city of Tikrit. I completed my elementary education in Tikrit, and then moved to Baghdad after completing the 6<sup>th</sup> year of my elementary education. In the first quarter of the year 1963, after my step brother Saddam got married right after returning from Cairo where he was a political refugee after having taken part in the known attempt to assassinate Iraqi Prime Minister Major General `Abdal-Karim Qasim in the year of 1959, I moved to Baghdad to live with him because I was closer to him than his two other brothers. In his messages that he used to send from Cairo, he would urge my father, may Allah bless his sole, to take special care of me and used to tell him, "Pay attention to Barzan because I think he is of high class character and I expect a bright future for him." He very much loved and admired me because of distinguishing traits he thought I possessed.

I joined him at the end of June in 1963 and we lived in a small residence that consisted of two bedrooms - one for him and his wife and one for me - in addition to a living room, dining room and a small hall, etc., suitable for family members who visited us every once in a while. However, those visits were very few and far between because his wife was rude, stingy and did not like to have visitors, etc. In contrast, Saddam was hospitable and affectionate. Her human characteristics and her way of thinking were far below that which the wife of such man should be. The residence was located in the area of Raghibat Khatun, near 'Omar `Abd-al-`Aziz Street, the very same street where the family of the late martyr Nazim

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[TC note: this is a slightly different version of page 2]

I was born in late 1959, specifically in November of that year, and what helped to know the exact month, was my older brother. I was born to a family, you could say, belonging to the middle class in our region, the City of Tikrit.

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al-Tabaqajli used to live. It was a wonderful period of time because the area was beautiful at that time and full of [IL] and Palm Trees. People used to take care of parks and sidewalks, and services were good at that time. Therefore, the streets were clean and there were parks in every city. I used to play with the children at those parks during the summertime. Life was easy and the relations between people, unfortunately, were better than they are now. Our relations with the neighbors were good and I forged friendships with the children of our neighbors who were of the same age as mine. I was studying at Al-Muthanna Middle School that was nearby the former `Antar Square. I used to go to school by bus and sometimes on foot with the children of our neighbors who were studying with me in the same school. Unfortunately, however, this wonderful period of time did not last long because the Ba'thist regime at that time had fallen, and everything had changed because Saddam went to Syria. When he returned, he took refuge in a hangout that belonged to the Ba'th Party because the authorities at that time had issued a warrant for his arrest. Along with the mother of `Uday, I remained in my uncle Saddam's house because his wife was pregnant with her older son (`Uday). The school where she was studying, at Al-Karkh area, was located near my uncle's house. This is why she used to spend most of her time there. As for me, I used to visit her there and stay in my uncle's house on the weekend. However, I used to spend the rest of the week alone because of my schooling, and also because of our fear that our house might be looted if it was not attended to. Imagine a child barely thirteen years old taking on such a duty. Since then, I forged friendship of understanding, respect and love with Shajarat Al-Dur. Such a friendship of understanding, respect and love began to deepen and indeed had rooted.

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In 1964, after the party's attempt to take over rule of the country had failed, Saddam was arrested in late October or November and remained in prison until the middle of 1966 when he escaped and his case was arbitrated with the regime and consequently closed because of the mediation of the late al-Bazzaz and Sa'id Salibi. At any rate, I do not know the details of how his problem was solved and closed. We then moved to the Al-Mansur area nearby my uncle's house (he is the father of my wife and Saddam's wife — Mr. Khayrallah Al-Talfah). Because the house that we were living in was located just over one hundred meters from my uncle's house, and since our family and my uncle's family were just like one family due to the good relations and the traditions that ruled our society and prevailed among relatives at that time, I used to spend most of my free time at my uncle's house. This was especially the case when they had no one to run the errands that every household required. Therefore, I used to go to the market at the end of the street to buy what they needed, just as I used to do for our family. During this time I used to meet with Shajarat Al-Dur along with the rest of the family as friends and relatives. I was very concerned for her and cared for her. As I mentioned, I used to respect her very much because of her character, even though she was young at that time. However, her rare traits were obvious - she was generous, calm, loving, and truthful and had a wonderful personality that was loved by all - and all relatives and family members looked at her differently than her sister (the mother of `Uday). They respected her and dealt with her differently, as if she was older than her age. She was hospitable, loving, attractive, very polite and shy, and yet she still had a strong personality.

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We lived in that house until after the coup in July, 1968. The family atmosphere was a nice one, built on love and respect. Our sister Siham, a high school student, was living with us and used to care for Saddam's children, `Uday and Qusay, as well as taking care of the household tasks. The mother of `Uday was a teacher, and for this reason, as well as because of her less than generous nature, she could not take care of the household tasks. My relationship with Saddam was nice and loving, based on love and respect. He always treated me as a grown man, and depended on me when he was absent. I was like a shadow to him, especially during the summer times after school was out. I used to go everywhere with him. He used to go to his party's activities and attend lower level as well as leadership level meetings, and he used to commission me with some party duties such as delivering a message to the late Al-Bakr, greeting the party members until his return, or storing and maintaining the weapons, grenades and military uniforms. Earlier, when he was hiding from the regime and moving between the party's hideouts, I used to visit him in those hideouts. He used to depend on me and was not worried that I would tell his secrets or that security forces would be able to follow me to discover his hideout.

In 1964, he was hiding in a hideout in the area of Al-Mansur, more specifically on Nafi' Dawud street. There, the late `Abd-al-Karim Al-Shaykhali was hiding along with him. They introduced me to the Sa'ad family with whom they were living. Abu 11day [Saddam] told me that, "Abu Shihab (*he* meant `Abd-al-Karim Al-Shaykhali) is your party's official." Of course I knew he was kidding with me, because I used to feel the difference between me and Abu Shihab in regard to

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his party's rank — both of them shaved their mustaches and put on prescription glasses for disguise. They spent their daytime in the house, did not go out of the house except on very rare occasions that forced them to go out. The relationship between the two of them was excellent and lasted about two years after the party took over rule and the competition for the spoils had begun. This is natural in the work of the revolutionary parties and bandits, because all the revolutionary parties and bandits begin by killing each other after they hold up the bank or after they have realized their objectives. There are many examples of such actions in the region and worldwide.

I knew the party was preparing for a coup ... Abu `Uday promised to take me with him at the time of execution, more specifically to the Republican Palace, which was the first target of the coup (the revolution). However, that attempt had failed when discovered by an officer of the Air Force, the husband of late Ahmad Hasan AlBakr's daughter and the cousin of 'Ali Hasan. Who was that officer? He was Tahah `Abdullah Al-Sultan, and naturally, in the same time, he was Saddam's cousin. However, Saddam did not have good relations with his uncles because they disavowed him after he murdered Hajj Sa'dun, one of our relatives. Hajj Sa'dun was murdered because he was the reason our uncle, Mr. Khayrallah, was forced to retire from his post as General Director of the Ministry of Education, which made my uncle very mad and incited Saddam to kill him. He bought a hand gun for him and Saddam went to Tikrit, waited for him in the road he used to take to return home at night and killed him. For this reason, Tahah `Abdullah informed the intelligence with news of the coup, after which the intelligence conducted a widespread campaign to arrest the members of the Ba'th Party and its supporters. A massacre of the partisans had taken place in the general security and military intelligence detention centers, causing the collapse of many partisans because of their families collapse and expulsion from their homes. This made Saddam angry at him,

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and he vowed to kill him. However, as days went on, he had refrained from doing so. Despite the party's setback, Saddam did not refrain from working and continued his activities to achieve his objective, which was to take over rule of the country. Therefore, he began to be active while in the military prison number (1) at Al-Rashid military compound. He gave us messages to deliver to the party's transitional leadership, which was formed after the party's leadership and most of its members were arrested and detained. Mr. Fatik Al-Safi, who we knew well and considered a friend, and moreover one of our family because he was a comrade and a friend of Saddam, was the secretary general of that transitional leadership. He was a sincere friend in a way very hard to describe. During this time, he used to give us messages to deliver to al-Bakr who was detained at al-Taji military compound, and who, at the same time was working hard to escape from prison. For this reason, he asked me to buy a steel pair of scissors for him to cut through the bars of the window and then through the prison's fence to escape, which I did. I placed the pair of scissors beneath a pot that contained "al-Dulmah" [TN: an Iraqi dish / food], and took it with us when we went to visit him. At the same time, he asked me to bring the ID card of our cousin Mahmud Ghalib al-Khattab, a friend of Abu '11day, who looked exactly like him, especially when he put on the Arabic uniform. I therefore went to Tikrit and brought the ID card. I told my father that Abu `1.1day was likely to escape from prison within that month, and that Ghalib should wait for him in a location predetermined by Saddam at al-`1Jjah Village while carrying two rifles, one belonging to my father and the other belonging to Ghalib. However, I do not know the reasons that prevented him from escaping from prison at that time. He remained in prison until he was able to escape in the first quarter



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of 1966, when he escaped along with the late Hasan al-`Amri while revisiting the hospital. At that time, contrary to what was happening during Ba'th days, a prisoner used to go either to a hospital or to have an examination if he was a student. He was able to convince his guards to have lunch at one of the restaurants and the guards agreed. Therefore, they went to al-Jandul Restaurant on Abu Nawwas street, where the guards sat at one table while Saddam and his friends sat at another table. During lunch, they conspired to escape and agreed that Saddam and `Abd-al-Karim should escape while Hasan was to remain sitting at the table. Saddam was to go to the washroom, followed by `Abd-al-Karim after a few minutes. They would then both escape from the side door that led to Al-Sa'dun street. They actually carried out their plan. When the guards finished their lunch they went and asked Hasan Al-Amri about the others and he told them that they went to the washroom, and when they went to the washroom to look for them, they found no one. Saddam went to the house that belonged to the father of Farouk al-Samra'i, located in the area of al-Harithiyyah. As for `Abd-al-Karim, he went to a house that belonged to one of his unknown relatives, and, as I mentioned before, after two months or so, the issue was resolved. Therefore, Saddam began working to get the party together after it was disarranged and weakened, especially after the split that took place in February of 1966. Despite the conflict and disarray of the party, combined with the hopelessness of most Ba'thists, he was able to do this with the help of his party's comrades as well as some courageous men outside the party's ranks. Among these men were the late Hardan al-Tikriti, who played an important role in gaining the military personnel who occupied critical positions in the army and Air Force, and also Hammad Shihab, commander of the 10<sup>th</sup> Armored Brigade,

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whose military compound was located at al-Warrar. The late Hammad Shihab was approached by one of his friends. However, he refrained at the beginning, saying that he had vowed his loyalty to the country and therefore he could not betray that loyalty. As he put it, however, the people of Kharbit House continued their pressure until they convinced him that the country was in a miserable condition in general, and a patriot's duty, as they put it, necessitated rescuing the country. They argued that this was his duty [talking to Hammad Shihab], and that he must go to the president of the Republic, `Abd-al-Rahman `Arif and tell him that, and also to suggest that he should appoint Ahmad Hasan al-Bakr as the Prime Minister, since he was a representative of the Ba'th Party. If he were to agree, then this is what was required, but if he did not, then you [Hammad Shihab] are freed of your loyalty to him. Hammad Shihab then agreed and went to the president of the country and spoke with him regarding what was agreed upon. However, the president of the republic did not agree and rejected the idea. Therefore, Hammad Shihab returned and informed the Kharbit House, who then informed Abu `1.1day, who in turn asked them to make an appointment with Hammad Shihab. That was done at the house of `Abd-al-Karim Al-Kharbit, who was a friend of the party and most of his brothers were Ba'thist. He spoke with Abu `Uday and then agreed to take part in the coup, and at the time of execution was determined to move in the direction of Baghdad at five O'clock in the morning of 7/17/1968. However, at the determined time the 10th Brigade did not do anything. This was because the revolutionaries had complete control of the Republican Palace, all of the guard forces, the military forces, the police, the security, and the headquarters of the Ministry of Defense, and had faced no noticeable resistance. For this reason, the 10th Brigade did not arrive to Baghdad.

As for how `Abd-al-Raziq al-Nayif and `Abd-al-Rahman al-Dawud took part in the changes, this is another story. In brief, `Abd-al-Raziq Al-Nayif,

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who was the actual director of the military intelligence, was informed that the Ba'thists would carry out a coup during the next couple of days. The most likely source of this news was the American CIA, through Mr. Nasir Al-Hani. Al-Hani was the Iraqi Ambassador in Lebanon at that time, and the connecting link to the Americans. He became the Minister of Foreign Affairs in the administration of `Abd-al-Razzaq al-Nayif, the first Prime Minister after the coup of 7/17/1968, and it should be noted that his current wife is an American who was imprisoned in 1982 when she was accused of talking about her husband's role in the coup of 7/17/1968 [IL].

The late Sa'dun Ghidan, commander of the Republican Guard's Tank Regiment, [IL] who was contacted by the late Hardan, agreed to take part in the coup operation, and it was he who allowed the regiment in on the dawn of 7/17/1968. `Abd-al-Razzaq al-Nayif was known for his intelligence, and after some pondering, went to visit al-Bakr, who enjoyed the respect of the army officers. Because the army at that time has its own traditions and principals, al-Bakr was surprised by that visit and became suspicious. After general conversation over coffee and tea, `Abd-al-Razzaq stood up to leave, and, at the door of the guest room, he said to al-Bakr, "Sir, I wish you success." Al-Bakr replied back, "What do you mean?" `Abdal-Razzaq then answered, "Sir, you know what I mean" and then left. A few minutes after `Abd-al-Razzaq had left, al-Bakr sent a messenger to our house in the al-Mansur area which I mentioned previously. The messenger asked to see Abu `Uday immediately. It was around noon and the weather was hot. Abu `Uday went there and I went along with him. There we found al-Bakr in an indescribable condition. When Abu `Uday asked, he said that the revolution plan was discovered. Abu `Uday then asked, "How so?" Al-Bakr proceeded to tell him the whole story, after which Abu `Uday answered that the issue was not worth all that worry and the bad condition he was in. Al-Bakr then asked, "How so?", and Abu `Uday asked him to summon `Abd-al-Razzaq so that he could meet with him. Al-Bakr then said: "What do you want to tell him?" Abu `Uday replied, "Just bring him here and you will hear what I will tell him." Al-Bakr sent a messenger to bring `Abd-al-Razzaq al-Nay if in, and `Abd-al-Razzaq came in smiling like a fox and sat down. Abu `Uday then said, "Abu Haytham told me what happened, and indeed you are our brother. However, we did not approach you about this subject to alienate

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you. Rather, we are determined to have you participate after the execution of the operation, and now there is no problem. You could consider yourself as one of us." `Abd-al-Razzaq replied by saying, "I must take part in it because I want the position of Prime Minister and want `Abd-al-Rahman Dawud to be the Minister of Defense." Abu `Uday answered by saying, "We are not concerned with the Prime Minister position because it has to do with the daily affairs and the many problems of the citizens, and there is no one better than you for the position of the Prime Minister. However, as to the Minister of Defense position, we do not have a professional army man for this position, and we must trust Major `Abd-al-Rahman al-Dawud, who is taking part in this operation. Therefore, there is no problem. Let us go for it." If it was not for this idea, `Abd-al-Razzaq would have certainly informed the regime within 24 hours. For he would have lost hope in taking part in the operation, and the situation would have been worse than what happened on 9/5/1964, when the first attempt was discovered. This issue was contained, however, and of course I was not inside the room where all this took place. But Abu `11day later told me what happened.

Around noon on Tuesday 7/16/1968, I went along with Abu `Uday and Hatim alIzzawi, the president's comrade during the attempt to assassinate `Abd-al-Karim Qasim, to see Mr. Ahmad Amin. At that time, Mr. Amin was the General Director of Frozen Assets, and Abu `Uday asked Ahmad Amin to appoint Hatim as an employee in the Frozen Assets Treasury. Despite Hatim's separation from the party - and for that matter his immoral stance against Abu `Uday in particular, and the party in general - Abu 'Uday still took care of him. Particularly after he ceased with the politics and approached Abu 'Uday as a friend. He persistently asked Abu `Uday to take him to Ahmad Amin, and despite how busy Abu `Uday was on that day, he took him, and I went along with them as I mentioned. We sat in the room that belonged to Ahmad Amin, and Abu `Uday asked him to find

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a job for Hatim. We left about thirty minutes after noon and went home. After having lunch with the mother of `Uday, our sister, and children, Abu `Uday asked me to bring in the weapons, military uniforms, ranks, and grenades that we had hidden behind a library. The front of the library was used for books, but the area behind it was used to store all of these things. I did what he asked me to do, and two hours after his noon nap, he took part with me in assembling some rifles, etc. After that, he put on his clothes and went out. Before leaving, however, he told me that some comrades, some that I already knew and some that I did not know, would be coming over. When they came, I was to let them in the guest room and be hospitable to them, but I was to let no one leave until his return - even if he was late. I agreed, and indeed a number of people came and I did what he told me to do until he returned at 7:30 or about 8:00 that evening, at which time he met with them. I do not know what he told them as they all were leaving at about 9:30 p.m. At this time, Abu `Uday told me to take Siham, the mother of `11day, and the children to our uncle's house and to leave them there and return alone. I took them in my Volkswagen Beetle vehicle that Abu `Uday had bought for me at that time, and drove them to my uncle's house. All the way to my uncle's house, I was thinking of a way to say goodbye to Shajarat Al-Dur, especially since I would be taking part in this operation, and the likelihood of death was certainly present. Indeed I tried, but I was unable to do this. I expected her to show me to the door as she always did, and to say goodbye. But this time, for whatever reason, she did not. And as I remember, she did not even make a comment because of her shy nature.

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I did understand, however, that her feelings for me were just like mine for her. Maybe they were surprised when we arrived without any forewarning. I forgot to mention that a few months earlier, my uncle's household had moved to the Army's Canal, in the province of Jamilah, where they built a home. I returned home, and while sad because I was not able to say goodbye to Shajarat Al-Dur at that time, I was also afraid to die without saying at least one or several words to express my love and respect for her.

When I came back home, Saddam said, "Let us go place the weapons and other equipment in the vehicles." He had a Mercedes that belonged to the party, and I owned the Volkswagen. So we placed the weapons, military uniforms and the other equipment in the vehicles and proceeded to drive. We reached the house of Mr. Sa'dun Shakir, which was not too far from us, as it was located in the Arabic province near the Al-Mansur area. There was a gathering of a number of party members, and he gave them some of the weapons and uniforms, etc., and gave them directions. While we were still there at the house of Sa'dun Shakir, he took me aside and said, "Barzan, go to the house of Abu Haytham because it is likely that the regime loyalists may attack them. Therefore, you must be there with a group of comrades to protect the family of Abu Haytham." I replied, "How about you? Where are you going?" He said, "I am going along with the leadership and a number of comrades to the Regiment of the Republican Guards to take control of them, and therefore, control of the Republican Palace." I replied, "Then I am going with you there and not to the house of Abu Haytham." He did not reply, and I knew that he agreed on what I said. Later, in a family gathering held after the operation was successful, he said that he had suggested that idea because he did not want to jeopardize my safety, not actually to protect Abu Al-Haytham family.

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We departed from the house of Sa'dun Shakir and went to another gathering in the house of the late `Abd-al-Karim Al-Nada. There, we found all of the party's leadership except for Dr. `Izzat Mustafa, who was spending his summer in Lebanon, as I remember. This was in addition to yet other party members of various ranks. There, he pulled me aside to one of the rooms and told me that we had to put on the military uniforms and abandon our civilian clothes, which we did. After changing our clothes, he said, "Barzan, do not forget your ID." I had my school ID because I had not yet finished high school, while he had a university ID. I asked him why we needed the IDs, and he told me that they are necessary because our comrades would recognize us by our IDs in case of our martyrdom. After an hour or so, we all went out and got into trucks that were sent from the Guards' regiment for our transportation. All of a sudden as we were getting into the truck, a night guard on a motorcycle showed up and began to blow his whistle while asking what our gathering was about. Al-Bakr rushed towards him very quickly and grabbed hold of him, saying, "There is nothing my son" and just as quickly, Abu `Uday shouted, "Barzan, throw him in the truck!" I grabbed him but could not control him because I was small in size and skinny. This is why I screamed, calling Mr. Ja'far al-Ja'fari to help me, and he did. We both lifted him up and threw him in the truck, and drove away. Al-Bakr, the late Salih `Ammash, and one other individual - I think it was the late Anwar al-Hadithi - rode in `Ammash's Mercedes. Behind them was the Mercedes vehicle that belonged to the late Hardan Al-Tikriti. This vehicle was driven by Sa'dun Shakir, and in it rode Hamdan and two others. As for Abu `11day, he came with us in one of

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the trucks. The policeman began to scream, and since we were afraid he might cause us some trouble, Abu '11day told me to shoot him in the head if he did not stop screaming. When the guard heard that, he stopped screaming and entered the Guard regiment with us. In the morning, we began to look for him because Abu `Uday wanted to promote him. We found him in a corner of the regiment's gardens on our way to another hideout belonging to the party which was located behind the Arabic Child Hospital at the Miriam Province. We took a number of young people who were gathering there, and when we reached the regiment's gates, I noticed that the Mercedes vehicles were behind us and we were right in front. The guards then shouted "Stop" with very loud voices, and the commander of the guards proceeded towards us, pointing his weapon at us and asking who we were and why we were there. At that moment, the late Sa'dun Ghidan showed up shouting and proceeded to order the guards to open the gate saying, "Friends, friends." When the guards' commander realized what was happening and saw the regiment's commander, I remember seeing him drop his weapon on the floor. We then entered the regiment through the tanks' garage that was surrounded by towers, each one manned by a number of troops equipped with medium machineguns. With all of these guns aimed at us, it was an awful scene, and my body goes numb every time I remember it. Some of the comrades had been trained previously to drive tanks. We got off the trucks and divided ourselves into groups according to military custom, and the comrades mounted the tanks. As for Abu `Uday and I, we went looking for the weapons storage area to take control of it. Since we did not know exactly where it was, we were forced to go through the halls of all the troops and officers' quarters to lock them all up inside those halls and rooms. We then returned in the direction of the garage in order to



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catch up with our group. While we were on our way, three officers appeared running, while trying to button themselves up. Behind them a number of warrant officers carrying Kalashnikov rifles were advancing towards us. We stopped, and I stood in front of Abu `Uday. My reason for doing so, and Allah is a witness to what I am saying, was to take the bullets for him if they began to shoot at us so that he might be protected. We shouted at them to go back, or else we would open fire. At that time, Abu `Uday was carrying a Sterling machinegun, and I was carrying a Browning handgun that Abu `Uday had bought for me a few months before the operation. Lo and behold, they stopped, and we ordered them to go back to where they came from, and they did. We then went to the tanks garage and mounted one of the tanks. Mr. Ziyab al-`Alkawi, a Brigadier General at the time, went along with us. The only soldier in the tank was the driver, and Abu `Uday asked him to drive the tank towards the main gate of the Republican Palace. Of course at that time, the buses and peoples' vehicles were passing by the gate of the palace, since the area was not yet deemed restricted. In fact, after the Miriam Provence it was a dream of a residential area, and considered one of Baghdad's high class areas. It was one of Baghdad's older areas where Baghdad's pool and [IL] were located, across from the Republican Palace and open to the public. I went there myself more than once to swim. Unfortunately, however, all of that beautiful atmosphere and nature disappeared after we arrived to the Republican Palace and confiscated the lands and homes, along with all the public service centers in this wonderful area and turned them all into an organized military compound, etc.

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The driver then began to drive the tank. After a short distance, however, the tank stopped, and we thought that the driver had something to do with that because he seemed to not want to obey our orders (since by that time, the conspiracy theory had started), and, unfortunately, the decision makers could not shake it off even by this time. You see, they scream, "the conspiracy theory and conspirators" when faced with any difficulty, all the while forgetting that they were the conspirators against themselves, their peoples and their country. For this reason, Abu `11day told the driver in a strong, decisive, and threatening voice that he must try to make the tank work and continue on with his duty. The trooper understood and indeed pumped what seemed to be the intake air out and the tank started. But before we began to move, a trooper carrying a Kalashnikov rifle passed by the tank we were on. Without thinking, I jumped, threw him on the ground and disarmed him. Being aware of the situation, Abu `Uday shouted in a loud voice, "Lieutenant Barzan, give Abu Khalil your gun instead of his rifle." This was done to avoid making the troopers and officers angry, and I did so because I knew what he meant. He then mounted the back of the tank before the tank moved away, ultimately stopping across from the entrance of the Republican Palace. Abu `11day was watching the driver because he noticed that the driver seemed uncomfortable. He asked the driver about his name, his location and how long he has been in the Guard's tank regiment. We found out that the driver was from the al-Zawba' tribe, which was known for its close relationship with the former president `Abd-al-Rahman `Arif. Because of this, Abu `Uday told the driver that we came to help the President against the Prime Minister -at that time the late Tahir Yihya - and indeed, when the driver heard that, he seemed comfortable. After that, Saddam began asking him about how to use

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the machinegun that was mounted on top of the tank [al-Dushka]. The driver explained to him how to use the machinegun, to the point that Saddam mastered the use of that machinegun. He aimed and shot a few rounds at the entrance of the Palace, and of course there were a number of tanks behind us. Mr. `Abd-al-Rahman `Arif refused to surrender when al-Bakr got in touch with him, and as a result, AlBakr ordered the late Hamid al-Tikriti Hamid to fire a bomb at one of the palace's windows, which he did. After that, the late Hardan al-Tikriti called on the president to surrender without bloodshed, telling him that his life would be spared if he should choose to surrender without a fight. The president then asked for a delegate to come to the palace to discuss a few issues. Al-Bakr then sent Hardan Al-Tikriti, the late Anwar Al-Hadithi, and I believe Mr. Salah 'Omar al-`Ali, along with a small group for their protection. Among this small group was comrade Abu Raddlam, who, I believe was the most courageous among the warrant officers who took part in the coup operation. He was too hasty and did not wait for the guards to open the inside door of the palace, but rather shot a few rounds at it. They brought `Abd-al-Rahman in to see al-Bakr, who was sitting at the regiment's HQ. Al-Bakr then allowed him to sit and asked him, "'Abd-al-Rahman, what did we do to your late brother to deserve what he did to us?" Of course, when he said the "late", he meant it's opposite. After that, it was decided to exile him to London, but I do not know not why they chose London! They placed him in the vehicle of the late Hardan, which passed in front of the tank upon which Abu `11day rode, whereupon he fired a few rounds in the air, very content with the arrest of `Abd-al-Rahman `Arif, At that time, the driver of the tank realized that we were against `Abd-alRahman `Arif and were not among his loyalists, so he began

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to cry. Abu `Uday tried to comfort him, took his name and other details, and promised to promote him. There was another story about Abu Raddam. He was a sergeant in the army, got fired for his affiliation with the Ba'th Party and remained jobless from 1963, after the fall of the Ba'th regime, until 1968 when the Ba'th returned to power and was among the field of warrant officers. The commander of his cell was Major General Fadil Al-`Assaf, may Allah remember him with all the good deeds. It is known that Fadil Al-`Assaf was a graduate of the school of life, rather than the conventional school. He therefore knew the mentality of those young people under his supervision. When the execution time for the coup operation was determined, Fadil Al-`Assaf rented a vehicle similar to today's coaster vehicles. He took all the members of his cell, to include warrant officers who were fired from the army and had decided to take part in the operation, to visit Imam 'Ali, may Allah bless his face. It was there, by the graveside of Imam 'Ali, where he spoke to them saying, "Comrades, I have a secret that I want to tell you about. But before I tell you, you have to swear by the Imam 'Ali that you will not tell anyone before the time of execution. The comrades, including Abu Raddam touched the window to Imam `All's grave, and swore to be secretive. He then told them about the operation, and that the party had decided to launch the operation to topple the regime and take over power, expressing all that with one word "the Revolution". They hugged him, feeling very happy with the news, and then returned to Baghdad. When al-Bakr asked him where he was all day and he told him what happened, al-Bakr laughed, saying, "Well you know their mentality, you did well." After taking over power, Abu Raddam was assigned to one of the protection details for the late al-Bakr. However, he was negligent like the others until after the defeat of 1991, when Abu `11day became aware of

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the so called "revolutionaries", and began sending them money at every occasion. He then decided to grant them ranks. He was granted the rank of Lieutenant Colonel. The same was true for civilians, and I was therefore granted the rank of Brigadier General. At that time, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Ahmad Hasan, got in touch with me while I was an Ambassador in the European HQ in Geneva to congratulate me on this rank, and to send me a congratulatory telegraph. I told him that I thank Mr. President for that, but that I did not understand what my affiliation with this institution was. So, he felt that it was not appropriate for him to get in touch with me and found out that I was not comfortable with what he did. He therefore replied and said that Mr. President, the leader, had made that decision. Later on, I sent him a message in which I explained my theory about the necessity for the civilian to be away from these institutions, and the importance of leaving it to qualified people. I asked him to tell the president to exempt me from this issue, and attached a copy of this message and also a copy of a message I sent to the president, that included many issues in addition to this one. The issue remained up in the air until my visit to Iraq when the president spoke with me and I expressed the same stance as I had in my messages. After that, the president asked his secretary `Abd Hamid to speak with me about this issue but my answers were decisive with my disapproval. Finally, they made the decision to cancel this ranking issue.

In communiqué number one, as is the case in all military coups, the late Hardan AlTikriti, announced the seizure of all power centers in the capital Baghdad, the Ministry of Defense, the Air Force, the Republican Guard Forces, Al-Rashid Military Compound, Al-Taji Military Compound, the General Security, General and Emergency Police, etc.. This was completed by the late Mandi Al-Rifa'i, with the help of the late `Abd Muhammad Salih. The former later became

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the director of Baghdad's General Security after being the director of Emergency Police. The latter became the director of Baghdad's Police. The operation was thus a success, and at that period of time, I went along with Abu `Uday to the 14<sup>th</sup> of July Casino that was located adjacent to Baghdad's airport. There was a group of comrades whom Abu `Uday had given directions and definitive orders to arrest a number of officials of that regime. Among these officials was the late Tahir Yihya, Rashid Muslih and the former director of general security. From there, we went to my uncle's house at the Army Canal, and when we arrived, Abu `Uday fired his rifle in the air and woke up the neighbors, who started looking out their windows and rooftops to know what had happened. We entered the house where our family members were happy to see us, and then had breakfast together. We then returned to the Republican Palace and I remained there with Abu `Uday like his shadow, except when he went to meetings with al-Bakr. On such occasions, I sat in the secretary's room. On the third day, I went back to the house after the operation was judged a success, and I felt very tired because of staying up very late at night and getting only a few hours of sleep. I had not been accustomed to staying up late at night, but rather usually went to bed before 11:00 PM. I was used to completely living childhood and student life.

On the morning of 7/29/1968, Abu `Uday got in touch with me, as was the case with our everyday routine. I was in the house and he asked me if I had something to do. I told him that I had nothing to do because, as you know, I was on my summer vacation and I had nothing to do but the house chores. He then said: "Alright then, come over to the Palace at about noon and bring your weapons with you." It was about 10:00 in the morning when he called. I took a bath and put on gray trousers and a short sleeve shirt. I put on my sidearm under the shirt and grabbed the Kalashnikov rifle that I took away from the trooper. I then got into

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my Volkswagen vehicle and went to the Palace. I met with Abu 'Uday, who took me to the room of the late 'Adnan Sharif, who was the senior bodyguard of President al-Bakr, whose affairs deteriorated after the years of 1979 and was completely finished after the war with Iran. Abu 'Uday told me to sit there and not move until he returned. I sat there until Abu 'Uday came back at about 2:30 PM and told me to go back home. He then asked me to try to stay at home just in case he needed me, and I agreed. I got into my Volkswagen vehicle and went back to the house where both the mother of 'Uday and my sister asked me what Abu 'Uday had wanted from me. I replied, "I do not exactly know and what happened was so and so, etc." I remained in the house and did not go out *even* to meet with my friends in the street, and in the morning of the next day, at about 11:00 AM, Abu 'Uday called me and asked( me to go over to the Palace. I took my sidearm and rifle and went. When I arrived to the Palace, he told me to stay in the room that belonged to Abu Haytham's bodyguard until he called on me, and so I sat waiting for him until he came back at exactly 3:00 PM and asked me to follow him. I followed Abu 'Uday to the room that belonged to Shafiq Al-Darraji, and he opened the door while calling for Abu 'Ayyub to come over. Mr. Salah Al-Ali, who was nicknamed Abu 'Ayyub at that time, caught up with us and we all marched to the room of the Republic President. Before we reached the door of the room that belonged to the secretary of the Republic President, who was Mr. 'Adnan Ayyub Sabri Al-Izzi, Abu 'Uday said, "Pay attention. When we enter the room of the Republic President, just do what I do." We entered the room of the secretary, first Abu 'Uday, then I, and finally Abu 'Ayyub behind me. The room was full of senior officials, and Abu 'Uday said to them, "May Peace be upon you", and without further discussion, he marched to the door that connects the secretary's room with the Republic President's room.

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He opened the door and entered, and I was half a meter behind him. We all got inside, and Abu `Uday turned to Salah and asked him to shut the door behind him. This was all happening very quickly, and I remember Abu `Ayyub closed the door behind him. Then I noticed that Abu `Uday had drawn his gun. I then immediately drew my gun and waited for him to point out the target as I did not know who the target was. There were only three individuals in the president's room: al-Bakr sat behind his desk. `Abd-Al-Razzaq Al-Nayif was sitting nearby al-Bakr, whispering in his ear something which he apparently he did not want the late `Ammash to hear. The late `Ammash was sitting at a small table and before him was a small plate of Kabob, salad, and a piece of bread, since he had arrived after the lunch time meal. At that moment, Abu '11day shouted, saying, "'Abd-al-Razzaq, do not move!" I knew then who the target was, and so I jumped in front of Abu `Uday and stuck my gun in `Abd-al-Razzaq cheeks. I then told him, "If you move, I will split your head to a hundred pieces." I took hold of his right hand and Abu '11day held the other, while grabbing his sidearm to hand it over to me. It was a 38mm Colt revolver. I put it in my pocket, and then `Abd-al-Razzaq said to Abu `Uday, "I am your brother, do not kill me." Abu `11day told him to stand up and he did while I was holding his hand. We took him to an internal retreat room that was connected to the president's room, and as we walked towards the room, the late Abu Huda stood up, trying to calm the situation, after which Abu `Ayyub went back and told him not to interfere. The late `Ammash then returned to his seat. We placed `Abd-al-Razzaq in that small room, and asked him to sit on the edge of the bed, which he did. There was a small telephone connected to the palace's switch room, and Abu `1.1day cut the telephone wires and told me to stay there and fire at his head if he tried



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to make any move. He repeated his instructions and reminded me to pay attention, and I told him not to worry about it and to just go handle his affairs. I remained standing in a spot where I could have control of him, and Abu `11day returned after he had arrested `Abd-al-Razzaq's bodyguard with the help of some party members. I then heard footsteps and the sound of struggle in the hall adjacent to the room where I was guarding `Abd-al-Razzaq Al-Nayif. After half an hour or a little more, Abu `Uday came back and told `Abd-al-Razzaq that it was decided to deport him abroad and asked him which country would he have preferred. `Abd-al-Razzaq replied, "Beirut, Lebanon." Abu `Uday then told him, "No, you will not go to Lebanon." He then added "Stand up, we will deport you to Morocco." `Abd-al-Razzaq stood up, and Abu `11day told him that they will go out to the car that was waiting at the entrance of the palace, warning him that if he made one wrong move, he would be shot. We went out with `Abd-al-Razzaq in the middle to where the vehicle of the late Hardan was parked at the entrance of the palace, and then we got in. Abu `11day sat in the back along with the late Hardan, the two of them on each side of `Abd-al-Razzaq. I sat in front with the driver, who drove us to Al-Rashid Airbase, located at the Al-Rashid Military Compound. We were followed by some party members and military personnel, and arrived to the base where Staff Major Tahir Salih Al-Tikriti was waiting for us, having prepared a Krania airplane to transport us to Morocco. Major Ni'mat Allah Khalil piloted the plane with the help of Captain Farouk Abu Shawrib, who was from the people of al-`Azamiyyah. While on the steps of the plane's ladder, Abu `Uday told me to take him with me, as well as the comrades `Adnan Sharif, Sa'dun Shakir, and Ibrahim Al-Shaykhali. All of these men were accompanying the late `Ammash, Ja'far al-Ja'fari and a number of the other party members. That was the first time I rode a plane. Baghdad looked beautiful from the air. I was sitting on the bench beside `Abd-al-Razzaq, as that plane was for set up for freight and training, not for passengers. After a long time, at least

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six hours or more, we arrived to Benghazi in Libya. We landed to refuel the plane, and I sat with `Abd-al-Razzaq in a small park at the entrance of the airport, which was a military one, I think. The comrades went to the bathroom, the restaurant, etc. I did not leave him, however, following the order of Abu `Uday as best as I could until the end. After an hour or so, we flew again, this time heading to Al-Rabat. However, the captain landed in the Algerian Capital to refuel again, and in the Algerian airport, a quarrel erupted between Sa'dun Shakir and Ibrahim AlShaykhali when Sa'dun said to him, "You are the bodyguard of the Minister of Internal Affairs, why did you come with us while carrying all the keys for the Minister's office?" Ibrahim was not wise, and tried to behave inappropriately. So I reprimanded him, and Sa'dun said to him, "I will not talk to you here but rather when we return to Baghdad." I liked the way Sa'dun acted. We arrived to al-Rabat at about one o'clock in the afternoon on 7/31, where a number of the Moroccan Security Officials, the honor guards and the Iraqi ambassador Mr. Hikmat Sami Sulayman were waiting to receive us. After greeting us, they took us to town where we stayed in the Hassan Hotel, which was the best hotel in al-Rabat at that time. The hotel was wonderful with all the halls, rooms, bathrooms, internal and external gardens, restaurants, bars and everything else it had. It was not as though we were like people from the desert and who had just arrived to a city such as Al-Rabat, or to a hotel such as the Hassan Hotel, but it was really wonderful. I confirmed that when I went to al-Rabat in the year of 1974 when Abu `Uday attended the Arab Summit in al-Rabat. My impression was the same as it was on that day in July, 1968, even though I visited many other countries during that period.

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I was exhausted so I went to my room, took a bath in the large bathroom and bathtub etc., and then crashed on the comfortable bed. I fell asleep and did not wake up until 7:00 p.m. at dusk. I put on my clothes and went down to the lobby of the hotel in an attempt to meet with my group, but I found no one but Ja'far alJa'fari, who was my friend as well as my party's comrade. I found him alone sitting in the garden of the hotel and before him was a glass of whisky. I did not know what whisky or any other alcoholic beverage was for that matter before that evening. He asked me to sit down and I did so. When he asked me what I would like to drink, I answered, "Coke or Pepsi." He then said: "Why do not you drink like me?"

I answered, "What are you drinking?" Then he said, "Whisky." I replied, "No, I have not tried this before." Then he said, "Well, try it then." I refused, and he tried with me further, but to no avail. Then he said, "Alright then, drink beer." I replied, "Okay but I am afraid to get dizzy." He said, "No, beer is just like Pepsi." He then bought me a bottle of beer which I drank, and he bought me another one, which I drank half of before beginning to feel dizzy. This was because I had not tried beer before, and did not have anything to eat since earlier in the morning. So I did not finish the other half of the bottle. After that, I asked Ja'far to go out to the market and buy some things: underwear, shirt, pajamas, etc., because we did not bring anything with us. Earlier, Ja'far had handed me an envelope that held a sum of the Moroccan currency that the embassy had given to each of us to purchase what we needed. We went to the market and I bought what I needed: a handbag for `11day's mother, one for my sister, and under this guise, I also bought one for Sha,jarat Al-Dur. Two days later, we returned to Iraq late in the day, and I found Abu `15day in the house. He inquired about the trip, and I told him all the details

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I gave the gifts to `Uday's mother and my sister, and they were very happy with them. In the evening, I asked my sister to give Shajarat Al-Dur the handbag and bottle of perfume (type [IL]) that I bought for her in the duty free market in the Cairo airport on our way back. Siham delivered the gifts to Shajarat Al-Dur, who was happy and said, "Thanks, the important thing is he came back safe and sound." That was the first sign to my family about my feelings for Shajarat Al-Dur, even though they had previously noticed my interest in and respect for her.

During the ninth month, Abu `Uday handed me an envelope holding 50 dinars, and informed me that the party's leadership had decided to grant me a monthly salary. After two months or a little more, I was granted a temporary rank in the army in November, 1969. I went to Cairo for a six months training session that had to do with intelligence and security, seeing as though I was an employee of military intelligence at that time.

On 9/12/1969, I was engaged to Shajarat Al-Dur, and the engagement certificate was completed on the same day. It was a very beautiful and wonderful period of time. I used to visit my uncle's house twice or more a week, where I met with Shajarat Al-Dur. We would go out together to the movies and dinner at one of the excellent restaurants that had become common in Baghdad at that time. The kind of restaurants with a high class, family-oriented atmosphere, comparable to the nice restaurants in Europe and Lebanon, and yet regrettably contrary to what we have now. I used to buy her gifts for every occasion, and sometimes without any occasion at all. Even now, we still keep those small gifts ranging from pendants, rings or bracelets, etc. I used to buy her those gifts from a jeweler nearby the Baghdad Hotel. His name was Ahanis Dush, and he became famous because I introduced him to the mother of '11day, who in turn introduced him to the al-Bakr family ...

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He then became even more famous because Iraqi high class society is by nature a society of trend followers, and so the families of the new regime are even more so. This is due to the fact that they were people of the desert who knew nothing about city life before, despite that they yearned for it. That jeweler was the best in Baghdad. Shajarat al-Dur was shy, and she did not know how to express herself. She used to approach me, kiss me, and then whisper in my ear, "My love, what is all that for? Your love is more than enough for me." I would then reply that it was merely a small expression of my love for her. Indeed, those were wonderful times, but thank Allah, it did not end. Rather, it deepened, rooted and flourished contrary to most relations of other people that began in such a beautiful time of war, then soon cooled down after marriage, when the problems and shameful behaviors began. The warmth of our relationship has always increased, and we got continually closer, even up to the last moments. Respect and even shyness existed between us until the last day of our relationship. I could say it was one of those rare relationships that continued just the way it began. Unfortunately, however, it ended soon like a beautiful dream.

Our engagement on 9/12/1969 lasted until the day of 8/12/1971, when Shajarat alDur met up with me in London where I had taken my ill sister for treatment. My sister Siham was there with me, and we agreed that Shajarat al-Dur should catch up with me in London to get married. During the time of our engagement, I bought a piece of land from the officers' association located across from Yarmuk Hospital, and obtained a loan, as well as 1000 dinars that Abu `Uday helped me with. I built a small but beautiful house and furnished it with beautiful furniture that I bought from the famous Aywan furniture store. It was the first home within our family or circle of relatives that had oil paintings on its walls and crystal chandeliers hanging from the ceilings. I had bought the chandeliers, as well as a number of oil paintings in Prague during my visit there.

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We still have them too. I gave Muhammad some of them to use in his house. That house was a masterpiece in the eyes of family and friends.

I got married to Shajarat Al-Dur on 8/12/1971. I invited the embassy staff, the ambassador, Mr. Kazim Al-Khalaf, and a number of friends to a simple cocktail celebration at the Dover Hotel, where I stayed for a period of 10 days. After those ten days I moved to an apartment I had leased for my sister's use. The number of invitees to the reception did not exceed fifty men and women and the cocktail cost was about 250 English Pounds. A few days later, however, I heard from my friends that the Iraqis in London were talking about my majestic marriage celebration that cost huge sums of money!

A month or more later, my sister completed her treatment and returned along with my other sister to Baghdad. Shajarat al-Dur and I stayed behind in London since we spent all the time dealing with my sister's illness and staying by her hospital bed where Shajarat al-Dur and my sister Siham especially were spending most of their time caring for her. In the apartment, Shajarat Al-Dur had been cooking the food for my ill sister, since Siham was staying with her in the hospital. As always, Shajarat al-Dur was loving, generous, and selfless. She could not stop herself from taking part in anything she could to help. I could not be annoyed or complain, since she was a bride who had come to London for her honeymoon, not to care for a patient, cook for her, and work like a nurse. That was part of Shajarat al-Dur's nature.

We stayed in London for two weeks, went to Paris for two weeks, and then returned to Baghdad in the middle of October. We went back to the house that I mentioned earlier, where I had a cook that was working for me for free. He was

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working for Mr. Tahah Ma'ruf, and since Mr. Tahah was an ambassador in Italy, and because his brother, my friend, the late Amin did not need him, I asked him to loan him to me. I had a Kurdish servant for cleaning who was an honest person, may Allah remember his good deeds. His name was Faraj. One day I was listening to a cassette of Najat Al-Saghirah [TN: Egyptian singer], because I liked her voice and her songs. The first side of the cassette ended, and I asked Faraj to turn the cassette to side two. I did not know at the time that Faraj did not know how to do that. So Faraj tried to turn the cassette and seemed to fail. After few minutes I realized that the cassette recorder was not playing and I asked Faraj why he had not turn the cassette over. He answered that the cassette recorder was tired and needed to rest. I laughed and told him, "Oh Faraj, the cassette recorder does not get tired. You, however, do not seem as though you know how to deal with it. Why do you not simply tell the truth?" He in turn laughed as well.

On the next morning we had visitors: the family of Abu '11day, my sister, and my aunt who had raised Shajarat Al-Dur after her mother had passed away, which happened before she turned seventeen years old. When they arrived, Abu '11day asked, "Why didn't you come home?" He was referring to his house. I told him that we had arrived late and did not want to disturb them. Shajarat al-Dur was a junior in high school at the time, so I had her join the Nuns' High School, which later became the Islamic Faith High School after everything became ideological! I felt that she wanted to drop out of high school, and so I said to her, "My love, I know you will not take a job after you complete your high school or college education, because, Allah willing, we will not need you to work. Still, education is necessary for all of mankind because no one knows what the future has in store for them. Even if one does not need education to gain employment, he or she still needs education for its moral and intellectual benefits.

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I told her then that I would try to get my diploma that same year, and, Allah willing, we would join the university together. Indeed, she graduated from the Islamic Faith High School and I too passed, and got my high school diploma. Then, together, we joined the School of Law and Politics at the University of al-Mustansiriyah. We also graduated in the same year, 1975 — 1976. Those were very beautiful days.

We lived in that house for a year, and after that, Abu `Uday suggested that we move in and live in his house and so we did for a couple of years or a little less. After that, Allah gave us our child Muhammad, and we returned to live in our home. We later moved to a house in the Karada, Miriam area, however, after our house was taken over to turn into a regressive military compound.

In June of 1973, the director of General Security, Nazim Kazzar, along with a number of party members and leadership personnel, carried on with their known attempt. I consequently had a disagreement with some al-Bakr supporters, to include: Mazhar al-Mutlak, who drowned when his vehicle fell in the Tigris River as he was speeding drunk, al-Bakr's son Haytham, Zuhair Ahmad al-Mutlak, and Mahmud Al-Nada, etc. The reason for the disagreement was that they tried to commit aggression against Nazim after he was arrested in the desert area east of Baghdad, claiming that he took Munzir Al-Mutlak with the kidnapped personnel. Nazim arrived to the palace in an indescribable condition of exhaustion. I hardly recognized him, as the dust covered all of his hair and face, etc. In addition, he lost his glasses and his shirt was torn off, etc. When Nazim arrived I took him and led him into the bathroom that was attached to the room I was in so that he could wash his face. I then asked him to sit on one of the benches and ordered a cup of tea and a glass of water for him. At about this time, the previously mentioned group arrived and began to commit aggression against him. So I reprimanded them, saying that



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Nazim was a Ba'thist and if *he* has committed something that he should be punished for, there are courts of law that would look into that matter, adding that, "We are not a tribe to behave this way." I then asked them to get out of the room. Nazim was not satisfied with what had I said, and proceeded to accuse Mahmud Al-Nada of not being a Ba'thist, asking, "What are you doing here in the house of the party? Get out of here! You have no right to be here!" Mahmud answered him back with something that I cannot remember, but Nazim told him to get out, or else he would expose him, because he knew of all his affairs.

After all that, Abu `15day arrived. He was in al-Bakr's room sitting with Nazim. I was there with them and asked Nazim, "What did you do that for?" Nazim answered him saying, "I did this as a service to the party!" Abu `11day then asked, "How?" He answered by saying that the leadership of the party had deviated from the party's principals. Abu `Uday again asked, "How?" He answered, "Don't you know how the al-Bakr group behaves, and how Sa'dun Ghidan behaves? Don't you know that the Jews are being smuggled out of the country in exchange for sums of money? Don't you know how Hammad Shihab behaves with the party and the military organization, and how your uncle, Hajj Khayrallah behaves?" Abu `Uday then asked, "What did Hajj Khayrallah do?" Nazim replied, saying that, "A few days ago, there was a military exercise in the Al-Ramadi area and the comrade Muhammad Fadil, a member of the national leadership was there and sat in the front line. Hajj Khayrallah grabbed him by his clothes and told him to sit in the back because the front line was not his place to sit." He then added, "Did you forget how Hajj Khayrallah hit our comrade Muhyi Al-Shamri in the office of the governor, and that comrade Muhyi is a branch member?" He finished by saying, "That is why I did this - to serve the principals of the party."

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Abu `Uday began to cry, but said nothing to answer him back. He then said, "Barzan, take Nazim to the committee that was formed to interrogate him and his group." I took him to the Al-Nihayah Palace where the committee was waiting, and handed him over to Sa'dun Shakir. Later on, I learned that Nazim did not say anything more than what he had told Abu `11day. In the end, Sa'dun Shakir put him to death. Sa'dun Shakir wanted to take revenge on Nazim because he told Abu `15day about Sa'dun's behavior that was contrary to the party's principals at that time. Such behavior had begun early on, and after this happened, he informed the al-Bakr family, who in turn began to get back at our family, saying, "How dare Barzan care for Nazim in such a way when he almost killed Munzir", and "How dare he reprimand the boys?!" They were referring to Mazhar, Mahmud, Haytham and Zuhair, and could not believe that I had ordered them out of the room before the eyes of all people. They also said that Al-Bakr was angry when he heard what I had done. Through the family, though, I told them that I did the right thing in my view, and that my behavior was elementary and I am content with what I did. A few days later, I was forced to retire and remained retired for about a year. After that, Abu `11day approached me to return and I agreed with one condition: that I would not go back to the army since I had no military background and did not like the military, but rather preferred civil service in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in particular. He agreed and spoke to al-Bakr about it, and then the decision was made to appoint me to the position of Secretary III in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in the first quarter of 1974. I was attached to the 1st Political Department, and there I worked with Mr. Hatim al-Izzawi, who later became the council's Chief of Staff, in addition to being the director of the General Private Security, etc. Also among those working with us was Mr. Ma'n `Arim, but I do not know where he is now. There were also a number of employees to include Sirur Najib, Muhannad Qasim Khalil, and others.

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I continued working in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and after Shajarat al-Dur agreed, I prepared myself to ask Abu `Uday for a transfer to work in one of our embassies in Canada or London. At that time, Shajarat al-Dur and I had graduated from the university after the 1975 — 1976 school year, and we had an urgent desire to complete our studies in America or England. However, as was usual during that time. Abu `Uday surprised with an offer to work in his office and supervise his personal security details. I told him that my desire was to work in one of our embassies in America or England, and that I had prepared myself for such work since I had a desire to get to know the cultures and thinking of the world, citing that this was important to me as a human being and as a government employee. He replied, "This is true, but you are of more benefit right now here in Baghdad." He added that he needed me to arrange his personal security details, and after some negotiation, I agreed with one condition. He asked, "What is your condition?" I answered, "This should be a temporary assignment, and not a transfer out of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the Office of Vice President." I wanted to return to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs after we trained someone who he could depend on in this capacity, and he agreed. The order for temporary duty from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the Office of Vice President was issued, and I established the Department of the National Council's Security. I also increased the number of guards, most of whom were relatives, except for a small number from Tikrit. I was confident of my work and the arrangements I had made, but was always looking to return to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to fulfill my desires and dreams to work in one country of the advanced world where I could absorb science and knowledge. Unfortunately, however, one day in February, 1977, Abu `Uday surprised me

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once again as he used to do. On the morning of that day, he sent for me, inviting me to join him in his retreat wing at the National Council. He was having breakfast, so I sat before him, and after a general discussion, he remarked all of a sudden that yesterday he had a discussion with president al-Bakr about the Intelligence Service, and that there was no individual amongst us, as he put it, to handle managing that task. He had therefore agreed with al-Bakr that I should go to work in the Intelligence Service as a Deputy Chief of Intelligence, where Sa'dun Shakir was the Chief of Intelligence at that time. Indeed, I was shocked with what I heard since I was looking forward for my return to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to realize mine and Shajarat al-Dur's dreams. So I replied "You know how I got to your office." He answered, "Yes." I then added, "Yet I am still looking forward to that idea." He then said, "We need you here in Intelligence." I tried to convince him to favorably consider my wishes, but I realized that he felt bad when he said, "Barzan, you need to know something. We went down the road we did, and reached a point of no return. Therefore, we must continue to the end." I kept silent. A few days later, an order was issued to appoint me as the Deputy Chief of Intelligence. I would work there but still keep an eye on the security details of the Vice President of the Revolutionary Command Council. I still had an office at the Office of the Vice President, which was located in the building of the National Council (The Ham murabi Building). I found intelligence just a name without any meaning. The possibilities were huge, and the facilities were even larger. Any intelligence request could not be denied however huge it was. But all those possibilities were in the hands of a small number of regressed hands that were not proportionate to such possibilities. The total number including the service ranks, guards, drivers and messengers did not exceed 700. That was including the Chief of Intelligence and his three deputies: one for administrative affairs, one for political affairs and the third for the technical affairs.

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As for the number of college graduates, it did not exceed 6%; most of them obtained their degrees in special ways. By this, I mean they misused the power of their positions as party members and intelligence officers to get those degrees. I began the development of that institution, and established an academy for training preparations. A little later, I established a National Security College that granted its graduates a Bachelor of Science degree in the Science of Politics and Security. At this College, the lecturers were among the best in Iraqi universities. I began to provide this institution with elements from the nation's various agencies and its different ministries, to include the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Army. I also established relations with, and protocols for Arab and foreign agencies, to include agencies from France, Germany, Greece, and even Great Britain, the United States, Korea, and all the countries of east Europe. Those agencies played a significant role in providing us with information during different times and during the war with Iran in particular. They also proved helpful in issues other than simply information. This institution ultimately reached a level where it was known to people and administrations inside and outside of Iraq. That institution had a primary role in the manufacturing of strategic weapons, and generating nuclear energy research projects. Additionally, what Dr. al-Shahristani spoke about in regard to the scientific side was true. I got Dr. Ja'far Diya' out of prison after the director of general security at that time, Fadil Al-Barrack, had put him there for being an active member of the prohibited al-Da'wah Party. I provided him with all possible means of comfort. With the help of Dr. `Abd-al-Razzaq Al-Hashimi and Mr. Ham mam `Abd-al-Khaliq, the Minister of Information and Higher Education at that time, and who was also working in the field of nuclear energy, convinced him and his wife to work in the nuclear field. I told them I would provide him with all the work he would require. I provided him with a house, which I supervised the furnishing and preparing of. I also made all means of comfort available to them. I forged a friendship with him, and convinced him to work for the benefit of his country. I also had the help of the late Na'im Al-`Addad, who was the General Director

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of the Intelligence Department of Science. He was indeed a smart individual who possessed rare expertise in the field of electronics.

The Intelligence Department authored the project of the "Giant Gun". We used the Ministry of Oil as a cover to obtain the pipes and parts for the gun, and because of the ingenuity of those working in intelligence and its scientific department, the president awarded those scientists, giving them Mercedes vehicles. This happened in a meeting with them in his office, which I attended. The president listened to the details of the project, to include information about the earlier chemical and biological weapons. The Intelligence Department had previously produced chemical weapons and had been asked to hand those weapons over to the chemical department of the Ministry of Defense. I was surprised, however, when `Abd-alJabbar Shinshil contacted me and said, "Abu Muhammad, please ask our brothers in intelligence to take over the process of transportation and storage of this weapon, because the Chemical Department of the Ministry of Defense is not capable of doing this, as they do not know how to handle such a weapon. When the president learned this fact, he executed the director of the Chemical Department in the Ministry of Defense, Staff Brigadier General Nizar Al-Naqshbandi. That was after I had already quit my work at the end of 1983 because of Husayn Kamil, who the president was found of. The affiliation of the Scientific Department was switched from Intelligence to the Republic Presidency, and with the approval of the president, Husayn Kamil claimed ownership of all the expertise and achievements that were handed over to him.

What must be mentioned in this area, is that I noticed the president began to become annoyed with the Intelligence Department and had begun dealing with me in a not-so-loving way. I am kind of a straightforward person who likes to run the process of checks and balances on my own behaviors, yet I still did not find that I had not committed any wrongdoing. I did not try to find out the reasons for this notso-loving treatment toward me. But after I quit working in intelligence,

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and with a little persistence, I learned that there was an atmosphere of doubt, and that there were many circulating false tales that the president, his sons, and Husayn Kamil had about me.

All those tales and imaginary things reached the ears of the women, to include the mother of `Uday and her daughters. In brief, those imaginary tales said that Barzan was working for and preparing himself to take over rule of the country, and that the intelligence had its own army, tanks and artillery in private military intelligence compounds, and so on and so forth, with that nonsense.

I think that the president knew that all those imaginative tales were in fact nonsense. But he enjoyed believing them to make himself angry. This is the way he is, and the reason that forces him to make himself angry is that he is a suspicious man, just like any other ruler, belonging to the same school. And because Abu `Uday was raised under unusual circumstances that were based on opportunities, his aim will consistently be plotting to get rid of others who enjoy social, professional or political respect. This is because he thinks that those are the real danger and threat to him. Therefore, the first thing he did after pretending to be angry was to separate the special security agency that I established under the name of the Palace Security Department, from the intelligence service. This department was established from within the Intelligence Department, and all its personnel was taken from the intelligence service to work in the palace security department. With the help of the intelligence leadership and its legal advisor, I designed the organizational frame of that agency, divided it into branches and divisions, wrote the job descriptions and objectives for each branch and division, and provided them with all that they needed. The Intelligence Department was supervising the president's security details, and also maintained control of the places he would go to. One day in the March, 1983, the president paid a visit to the city of Al-Mosul. The Intelligence personnel were there doing their job to secure the building, as well as the road to protect the president. Mr. Mani `Abd-al-Rashid, who was

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the director of Intelligence Security and later the Director of Intelligence called me, and informed me that Husayn Kamil asked him to withdraw the intelligence personnel out from that assignment and to return to Baghdad. When I heard the news, I was stunned, and told him that surely there must be a mistake. He assured me that there was no mistake, but rather, there were some grievances leveled by Husayn and a number of the security details against the Intelligence Department. So I told him to carry out what he was asked to do, and the intelligence forces returned to Baghdad. When the president returned to Baghdad, I called Husayn Kamil to inquire about the issue, and he said that he did not know, and that it was a directive from the president. I told him there surely something must have reached the president's ears but he, again, gave me the same answer. I noticed he was trying to change the subject, so I said to him, "Oh Husayn, the president's security detail is a significant task, and requires men of certain caliber and level of understanding in regard to their responsibilities, etc. I know that the existing personnel....", but that was the end of it. Less than half an hour later, the president called me all of a sudden, asking me what my problem with Husayn was. I explained the issue to him, but he replied telling me that I was no longer responsible for the palace security department. I told him that was his decision, and that he made it easy for me, since supervising his security details was a heavy responsibility. I proceeded to explain that he was always on the go, and needed a person who was dedicated to protect him. I told him I was tired of doing so, and that I have more than enough work to do. The call ended, and it was tense. On that same day, an order was issued to transfer the personnel who were chosen by Husayn Kamil, and the others were returned to intelligence. And so on and so forth with these measures, seeming as if the issue was already decided, and what had happened was just a cover to carry out what was already planned. A few days later, Husayn Kamil was appointed as the general director of the Special Security Agency and a law was issued including the same organizational frame that I had already established. After that, I knew that Husayn Kamil told the president that I had insulted him, by saying that, "You and your uncles are known



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Only as far as your capabilities," etc., which to them meant they were cowards. I swear by Allah, none of that ever had happened at all. After that, the president began to avoid meeting with me, the memos continuing to accumulate while I did not meet with the president for months. Then one day in August, 1983, the president summoned me to have lunch with him at his house. I went there and found brothers Sab'awi and Watban in attendance. After general conversation over lunch, we sat in the Living room to drink tea, and all of a sudden, the president said that our uncles want to come over and ask for Raghad's hand to marry Husayn Kamil. He then told me that for this reason he had called on me to ask my opinion. After that, I started talking in the form of questions and asked, "Do you want to just tell us or do you want our opinion?" He answered by saying, "No, I want your opinion". I think he said that only because I had surprised him with my question, and therefore I was still confused. I said, "Alright then, since you want our opinion, I will give you mine, and I think that it is the opinion of our brothers too. We think that boy is not good enough to be our son." He asked, "Why?" And I then replied, "Because he does not care about us and always tries to cause trouble, and attempts to separate us." He said, "Do you know me as a person who could be influenced by others?" I said, "At the end of the day, you are a human being and when Husayn gets married with your daughter, his sitting place will be on one of these chairs that we sit on, and moreover, he will sit with you daily, and more than once. You will begin to listen to what he says and will consequently be influenced by what he says. Keep in mind that lie is an evil and very anxious to get what he wants." But the president said that I was mistaken, to which I replied, "I hope so." After that, brothers Sab'awi and Watban spoke in the same direction. So I told him that his brother Sab'awi wants his daughter to marry his son. He told Sab'awi to send his wife, and to approach the girl and her mother. I then replied without waiting for Sab'awi's answer, "Do not send your wife because the issue is in the hands

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of Abu `Uday. If he wants to, he knows how to make it happen." I then added that Yasir could not be compared with Husayn Kamil because he was still a young student, and then jokingly added, "Besides, he is weak and tall like a sugar cane, so if you were serious, put this issue aside for two or three years - especially since the girl is young and is not even fifteen years old."

He said, "Okay, this is enough for today and we will meet again in the future if something is to happen." Before we left, I gave him a final word about the issue, because I realized he was serious and adamant about having his daughter get married to Husayn Kamil. I said to him, "I want to give you a final word, and it is this: Husayn Kamil is just like a time bomb in your pocket. But you do not know where and when it will explode. And God forbid, if exploded, its shrapnel will go a great distance." I swear, this is what I told Saddam Hussein at that time, and this same talk was what he relayed to his tribe and security details thirteen years later when Husayn Kamil revolted against him, took his daughters and coordinated with the Americans to topple the regime of Saddam Hussein and take over rule.

We left him at that time. But a few days later we heard that the engagement had taken place, and a few days after that in the beginning of September, we heard that the marriage had taken place. It is worth mentioning that Saddam's mother had passed away on 7/23/1983, and less than one month went by before the engagement had taken place, and less than forty days after her passing, the marriage had taken place. I must mention another important thing, and that is this: when his mother was about to die, my sister Siham was by her bedside. Saddam's mother said to her, "I want to entrust you with something to tell your brother Saddam and that is this: I recommend that he does not give one of his daughters in the family of Hasan Majid, and especially not to someone in the Kamil family, because they are

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traitors, and they only want to get closer to him because of his position. Saddam has to remember how their father disavowed Saddam when he killed Sa'dun al-`Omar and hit `Abd-al-Karim Qasim. He also must remember the marriage between Hasan and Kamil's mother, Al-Samra'iyah Husnah, Husayn Kamil's grandmother at the time. He was then a policeman in Samra' and used to frequently visit Husnah's family after he got to know them and they took him in as a friend. But he established an illegitimate relationship with Husnah, and then was forced to get married with Husnah to avoid a scandal after she was found to be pregnant with

Kamil was born six months after Hasan got married with Husnah, and then, Saddam's mother added, "It does not matter if Saddam gives one of his daughters to the family of Sulayman, or to others from the Ghafur family." Siham mentioned those exact words to Saddam, to which he replied, "Oh sister, you should not pay attention to everything you hear." After we, the three brothers, knew of the marriage, we met in my house and decided to write him a letter saying, "We are in this administration because you are the president. We joined the party because you did so before us, etc. And since you have made your decision without any consideration to our input, we think that the brotherly relationship that we have grown to know is no longer there. Consequently, you should consider us as having resigned from our positions in the administration." I was Chief of Intelligence, Sab'awi was the director of the Syrian Organization Office. The Syrian Organization Office, by the way, was the same office that I warned Saddam about, specifically in regard to its activities inside of Syria. These activities included bombing operations which yielded harmful consequences to Saddam and Iraq, especially at a time when Saddam was portraying himself as a strong leader. I told him that such operations would, of course, cause the Syrian regime to be wary of Saddam. I added that the Syrian regime would consider such operations ample justification to shut down the oil pipelines that were passing through Syrian territories. And indeed, a few weeks later after this conversation, the Syrian regime had decided to shut down the oil pipelines that were passing through its territories. Of course, I had taken responsibility of the Syrian office operations inside of Syria. And I remember that the late president Hafiz al-Assad made a long speech before the 1983 Arab Summit, which was held in the city of Tangiers, I believe.

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In his speech, he said that he could not understand why our brother Barzan insists on conducting sabotage and murder operations in Syria, adding that he believed there were more suitable options for the benefits of Iraq and the nation than the operations he was conducting in Syria.

As for Watban, he was the governor of Tikrit. Beginning on the second day, we did not go to our official positions. This was an unexpected chock to Saddam, because he could not understand or believe that there exists a human being who would abandon an executive position along with its fringe benefits, especially in a country spinning out of control country such as his. So he revolted and began to scream saying, "They got together against me because I am their father's step son, just wait and you will see", etc. That was what Hamid Hammadi, his secretary at that time revealed to me.

Two days later or so, he sent me a letter and copied Sab'awi and Watban, in which he did not spare any word against me. The reader could find a copy of those letters in the attachments and appendix of this book, as well as all the other letters that had to do with this subject. In his letter, he wrote that Barzan had led them to hell, and that Barzan had other objectives under the cover of this issue [TN: the marriage issue] and characterized the whole thing as a Trojan Horse, etc. He warned, swore and threatened against any action from us in an attempt to get in touch with his security details and the other nation's agencies and institutions! I was amazed, that kind of talk even went so far as to address issues that had nothing to do with the issue at hand. Well, this was typical Abu `Uday, to include the plotting schemes that controlled his brain. I gave the letter to Shajarat al-Dur to read. She read the letter and put it aside without any comment. Ten minutes later, I asked her what she thought about the letter, and she said that he had lost his nerve and mind, and that she believed he would go a great distance in this matter - as far as his future thinking and decisions can reach. She said that we must therefore

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avoid provoking him, because it seems as though this may be the first time someone has told him "Goodbye, farewell" since he began the presidency, which he had been dreaming of for a very long time, and which he made many sacrifices to achieve. He grew to know how to fire others, not to deal with others trying to leave him. She added that we should gather our things and find someplace to live, because they would bother us if we continued living there. Besides, she added, it is not unlikely that they might insist on us leaving. She concluded her talk by saying, "I will keep this letter for historical reasons, because one day he will find out that everything he said was a mistake, and that type of talk applies to people other than you."

(We were living in a government owned home after buying it from the Egyptian embassy. The embassy had bought it from the family of Mr. Diya' Ja'far, a former minister during the former kingdom regime. The house was located on the Tigris River, next to the house that belonged to Prince `Abdallah.)

I told her how correct she was, and that we must look for a house to lease because we did not own a house in Baghdad at that time. We had begun building our current home in the fifth month of 1983, three months before the crisis. I added that for security reasons, we should lease a home in the palace area, and definitely in the area that they control. This way, they would be responsible if something should happen to me, and also to allow them to easily monitor my movements, and thus be assured there was nothing they should be afraid of. She replied, "Exactly." I began looking for a home to rent, and found one at the beginning of Um al-Izzam street, just before the Tigris Palace after passing the 14<sup>th</sup> of July Monument across from the entrance of the Palace. The house was owned by a person named Shahin

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Al-Sakab. I leased the house for two thousand five hundred dinars per year and I paid the first year's rent upfront. The house was small and included three bedrooms, a living room, a dining room, a media room and kitchen. We made some repairs and set aside a room for me and Shajarat al-Dur and another for the four children. We bought bunk beds for them and we used the third room as a closet for all of us. Shajarat al-Dur wonderfully arranged and decorated the house as far as curtains and furniture. It was simple however, beautiful and very comfortable. It was liked by every visitor of our family, such as the brothers and the sister of Shajarat al-Dur who married with Watban in the year of 1986. We also had some friends visit because our family's visits had lessened due to the fact that they were pressured to disavow us. As this happened the friends were also subjected to even more pressure to disavow us. Not only that but some of them were bothered and even interrogated, as happened with Mr. Fu'ad al-Wattar who was kidnapped from the street and interrogated about his relationship with me and Watban, and if there was a sort of trade between him and us?! This also happened with other people who knew Engineer Fadil `Ajinah, who supervised the building of the house where we currently lived, and the Contractor Engineer Warkis Durzi, who managed the building of our house. They meant to use the technicians and former personnel of the peoples' army just to bother me and delay the building of my house. Also, they were checking the backgrounds of the people who were working for me; the driver, the guard, the servant; they wanted to find out if they had completed their military service.

One day in July when Qusay was attending a summer training session at one of the military compounds north of Tikrit, he ordered the special security to bring over Muhsin and Butros. The first man mentioned was working as a driver for us and had nothing to do with the government.

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The second, was working as a messenger for us and had nothing to do with the government either. They took them to the military compound and left them standing under the July sun until 3:00 PM when Ghassan `Abd-al-Rashid, the bodyguard of Qusay came and examined the military service record of each and found no problems and that they had nothing to do with the government but that they were rather civilian employees working for me. At that time they let them go on foot from the military compound to the main street that was seven kilometers away from the camp, without any food or water, which was one of their actions.

A few days later, they impounded the two cars that we owned and had nothing to do with the government, and kept them for several days until they made sure the cars were not government owned or were not bought from the government. They then returned them back to us.

We lived in that house from October 1983 to the end of the first half of the year 1986 when the construction of our home, in which we currently live, was complete. We were subjected to, almost daily, inconveniences in all different aspects. Troops were ordered to stand at our doors because the president's long motorcade used to pass by our house twice a day, on its way from Al-Radwaniyah to the Palace in the morning and when he returned to Al-Radwaniyah after the official working hours. The troops used to spread in the street from the Palace to the entrance of Al-Radwaniyah retreat. Husayn made sure to order one of the troops to stand at our door to prevent anyone from exiting or entering the house. Therefore, I used to stay inside the house and did not go outside when I noticed them in the street. They had previously stopped me and prevented me from exiting my house, therefore, to avoid any clashes with them I stayed home until they were gone. I knew they were trying to provoke, to try to make me use my actions against me.

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Such atmosphere had an effect on the children and all of us. In addition to the house being small, we all also shared one bathroom. The house was so small that the children were not able to move around. This situation had its effects on their health and for that reason we always went to Tikrit. There we had a reasonable home and a garden where the children could play. You could hear the children sighs of relief whenever we went to Tikrit, they would begin to laugh with happiness and their morale would change. We went to Tikrit at the end of every week and also during spring break and during the summer vacation. During this time Shajarat al-Dur was absorbing all that pressure and disturbing issues around us and would sugarcoat it for me and for the children. She was hard like a diamond and as sharp as a laser with them whenever we accidentally met, she did not spare any of the facts or criticism for them. One time, Saddam's daughter, the one who created all those problems, was out of line but Shajarat al-Dur confronted her and taught her an unforgettable lesson. After which Saddam's daughter began to cry while saying, "All those past years did not break you, how could we defeat you?" I replied by saying, "Allah willing, we were not broken because our cause is just while you are not and Allah willing you will remain as you are not capable of defeating us."

We have suffered a whole lot during the period from the end of 1983 and the middle of 1987. Even though the surveillance and forgery methods may have taken different forms and shapes, the objectives remained the same, to keep me away from the president and help arouse the president's fears and doubts against me. Since my desire to have relations with the president was genuine and had no calculated objectives, I continued sending messages to the president even though he used to neglect them and never replied. I will mention the text of those messages in the appendix of this book. The last message I sent was before his 50<sup>th</sup> birthday,



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on 4/28/1987, during which I told him that he was getting to his second half of life / older age and when one gets to that age, one would have special thoughts and feelings. This comes from being at the summit of his wisdom. I was hoping he would turn this ugly page of our relationship and start a new one.

On 4/27/1987, my sister, Siham, called me and said that the president sent a message that he wanted my brothers, Sab'awi and Watban, and I to have lunch with him the following day. He had something that he wanted us to hear. Shajarat al-Dur and I went to Siham's house where she told me that he had asked her to give me a piece of paper in her husband's handwriting [TN: her husband: Rashid al-Naqib]. The paper said, citing Saddam of course, "We will meet but we have nothing in common but honor. The other thing I want is to warn them not to bother my relatives" (he meant Husayn Kamil and his brother Saddam Kamil). I told her, "Personally, I do not have a problem with that because I see our relationship as a genuine brotherly one that has no other objectives. Therefore, there is no intent to start any problems with the children of Kamil Hasan, even if your brothers have been informed differently." She said that she had already informed Sab'awi who already rejected this contingency but Watban could arrive any moment now. Indeed, Watban arrived and I told him what Siham told me. Watban had no objection or comment. You can find that paper, in Mr. Rashid al-Naqib's handwriting, within the appendix of this book.

On the next day, Shajarat al-Dur, the children and I went to my sister Siham's house so that we could all go together from there, with the brothers. However, I only found Watban and when I asked about Sab'awi's whereabouts, my sister told me that he was at home refusing to go. We all agreed to go together to Sab'awi's house to try and convince him to come with us. If we did not go, they could say that our desire to meet with Saddam was to serve other objectives.

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Since we did not have any other objectives, there was no problem for us to go and meet with him. Once we got there we were able to convince him to go and all of us went together to the president's house. There, his wife and her two sons met us, there was some small talk but no real conversations and both parties were basically in silence. After going inside, we found Saddam's daughters, the wives of Hasan Kamil's sons. The atmosphere was very heavy and strained. After about two hours, the president arrived and we greeted him and hugged him at the entrance of the house. Husayn Kamil and `Adnan Khayrallah came along with the president, we shook hands with Husayn Kamil. He was feeling victorious, although anyone paying attention could see that he was uneasy still from the meeting previously, despite his well-known ability of deception. The reason for his disturbance was from the fear my future relations with the president, even though the president was obviously so fond of him. As for `Adnan Khayrallah, his disturbance was so obvious he did not say one word about that occasion or anything else. He was upset because he hated me for my stance towards al-Bakr, his wife's father. I brought forward his issue before the party's ninth symposium in June, 1982, when I noticed that there were party ranks and leadership members who frequently visited al-Bakr. I explained to President Saddam, who had the position of the symposium's president at that time, that there was an issue that needed explanation. I figured since all the party's ranks and leadership members are here together now, I have a question and it is, "Are the frequent visits by the ministers, the party's rank members and some of the leadership members, to comrade Abu Haytham allowed?" I also added, "I need a clarification of this issue before all the comrades here." The president said, "Frequent visits are not allowed. Comrade Abu Haytham is the National Secretary General of the party and the president of the Republic but still, he is not part of the official leadership of the party and has no role in the party or the nation."

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When discussing this he spoke decisively, clearly and set things straight without any doubt. Before anything could happen, the president issued an order to withdraw Al-Bakes guards and vehicles. Although I had nothing to do with that, `Adnan thought I was behind this order. In addition to that he knew of my stance when I supported the transfer of Munzir Ahmad Mutlak from our Mission in Geneva to our embassy in Argentine. Because Geneva is in the heart of Europe, a transportation center and well involved in well-known public issues, he had the opportunity to engage in activities with all the Iraqi abroad and in Europe, whether they were Arabs or Kurds, communists or Ba'thist, outside or inside the party. Because of this I asked for the president's approval to transfer him to a place that was far away from the area where those Iraqis and others exist. And therefore, the president transferred him; the objective of that transfer was to protect him and not to harm him, as he took it.

After lunch, when we were in the front yard of the president's house on our way out, `Adnan, Sab'awi and I were walking towards our vehicles. Sab'awi told `Adnan, speaking in the plural, that we all enjoyed the gathering, and that he intended to invite the president to another one. He hinted of the possibility of this invitation being delivered by `Adnan and the relatives, seeing as though Sab'awi had forgotten to tell the president just then. He then directly asked `Adnan to do so. `Adnan sluggishly said that he would tell the president, but later on however, we found out that he did not tell the president. Before the president got angry about what `Adnan said about us and we were forced to retire by resigning from our positions, and after sending our first letter to the president, `Adnan Khayrallah called us and said, "Come over to my house because the president wants to see you." We went there at about noon and remained there until 3:30 PM. When we asked him how the meeting would take place, he said that a person would arrive

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who had been sent by the president to take us all to where he was. During those three hours, there was a lot of talk. All about the subject and among the things that `Adnan said, such as, "Do you want me to resign with you?" To which I answered "no," because the issue would be explained differently and would mean more than what it actually was. In a way similar to what happened with the Egyptian Leadership at the time of `Abd-al-Nasir's rule. Anyway, I told him, it is up to you and your reasoning. Later on, we found out that the president had told `Adnan to call him as soon as we arrive to his house and he would send a person to take us to him, or he would come to `Adnan's house. However, `Adnan did not call the president and only told us that the president would send a person to take us. Because he never heard from us, the president got angry thinking that `Adnan did not call him because we refused to meet with him. This made him enraged and he made his official and unofficial decisions and then sent us his historical letter in which he threatened and warned us against doing any wrong move, as he put it, or any communications with his security details, army, guards and/or agencies. He also told my brothers that Barzan let you go to hell and portrayed my stance by the Trojan Horse. He continued on with his accusations, attacks and discriminations that I have mentioned in the beginning. We learned of all of this when our relations with him were again restored. He told us that he asked `Adnan to call us for his meeting and call him upon our arrival for someone to come bring us to him. Since he did not call, the president thought that we had refused to meet with him. There are other reasons for `Adnan's stance towards me, in particular, and also towards Sab'awi. The biggest reason that concerned me was that he thought I was behind the president's decision to remove Khalil al-Izzawi, the chief of the Military Intelligence, who was affiliated with the Ministry of Defense. Khalil was known to be `Adnan's dear friend and the manager of his private affairs. The reason that I had convinced the president

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to remove Khalil al-`Izzawi from his position as a chief of intelligence was Khalil's suspicious and indistinguishable relationships outside and inside Iraq. In addition, Khalil was an opportunistic hypocrite and he was facilitating illegitimate deals for the interest of `Adnan Khayrallah in the social and monetary fields. The most important reason was his attempt to create conflicts between `Adnan and myself. He purposely gave him false information about the amount of weapons the Ministry of Defense was giving to the intelligence to hand over to the Iranian Kurds and the Iraqis. He said that the intelligence was commanding to launch operations against Iran. He continued to say that those weapons were not suitable for the use of intelligence, as far as the type and quantity go, and that Barzan was imposing his will on the Ministry of Defense. While in fact there was a committee that was formed by the president, which included the chief of intelligence, to discuss every item that was being requested by intelligence and to hear the reasons for the request. They would then make their recommendation to the president, who would order the fulfillment of intelligence requests. When the president learned of this, he was disappointed with him, and that was in addition to the things about Khalil's personality and relations that bothered him. Therefore, the president decided to remove him, which made `Adnan disappointed. But he reacted without any comments or actions showing his well-known nature of ambiguity and inward thoughts, until there was an opportunity to advantage of the situation.

The other reason I believe he was upset with me, was that I have arrested two of his friends and I have also denied their entry to Iraq. This was because they all were known to be weapons' traders and *have* suspicious affiliations. These friends are: - The Armenian: William Ebkian

- The Armenian: Sarkis Agolinyan (who was imprisoned in the United States)

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- The Syrian: `Atif Daniel (an interpreter for the delegate that was headed by `Adnan to hold talks with the French to buy Mirage warplanes)

While having our lunch, I noticed the president was moved, he had tears in his eyes and his voice was not normal. There was no back and forth conversation, as he was the sole speaker, and his topic of conversation was about the military manufacturing and how the Husayn group, as he put it, was able to manufacture different weapons and bombs for the warplanes and artillery. He said that he agreed with the leadership wanting to see that achievement and asked me to visit the showroom to see what the struggling military manufacturers were able to achieve. Two days later, I went to the showroom and met with the manager, I walked around and noticed that the people who were walking along with me were also watching my movements and where exactly I was looking. After I had completed the tour, they asked me to write a few words in the visitors' file. I wrote a few words congratulating the officials of the showroom for their good organization and achievement.

The relationship remained the same, except for during some special occasions, such as feasts. It was this way until the conflict between him, his son and wife had erupted. It changed because of his relationship with Samira al-Shah Bandar, and with `11day murdering Kamil Hanna, he was the connecting circle between the president and Samira. Therefore, he was commissioned by the president to bring her to him and accompany her back home and care for her.

The conflict, that was like a fire under the debris, had erupted during the day of 10/18/1988 at about eleven O'clock in the morning.

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On that day, the person who was working for me at the house there in Tikrit came in and told me that the president had called asking to speak with me. He wanted me to call him back. I went home and phoned the president. After the greetings, he asked about where I was and I told him that I was in Tikrit, to which he said that he thought I was in Baghdad and that he needed me. That was the first time that I had heard that word from him, it was something he would never say at all. I told him that I would be there in less than two hours. To which he said, "Fine, but do not speed to get here." I replied saying, "Allah willing!"

I arrived to Baghdad that afternoon and Shajarat al-Dur informed me what had happened the night before. That the mother of `Uday asked Shajarat al-Dur to come to her aid and when Shajarat al-Dur arrived there, she found her sister in a very miserable condition. He actions and the situation was not normal however, the mother of `Uday did not reveal anything about what was going on. Shajarat al-Dur said that there must be something but they do not want to talk about it, she also added that she thinks `Adnan Khayrallah knows the facts. I asked her how she knew that, she replied saying, "Because Adnan did not say one word and all the expressions of his face show that he knows the reason. In addition, he seemed disgusted by what happened and what was happening, however, he was not surprised or even paying attention to what was happening." She said that '1.1day was in a hospital at that time because he tried to commit suicide by taking a number of Valium Pills! I told her that the president called me and asked me to go there, to which she said, "Call him." I called the president and he asked me to go to his house. It was five O'clock in the afternoon when I arrived and found him in a confused state. He told me what had happened and that `Uday killed Kamil Hanna when Kamil was with a group of his relatives. Kamil had been spending the night at al-`Awwas Island and seemed drunk when he stated opening fire in the air. `Uday was nearby where Kamil Hanna was and also

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was drunk when he asked Kamil to stop firing, but he did not. Therefore, `Uday hit him on the head with a stick that caused internal bleeding in his head and caused his death. Later on, we found out that Kamil Hanna was celebrating his uncle's marriage with Samira that took place few days earlier. Since he was the president's boy, and had his place in the president's heart, he considered himself as the faithful holder of the president's secrets. Before and during all that, the president gave much more money to Kamil Hanna than he gave me or any other government official. The Ministers, leadership members and others, carried favor with Kamil Hanna who used the helicopter for his travels. Also whenever he went to the governorates before the president to arrange the president's reception, he was met by the governor. During one of the meetings with the president, he told me that Hasan Al-Amri, a member of the Revolutionary Command Council, was showing affection to Kamil Hanna and asking him about the president's impression of him. I did not comment on what he said.

I tried to comfort him and told him what happened had already happened and we need to wisely handle the issue. To which he said, that boy is bad and his uprising was not completed. To which I did not comment. However, I said that we would handle the issue and he has to calm down. Of course when Kamil Hanna passed away, the president sent `Izzat al-Duri to take part in the funeral.

The next day I went to the hospital where `Uday was, to visit him and find out what his condition was. He was in the Bin Sinai hospital; Shajarat al-Dur went along with me. He was just acting sick more than actually being sick. His mother, his brother Husayn Kamil, and his sisters were all there. His mother spoke just a few words but was closer to silence, while Husayn Kamil was pleased, because what happened would take a long time to restore the relationship between the father and son. As for his brother Qusay, his stance resembled the stance of Husayn Kamil.



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Not only that, but also he was moving and behaving as if he wanted to take advantage of the opportunity and appear to be the sincere, obedient and straightforward guy, etc. It was in the afternoon when myself, Shajarat al-Dur, the mother of `Uday, and others were there at the hospital waiting in the living room; Husayn Kamil and others were in the hospital room where `Uday was. We heard running footsteps and screams, I went out to find out what was happening when Qusay told me that `Uday got out of the hospital, took his car and was gone. Qusay added that he thought `Uday was going to Al-Radwaniyah to confront his father. When his mother and sisters heard that, they were terribly disturbed and I heard them saying, "Allah forbid, one of them shall kill the other". I was surprised when I heard them saying that, in the meantime they got my attention and I began to remember what Shajarat al-Dur said to myself, "then, what Shajarat al-Dur felt was true; there was a reason for what happened but they did not want to reveal it". About half an hour later Shajarat al-Dur and I went back home.

About six O'clock that evening, the president called and told me to immediately come over to his house. I quickly went out on my way to the president's house where I found him in his sports attire, pants, shirt and a hat. He asked, "Do you know what happened?" to which I said "no". He added, "That crazy came in to Al-Radwaniyah" pointing his finger at me saying, "go back to your wife." He meant his mother (the mother of `Uday). The president added that his [ `Uday] behavior before my security details were very insulting, and fortunately I did not have handgun on me otherwise I would have killed him. The mother of `Uday was sitting there along with sisters Siham and Nawal, in addition to the president's daughters, when Watban also came in. At that time, Qusay entered the palace running while screaming "he is here" and when I asked him who was there, he said, "'Uday."

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I said, "Tell him to come in so that we could put an end to this nonsense," to which he said, "No, he has a rifle in his hands and wants to kill Dad."

I quickly went outside and Watban caught up with me, we found him in front of the house that was called "al-Qadisiyyah Palace." In his hands there was a Kalashnikov rifle. We approached him in an attempt to take the rifle away, however, he knew what we were about to do so he stepped back and fired the rifle under our feet. I spoke to him in a way that I do not remember now because I was disturbed then. After that `Uday began to cry and put his rifle down, therefore we were able to take him inside. Once inside the entrance of the palace, Qusay drew his handgun in an attempt to shoot his brother. However, I reprimanded him saying that he was a hypocrite and an opportunist who was trying to take advantage of the situation. We entered the living room where the president was sitting and I asked `Uday to apologize and kiss his father, and he did. We all sat down and the atmosphere was very miserable, the women were crying and, of course, `Adnan Khayrallah did neither move out of his chair nor said a single word, there was a terrible silence. Ten or more minutes later, the president spoke saying that after what had happened he would not consider `Uday as his son. Then he said to `Uday that he was a killer and must prepare to go to the police station and give himself up because that was the only solution to this problem. I said, "Yes, he will do exactly as you say." Indeed, I agreed with that solution because the problem became known to the general public and if left untreated would seriously embarrass the president. As he, at that time, was somewhat sensitive to what the people were saying. After that, the president left and I spoke with `Uday in an attempt to convince him to give himself up and later we would fix things up because that was the only solution. `Uday made me feel that he was actually going to do so and in fact, he was convinced of doing so. However, it seemed like

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he later changed his mind.

Shajarat al-Dur and I went back home, however, each of my sisters, Siham and Nawal, remained behind and I think Shajarat al-Dur sister, Ilham, was there too. From them, we knew that the president returned home about one hour later and along with him was Husayn Kamil and his brother Saddam. At that time, 11day came down from his wing at Al-Qadisiyyah Palace when his father summoned him; his mother, our sisters and Ilham were still there. The president asked `11day why did he contact the American embassy asking to facilitate his entry to America. It seemed that the president forged an agreement with Husayn and Saddam Kamil to arrest `11day, because as soon as the president said that, they attacked `11day, handcuffed him and took him to Al-Radwaniyah. It was here that they detained him in a room that included a simple bath and a medium living room, I know because I visited him there. It was later revealed that `Uday had contacted the American Embassy asking asylum while his phone was monitored by Husayn Kamil. Husayn quickly informed the president and the president arrested his son `Uday. `11day stayed at Al-Radwaniyah for three weeks, after which he got out. It is well known how the Minister of Justice, I think who was `Abd-al-Qadir al-Duri at that time, sent a letter to the president full of hypocrisy, lies and had nothing to do with the truth and law that he was supposedly guarding and protecting. Awhile after `Uday got out, he had a problem with the operator of the Palace's switch room and therefore beat him up. That action disturbed the president and caused another problem that we had to deal with. However, I noticed that the president was disturbed, embarrassed and confused about what he should do to deal with his son. A few days later, after his problem with the switch room operator, he beat up a security officer who was working at the palace along with Husayn Kamil. His name was Salih Rahim and apparently had something to do with watching `Uday and monitoring his phone etc. This beating caused a fracture in the officer's head because

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`Uday used the butt of the handgun to hit him with. At that time, the president got very angry and said that such a behavior had gone too far and could not be left untreated, because this situation would prevent the security and protection details from doing their jobs. This time I felt incapable of calming things down because `Uday would not let go or calm down. However, I called Hamid Hammadi, the president's secretary at that time, and asked him to not let that officer see the president until we fix things up. To which he said that Husayn Kamil and Qusay had already asked him to let the president see the officer in his flesh and blood and that at that time, the officer was in the president's room telling him what had happened. I made that call from the president's house because the mother of `Uday had asked me to go there, saying that another new problem had taken place. I went back to the room where the president's wife and her son `Uday were sitting and told them what happened and that there are individuals of this family who were trying to take advantage of this situation for their own special agenda. To which they asked, "who?" I told them that the officer went to see the president when each Husayn Kamil and Qusay asked the president's secretary to let him.

On the second day, the president called and asked me to come over to his office in the building of the National Assembly; it was about ten O'clock in the morning. I told him that I would be there after I got ready, to which he said, "Take your time; I will be waiting for you." I arrived to the president's office at about thirty minutes after eleven O'clock in the morning, when I entered Hamid Hammadi asked me to get in the office because the president was waiting for me. I entered the president's room and greeted him when he told me to sit down. Ten minutes later, after I sat down, the president said that he did not sleep all last night thinking of what to do with that crazy, he meant his son `Uday, and added, "if he stayed here

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in such miserable conditions, he would force me to kill him." To which I said, "Just hold on, there is nothing without a solution." He responded by saying that he had an idea to send 'Uday abroad and send Sab'awi with him, after he appoint him as an ambassador in that chosen country. He also added, "However, I do not think Sab'awi could control 'Uday," and that was why he wanted to see me and asked if I could go with 'Uday instead of Sab'awi. I immediately told him that there was no problem for me to do so because I was sincere in helping him get out of that tight situation, also, Shajarat al-Dur and I were looking for such an idea since a long time ago. I notice the president was comfortable when he asked me what country would I have liked to go to? I said, "England first and Switzerland second" to which he asked, "Why England?" I replied by saying, "Because of the language, we have a background of the English language and it is useful for the children to master the English language." The president said, "Switzerland is best" and added, "Honestly, I do not trust 'Uday and England is full of enemies therefore, 'Uday could betray us because he is capable of betraying and ready to do so." That was what he said to the letter. The president said that 'Uday does everything and asked if I knew of his friends that were arrested, he said that 'Uday handed them three million dinars that he saved at al-Qadisiyyah Palace. He was saving it as a down payment for a shipment of Whiskey to sell? Do you believe that my son deals Whiskey?

At first I did not comment, and then I said okay, Switzerland it is. The president got in touch with Tariq 'Aziz and told him it was agreed that Barzan would be Iraq's ambassador in Geneva and asked him who was the ambassador there? To which Tariq 'Aziz answered, "There is no ambassador here." After the president was done talking with the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Tariq 'Aziz at that time, I asked

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the president's secretary to arrange our travel as soon as possible. A decision was made by the Revolutionary Command Council to appoint Barzan al-Tikriti as the political advisor for the president of the republic and an Iraqi ambassador at the European HQ. I went back home and told Shajarat al-Dur, who was very happy with what happened and said that she always wished to live in Switzerland and hoped that our children get their education there. While being away from these sick people and falling behind conditions that were both increasing and causing the shining intellectual to lose knowledge and lose the shine. To which I said that now, Allah made our wishes come true and Allah willing all your wishes and desires will always come true. She said, "Thank God." There is something I must mention and that is, a huge change took place in our way of thinking our points of view during the period between the year 1983 and the year 1988. Those years are considered to be the harshest years in the lives of Shajarat al-Dur and I, because the pressures on us and wars launched against us were indescribable. The attempt to slander my reputation in all fields was strong and had all the country's capabilities, all hypocrites, and forgers working for it. In addition, letting go of the fertile family's mentality that was controlled by the conspiracy theory and suffering many mental complexities. Therefore, Shajarat al-Dur and I had decided that we had no future in that country, under the rule of this regime and this mentality. However, we put our thought aside for the future because the most important thing, "money," was not available to carry on with us with our dreams. But we could not live outside Iraq without any means, especially because we have children who needed living expenses. In addition, my family and I were placed in the no fly list and I had no intention of getting out of Iraq illegally because I did not want to work against the regime, for ethical reasons

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that many people may not understand. The adherence to those ethics have continued until this day, despite what was revealed about the nature of that regime and how the conditions in Iraq have become. Of course, we had some money however; we spent some of it to build the house that we currently live in, because we did not own a house before. We earlier sold our house that was located in the al-Nazimiyyah area, during the next five years our income did increase and we made a handsome amount of money. At that time we build a barn for the livestock; enough to house three thousand heads and my brother Watban was my partner. We use to sell that number of livestock every three months and replace them with others to raise and then sell, and so on and so forth. Therefore, we used to make good money out of this activity. I also built barns to raise cows and then sell them and so on. The capacity of that barn was 700 heads, which was in addition to a fish lake area which was 70 Donums, this also was good business. Therefore, we made good money out of that too. In 1986, the government started the specialization process in some of its sectors, including the sector of agriculture. Therefore, I began to sell farms etc. I also decided to buy a chicken farm, one of those that the government had begun to sell. However, I had no cash money that I did not need in another field at that time therefore; I suggested selling our farm that I bought from the Ministry of Endowments. I also planted citric trees and the president ordered me to build a villa on that land, just like he did with my comrades, the members of the Military Office at that time. Shajarat al-Dur agreed to sell; even though she liked that place and she was the one who arranged everything in that villa just like she did with all locations that we owned. However, when the children knew, they got mad and objected, after they found out all they did was not working, they began to cry. After they made sure

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that crying would not work either, they asked to spend a couple of days at the farm before we handed it over to the new owner. I told them that there was no problem for us to do so and explained to them the reasons for selling the farm and the villa. I told them that they were getting older and as they do their needs increase. While we do not have enough to fulfill our other needs and obligations, that we would use proceeds of the sale to buy a chicken farm that would bring in a handsome income, and later on we would buy a better farm than the one we had sold. The farm was about 35 Donums on the river's west bank, a short distance after Al-Taji military compound and across from the land that belonged to `Adnan Khayrallah. It was located on the Tigris River in the al-Rashidiyyah Area. The farm was sold for one million, three hundred and fifty thousand dinars. I sent a group of brothers and friends who had nothing to do with the government, had no influence what so ever. My relationship with them was unknown to most people, which really did not mean anything because most people already knew that I was prosecuted by the government. The president and other power centers were exaggerating in throwing the book at me so that they would not make the president, Husayn Kamil, or the president's sons angry at them. The friends I asked to attend the auction of the Ministry of Agriculture, which was being run by its Minister `Aziz Salih al-Khafaji and later, al-Numan, were Engineer Fadil `Ajinah, Engineer Muzfir Durzi and Mr. Fu'ad Dawud. They failed to buy something nearby Baghdad or its suburbs so we continued and bought Al-Ramadi Farm, which was one hundred and fifty kilometers away from Baghdad. At that time, such distance was considered too far because there was not a freeway between al-Ramadi and Baghdad. I would need two hours to get to



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the farm and two hours to get back, due to the fact that the road was old, narrow and passed by many cities and villages making speeding not possible. We began working in the farm, which was complete and working at its full designed capacity, producing a hundred and seventy five million eggs per year. Therefore, this yielded a very handsome sum of money at that time. I remember our income, during the years before 8/2/1990 when everything was destroyed, it was (---). This was because two or three months after starting I got the hang of it and gained the courage in this field. Mr. Ahmad Isma'il sold me Al-Tuz farm that also produced eggs at a capacity of a hundred and twenty million eggs per year. Therefore we began to receive huge income at that time. Before all this had materialized, Shajarat al-Dur used to tell me. "You never feel that you own anything in this country under such regime and its ruling mentality," and added, "You may own millions in the evening but you are very likely in a wink of the eye, to lose everything in the morning for no reason but envy or ill will etc." She used to conclude her talk by saying, "There are lots of such reasons; there is no respect for the personal ownership or human rights. Unfortunately, the law is absent in Iraq." I used to agree with her because what she said was true, however, I used to tell her that we have nothing to worry about at that time. But when our income began to increase, thank Allah, she told me that now we must think of saving our surplus money abroad as soon as possible. This was because you could never tell how things would be at the general or private levels and she also added that those guys could not live without creating problems. I said, "You are right."

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With the help of some friends and relatives, I was able to save this money abroad. Some of them needed money in Iraq, so I gave them the money they needed and they gave me the equivalent of that money abroad after I had arranged the administrative issues with the help of other friends. Some others were professional in getting money out of Iraq; a group of them was put to death at that time, such as Hazim Yasawi, Sami Yasawi and others. I had the help of many friends, most of them lived abroad although some were frequent visitors but lived abroad too. They were not sorry for doing so I think, and I say that they did good as they had a future vision. I forgot to mention the way the government sold its factories / farms, they were a 20% down payment and the balance was to be paid by ten equal payments.

During the two or three days after an order was issued to appoint me as an ambassador in the European HQ, the mother of `Uday called us many times, both Shajarat al-Dur and I. She also came to our house without prior call, she was persistence in pushing me to accelerate the procedure and travel saying that `Uday could do something and mess the whole thing up, as she put it.

We departed on 12/18/1988, three days before the birthday of Shajarat al-Dur, it was her 31<sup>st</sup> birthday. Even still she is beautiful at any age, and her beauty was calm but very elegant of a special kind. One would daily discover something new about her and her noble characteristics. She is very beautiful, very wise and has deep vision. She grows more beautiful every day, therefore, I say that her beauty and wisdom could not be resisted. During hard times, she is as solid as diamond

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and as decisive as a laser. I was hoping to travel after the new year's day and after we celebrated her birthday, but she said, "No, let us go as soon as possible because we do not know what could develop that may negatively affect this issue. Because all the parties involved are not normal and deal with things irrationally and with a revenge attitude for unknown reasons. Allah willing, we will have many other opportunities to celebrate."

`I.Tday and his mother came to our house so that we could go to the airport that had received an order from the president to prepare an airplane to take us to Geneva. Also my brother Sab'awi came to the airport to say goodbye. I said goodbye to Shajarat al-Dur, the children and the mother of `Uday.

At the airport, the plane was a Boeing 737 and the name "Salah al-Din" was written on its front. While on our way, Sab'awi told `Uday not to create problems because we do not agree with you and the care you receive from us is not for your sake but rather because you are our brother's son. He also added by saying that we support our brother against `Ilday and that we do not support Ilday against our brother. It was after five O'clock in the evening when we arrived to Geneva, and about ten O'clock in the evening when we arrived to where the embassy employee and the in charge, Dr. `Abd-al-Mun'im al-Qadi were waiting for us. They took us to the ambassador's residence, which was an apartment on the upper floor of our legation's building. What I noticed was that 'Ilday, despite his huge arrogance, was carefully carrying a medium sized bag that was obviously heavy but important to him. Also there was another bag that was carried his friend `Abd-al-Wahab Kamal, who was nick named Kabi, and who used to perform special services for `Uday in Baghdad

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and Geneva and who later escaped to the United States of America. Once he returned to Iraq, due to a scandal committed by `Uday in Geneva, he began to speak of the events of 8/2/1990 and what followed of `Uday's affairs and actions. `Abd-al-Wahab (Kabi) was one of the bad friends that were present and still surrounding `Uday. They were the reasons for his fall and his destruction as far as health, social affairs, professionalism and intellectuality go. They were bad because they lived the same way that Kamil Husayn designed for them, to realize his strategic objective and destroy `Uday first and Qusay later. Indeed, what he planned for `Uday was 100% realized but in the case of Qusay the percentage differs.

It was later found out that those bags contained a sum of money in dollars, his friend `Abd-al-Wahab told me so. `Uday brought with him more than fifty suits, more than ten fur coats and hats that attracted the attention he wanted. In addition, because men in Europe do not put on fur coats and hats, people used to stand there looking at him whenever we walked the streets and went into to a restaurant. He enjoyed that and used to say, "Oh uncle, they recognized us" and I used to tell him that they did not recognize us. What it was is that your clothes caught their attention, to which he used to say, "Yes of course, they could not buy such clothes." Sometimes I kept silent and sometimes I was too annoyed so that I told him, "No son, it is different here, they do not care. But they think you are from one of the African countries, perhaps from Congo?" He was behaving in a disturbing way that attracted attention and did not make any sense. Imagine, he used to go to the night clubs and take the hookah along with him so that he becomes ...

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something for the people to look at. Some other people thought that he was smoking Hashish.

One night he was at a famous night club called al-Krifter, and he went to the bathroom along with one of his friends and began to talk about another person who also was in the bathroom. The talk was all hard sarcasm and coincidentally, that man was an Arab too. All of a sudden he spoke in Arabic and reprimanded them. `Uday reacted by drawing his handgun and attempted to hit that man on the head. However, `Abd-al-Wahab held his hand and stopped him. The club administration interfered and did not call the police. However, the police were well informed the next day. There were the traffic violations and the smuggling of a vehicle, which specifications violated those of Switzerland. All that also caused a crisis, but the Swiss, uncharacteristically, put up with all those behaviors and violations because the status of Iraq at that time was different. Its capabilities and ability to influence other countries was huge due to the interests that those countries had in Iraq.

As for the Arab and foreign businessmen who surrounded him, they were a surprise to me because I never imagined that this young man had such ambitions and relations. However, the more important and more dangerous of all is that when `Uday shot Walid, the delegate's guard, twice the bullets entered his chest and exited out of the back. The reason for that was, the guard called to inform me that `Uday and `Abd-al-Wahab began to gather their belongings in the apartment and place it in the car. I quickly put on my clothes and went downstairs when I found their bags and belongings by the information desk. `Uday was out to bring the car and when he came back and saw me, I asked him, "Where are you going?" I was talking to him while

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I was emotional and instead of answering me, he walked towards the guard and shot him twice in the chest. To me such behavior was barbaric and indescribable. At that moment Dr. `Abd-al-Mun'im al-Qadi, who I called on to come there, came down and I asked him to help me take Walid to the hospital. At the beginning, Walid was screaming so I tried to calm him down. I was fearing that the building residents and the guards of the German Mission, which was located across from the Iraqi Mission and just meters away, may hear the noise and which in turn the news may reach the media and cause a scandal that we did not need. At this time the first scandal was still spoken of and in the papers. We took Walid to the hospital and immediately he was placed in the operating room where he had a three and half hour long surgery. I remained with Dr. `Abd-al-Mun'im at the "Continental Hospital" until seven O'clock in the morning. When the guard got out of surgery and his condition became stable, he was asked about the incident and how it happened. The hospital's security had invited police investigators. However, I asked `Abd-al-Mun'im al-Qadi to tell them that the incident was a result of the guard's negligence and not paying attention to his weapon during the cleaning process. The case was closed despite the fact that the Swiss police were not convinced by our claims, again because of Iraq's status at that time as I have mentioned before. The guard remained in the hospital for three weeks, during which time I was visiting him twice a day and brought with me the food I ordered the cook to prepare especially for him. Of course there is a story that has to do with the cook. When we arrived to Geneva, we did not find either a cook or butler in the ambassador's home because there was no ambassador there. After the late ambassador `Abd-al-Jabbar al-Haddawi left, the cook and the butler were let go. Therefore, `Abd-al-Mun'im

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hired an Egyptian lady to cook for us. However, we could not eat the food that she prepared for us. Therefore, `Uday called his mother and described this condition to her, She in turn, immediately, sent a cook and a butler to serve us in Geneva. However, they arrived to Geneva with only a two weeks tourist visa which had to later be extended. Along with them on the same plane, she sent all that one desires from readymade and fresh foods, fruits, fish, meat etc., the things that one could not find in Geneva. Therefore, we lived as kings for a month, unfortunately however, all this came to a quick end when `Uday decided to return to Iraq on 1/19/1989 after his new scandal. Therefore, they withdrew the cook and the butler, we really suffered until I was joined with a Lebanese cook from Baghdad who I have known for a long white back, since the year of 1972 in particular. I met him at the house of the Iraqi ambassador in Italy, Mr. Tahah Ma'ruf. He was looking for a job because of the conditions in his country which were worse than those of Iraq now. Along with him a young man, "Isa Habib, the butler," came and began working for me at the house. After that things were somewhat stabilized.

I called Shajarat al-Dur and explained to her that it was necessary to let the president know that his son left Geneva and was heading to Baghdad. Since the relations between the two of them were strained, I was afraid that something bad might happen to the president at the hands of his son. She informed the president however, the president did not object to his son's return without permission since the son was out of his father's control. After awhile `Uday was restored as the chief of the Olympic Committee and therefore, restored all his powers and position that his father ousted him from after his first scandal.

A month after the scandal and the departure of `Uday from Geneva, the mother of `Uday came

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along with Saddam Kamil to deliver the president's greetings for me. Saying that `Uday had bothered me and that they and Saddam were thanking me for what I did. They also said that it was up to Barzan whether to stay another period in Geneva or return to Baghdad. I thought, I just got out of that swamp, therefore, how could I go back to it? Shajarat al-Dur was there, she had come to visit us, as she stayed behind with Muhammad who was a senior high school student. Therefore, I said to her, "First ... I was hoping to straighten up your son and help him benefit from such a rich experience and unlimited knowledge in a country at the heart of Europe. A country that is known by its culture and organization however, not only *he* did not help me do that but also did not help himself. This is because you did not pay attention to raising him from the beginning. As to whether we stay here or not, we will stay because we registered our children in the boarding schools and we have a strong desire to educate them right here. To gain the science, language and knowledge in this country, the other thing is that it is hard for me to hear that Barzan went with `Uday and came back when `11day had returned. As if I am the bodyguard of `Uday, while 11day was the one who came along with me."

Of course, `Uday was appointed as a first secretary of the mission and I tried to convince him to join the university in Geneva. But he refused because he was not fond of the education and serious life. Instead he got his degree from Iraq by known means that his father admitted when I suggested that `Uday should join the university in Geneva. He said, "You would do him good if you could push him in that direction because he would discover himself, his value, how he got his degree here in Iraq and how the hypocrites here in Iraq were giving him full marks he did not deserve."

Two days after the mother of `Uday arrived to Geneva, Mr. Tariq `Aziz arrived in his way in New York to hold talks with



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an Iranian delegate under the supervision of the Secretary General of the United Nations, "Javier Perez de Cuellar." This was in an attempt to reach an agreement to apply the resolution of the Security Council number 598 which was issued at the beginning of the war with Iran. However, Iran did not accept that resolution until 8/8/1988 when al-Khomayni made his famous speech accepting the resolution by saying: "It is worse than poison etc." Tariq `Aziz said to me, "You must come with me to New York to meet with the Iranian delegate." Therefore, I went along with him and during the trip from Geneva to New York we had a conversation which summary is as follows: The mission of the delegate was to lower the curtain on the sixth item of the resolution, which requires the determination of who started the war and then not return to the accord of Algeria. I told him that achieving both goals will be difficult and requires certain circumstances and aids to help us reach those goals. Among which, the continuation of support from the West and especially, the United States of America, and added by saying, "In my views, we are now under the microscope of the West because they want to know our new directions that they believe Iraq will begin in the period after the war." Tariq asked, "What do they want to know?" I said, "First, they are watching Iraq and want to know what Iraq would do with this huge army that was formed during the war. Because it is known to whole world that the first thing the fighting countries would do, after the war ends, is to let go of the surplus troops. As they are needed in the factories and farms to begin the rebuilding of the economy and services etc. The country would be in need for those who joined the army to rebuild however, almost six months after the ceasefire, there is not a single sign that indicates the leadership intends to go in that direction. The other thing that the West and the Iraqi peoples are waiting for

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is there to be an announcement of a permanent constitution that would respond to the needs and ambitions of all classes of the Iraqi society, one that also aims to activate a civilian life and a civilian society." Tariq gave a brief answer and said that it was not the time to work on those issues.

We arrived to New York where Mr. Ismat Kinani, the Iraqi ambassador to the United Nations at that time, was in our reception. We held talks with the Iranian delegate, with the attendance of the Secretary General and his two assistants Mr. Pico and Mr. Yan Alyson. But we did not make any progress worth mentioning however, we did agree that the second meeting would be in Geneva. Some members of the Iraqi delegate tried to signal the Iranian delegate indicating that they wanted direct face to face talks without the attendance of the Secretary General, the Iranian delegate did not pay attention to those signals. Mr. Tariq `Aziz also tried to send them signals via friends of his and Iraq, including Arabs and Americans and again they did not give importance to such signals. We departed from New York and headed to Geneva where the plane landed and I left while the rest of the delegate continued their way to Baghdad.

My first visit to Baghdad was on 2/10/1989 when the Ministry of Foreign Affairs sent for me in compliance with an order from the president. I did not know the reason then but afterwards I knew that the reason was a message that I sent to the president that had to do with the conduct of his younger son. I was informed by Mr. Hushnik Sayyid Ahmad, an Iraqi Intelligence officer, who was responsible for the Iranian division that I was at the helm of. He was a smart hard working officer, especially when under the supervision of a strong boss. After that, he was appointed to work under the diplomatic cover of our embassy in Bonn. He paid me a visit in the beginning of the first month of 1989 and told me that Qusay was in Bonn along with a group of

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Iraqi businessmen, of whom included As'ad T'iymah and other frequent visitors of Iraq, also some who did not visit Iraq for a long time. The intelligence officer said that when they were in the hotel, one of them asked him if he could bring them something to inhale. Obviously, he was asking for drugs to which the nervous intelligence officer told him that he does not deal with such things and warned him that Qusay might hear him asking for drugs. But the man told him not to worry because they inhale drugs all the time. Therefore, I wrote a letter to the president in that regard to tell him it was necessary to pay attention to his children before he loses them and citing the intelligence officer. I told the president that Husayn Kamil was trying to destroy his sons because he facilitate everything for them including drugs, for that reason, they sent for me.

I arrived to Baghdad on February 10<sup>th</sup>, 1989. This is when the family of my sister, the wife of Mr. Arshad, informed me that my letter to the president caused a huge problem and all they knew was that I sent a letter to the president telling him that Husayn Kamil provides his sons with drugs. As a result, the mother, the children and the women were enraged. How did they know that? They knew that because Saddam Kamil was the president's companion and beloved friend and therefore, was able to read my letter without the knowledge of the president and informed Husayn Kamil. In his turn, Husayn Kamil launched a propaganda campaign against me telling everyone that Barzan was accusing him and the children of the president of being addicted to drugs. The president heard this noise and when investigating the issue, found out how they knew of such information. Saddam Kamil was the one who told them after reading the letter that was on the desk of the president but without the president's knowledge?!

I tried to clarify the facts about what I had mentioned in my letter, from very serious and significant information that I have received from the intelligence officer who came

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to Geneva. He came, especially, to provide me with that information which compelled me to write to the president. As that was one of my personal and national duties however, no one wanted to understand the truth?!

Anyway, on 2/15/1989, the president summoned me to his palace at Al-Radwaniyah Area. I went there and found him sitting in one of the palace's rooms and a number of files before him that he was reading. Arshad was there, and later to arrive were each of Hushnik Sayyid Ahmad, and an individual who was with the president's son in Bonn when the other Iraqi spoke with the intelligence officer. At that time, the president asked the switch room operator to connect him with Husayn Kamil. I noticed that he meant to tell the switch room operator to connect him with Major General Husayn. I was confident of what he meant because I know he means every word he says, his goal was always to show Husayn as a man of great value and rank, especially in front of me because he knew my opinion of Husayn Kamil. Indeed, a few minutes later, the president spoke with Major General Husayn and asked him to come over to where we were at. Husayn arrived in a half an hour or so. The president began talking about the problem and said that he received a letter from me saying so and so and added that, doing so, Barzan had performed his personal and occupational duty. Then he looked at the intelligence officer and asked him, "Is it true that you informed Barzan with what I have heard?" To which the intelligence officer said, "Yes, I informed Mr. Barzan with all I have heard because such issues are serious and Mr. Barzan is loyal to the president and his family. Therefore, I thought it was my duty to inform Barzan because he is considered as one of the family and could relate the information to your Excellency." After that, he looked at the Iraqi, who was Mr. Husam Rassam and asked him, "Did this happen when you were with them in

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the hotel?" To which he answered, "Yes. But we were talking about these issue in general and not as he mentioned." The intelligence officer, then, answered by saying, "No, the issue was definite and it was a request and was not a general conversation. I noticed the president was convinced with what he has heard and then asked Mr. Rassam and the intelligence officer to sit in another room and we remained alone with the president, Husayn, Arshad, and myself. Then there was a conversation about the relation of the president's sons with individuals who were away from the official and Party's stance and that it was very likely those would take advantage of such relations for their own interests. Husayn began to speak irrationally trying to cast a doubt of what I said to the president. I had had a serious conversation with him before the president. However, he did not care the president was there and actually was rude before the president. The president's reaction was less than appropriate so that it was disappointing and painful to me. This compelled me to speak in the same manner as that of Husayn and told him that he was randomly wasting the national wealth without planning and the businessmen he had relations with were the beneficiaries. He denied these things and said that was not true. I said, "No, it is true and I will tell you an example. The agent of the Mercedes Company attends the talks between you and the delegation of the Mercedes Company, how do you explain this?" To which he answered by saying, "We benefit from him as a source of information." To which I replied by saying, "The source of information supposedly should not attend the talks and should not be an agent of the company itself because the agent is only interested in selling and even if he was providing you with information, he would not do so to delay the deal." Husayn was enraged and said, "The agent of the Mercedes Company is your friend." I replied by saying, "No, that is not true and that I have never met with him or went to his house until this moment." Allah as my witness, I was truthful. After that we moved to

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the dining room and ate there with Mr. Rassam and the intelligence officer. While we were eating, the president said to Mr. Rassam, "Brother Husam, what is your relationship with these young people? You are of their father's age and should get away from them." To which Mr. Rassam said, "Sir, I love those kids and respect them because they are your children. However, since you prefer that I get away from them, I shall do so." After dinner, we left and a vehicle was waiting for the intelligence officer. Not to take him home but rather to take him to the military intelligence, where Brother Sab'awi was asked to interrogate him. A few days later, the intelligence officer was put to death. However, I do not know what was the charge that lead him to death or why he was sent to the military intelligence. Perhaps to make sure the news about his arrest would leak out, because he knew of no one in the military intelligence.

On 2/25/1989 at one o'clock PM, as I remember, I was visiting the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and when I went back home I found what I believed to be normal conditions. But when I saw Mr. Boutros, who was working for us at the house, sitting in front of the house crying I thought something unpleasant had happened. Therefore, I asked him what the problem was, to which he said that Hammudi had been in an accident while driving the motorcycle outside of the house. I asked him, "And where is he now?" to which he said, "An individual from the area took him to the hospital." I said, "Which hospital?" Without giving him a chance to respond, I replied by saying that he did not know perhaps in the area of Al-Atifiyah. I quickly went back to the car and drove to the emergency hospital at the area of Al-`Atifiyah. I do not know how I got there. I enquired there but the answer was that he did not arrive to that hospital, so I thought that perhaps he went to the Bin Sinai Hospital because that hospital was nearby

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the location of the accident. I drove to Bin Sinai Hospital and when I got there, I noticed many cars and more than normal traffic. When I entered the hospital, I found a number of the president's security details and one of them approached me and said, "Sir, he is fine." I entered the hospital room where Hammadi was on a stretcher and the blood covered his face to an unrecognizable condition. Two or more physicians were around him, the president and his wife were standing by him, and Saddam Kamil, the president's bodyguard and husband of his daughter was there too. Thanks are due to Saddam, he gave blood to Hamudi because he had lost a large amount of blood. After that they sent him to the operating room to perform several surgeries on him because he suffered from two fractures in his foot, a fracture in his hand and a broken jaw. In addition he had lost a number of his teeth and was unconscious. He remained unconscious for a week and almost gave up on his life. I was completely exhausted and because I did not want to relate such bad news to Shajarat al-Dur, I refused to talk with her on the phone. She was too smart and had the feeling that something bad had happened but she did not know what. Therefore, she began calling her sisters from Geneva in an attempt to know what had happened. After few attempts she actually knew what had happened and she came to Baghdad along with the children. Thank Allah, by the time she arrived Muhammad had regained consciousness and begun to move. The president was concerned and visited him daily during the first few days. However, when Husayn Kamil noticed his family and himself becoming annoyed, Husayn informed the president that Muhammad was treating the nurses badly causing the president to get angry and no longer visited him?! At that time a delegate headed to New York to hold talks with the Iranian so the president asked

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me to go with the delegate. I declined because my mental condition was not helping me and Muhammad's condition requires me to be next to his bedside. The president accepted my reasoning for not going.

Muhammad remained four weeks in the hospital. His jaw was fixed in place so that he could not eat anything except liquids through a straw. He lost a lot of weight and was in very critical health and poor emotional condition. I decided to take him to France because he needed other surgeries and physical rehab in a center where the necessary treatment equipment was available. Before we left, I asked the president, via his secretary Hamid Hammadi, to allow us to take along Mr. Tiymah the nurse who had been helping Muhammad with his needs. I told Hamid Hammadi that Muhammad was in bad shape and needed someone to care for him. However, the president denied my request. I also asked for a small plane to take us to Paris because Muhammad conditions would not allow him to sit in a seat of a commercial plane, and this request was denied too. So I asked Hamid, "Why all that disaffection towards me?" To which he answered, "I do not know." I replied, "Was it too much to ask for a small plane to transport my son and nurse to care for him, especially when he is in such a condition that it is necessary to have special planes to transport him. The vehicles are used for the president's son to go from Baghdad to Paris and from there to anywhere else he desires. They are used to transport him, along with his bad influencing friends, so that he can just use them there to show off among the children of the Gulf kings and Princes?" He said, "Just calm down there is no need for all that talk, no one here cares or understands".

I took Muhammad to Paris via a commercial plane. My brother Sab'awi was at the airport to send me off, told me to be strong and handed me an envelope to which I did not pay attention at that time. I opened the envelope while



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on the plane and found inside three thousand dollars. As for my other brother Watban, he was busy with his wife because she recently gave birth. We arrived to Paris after a long tiring trip, due to Muhammad's very bad condition he spent three months in the rehab center before he began to regain his health, thank Allah.

On the morning of 5/5/1989, I woke up when the telephoned rang. I picked up the phone and Dr. `Abd-al-Mun'im al-Qadi, the Mission's second in command, was at the other end of the line. He said, "Pardon me Mr. Ambassador, we have received an important coded telegram and it is necessary for you to review." I got out of bed and went down to the living room, as we were living in a two story apartment where the first floor was for daily living and guests, and the second floor for the bedrooms. I found Dr. `Abd-al-Mun'im in the living room who in turn handed me a file that included the telegram. In the telegram I read the news that `Adnan Khayrallah was killed in a plane crash and in fact I felt bad about that accident. The telegram was also to ask me if I wanted to go to Baghdad, if so they would send me a plane to take me back there. I asked Dr. `Abd-al-Mun'im to send a telegram telling Baghdad that I wanted to go back there and to send a plane as they said they would. At this moment, I did not know why they were showing me all that kindness and generosity. I had a very difficult job of finding a way to tell Shajarat al-Dur what had happened. When I went back inside and Dr. `Abd-al-Mun'im had left, I found her standing, waiting for me at the door of the bedroom, like one of Iraq's beautiful palm trees. While carefully looking at me she asked, "Allah forbid, what is wrong?" I answered, "There is some bad news." She asked, "What is it?" to which I told her that there was something wrong with `Adnan's plane. She immediately enquired, "Did he die?" to which I told her, "No, but he seemed to be in bad condition." She began crying and I tried to comfort her but she continued crying and became in a very miserable condition.

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After a half an hour or so, I turned on the TV and few minutes later, the accident news and the death of `Adnan Khayrallah was announced.

Iraqis, Arabs and foreigners began to visit us and offer their condolences. Many different people that we had friendly relationships with came to visit and among those were the Poet Nizar Qabbani and other dignitaries including the generous Sheikh Mrs. Fatimah, daughter of Mubarak and the wife of Sheikh Muhammad Bin-Zayd Bin-Nahyan. A friend of Shajarat al-Dur, had visited us along with her son. Sheikh Muhammad Bin-Zayd.

The plane landed before dusk and Shajarat al-Dur, Mr. Hamid al-Jaburi, the Iraqi ambassador in the Swiss capital of Bern, and I headed to Baghdad. We arrived at 12:30 or so, slightly after midnight. I showed Shajarat al-Dur to the house and told her that I was going to the house of Sab'awi to get to the bottom of what has happened. She said that after she freshened up she would go to the president's house.

We left the children, Sajja and Thurayya, behind in the Swiss boarding school in the area of "FLAR" while Muhammad was at the rehab center in Paris. Also we left Norah in Geneva where she went to an elementary Swiss school. We also, left behind with them a maid from Thailand that we brought with us from Baghdad and the Lebanese cook Yusif Nakhlah and the loyal `Isa Habib Katta.

I arrived to the house of Sab'awi at about two O'clock in the morning and found him sitting by the window. We sat together and I asked him about what had happened and he told me that `Adnan was in northern Iraq in an area that he frequently used to go to, where he owned a retreat. At this time the president was also at an adjacent area in one of his retreats. `Adnan came to Baghdad to take his family there to spend the days of the Tid in the retreat, which happened to begin on the day after he died. There was another helicopter that accompanied him in the area of South al-Mosul.

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His plane crashed while nothing had happen to the other plane. The news reports mentioned that a violent storm caused the crash of the plane that `Adnan Khayrallah was in. Sab'awi said that a committee was formed to investigate the accident. Later on, it was revealed that `Adnan got married with a woman that he knew under ambiguous circumstances. She gave a birth to a child named Muhammad and he went back to Baghdad to take her and the child to visit the president there and tell him all about it. We had an in depth conversation during which I told him that we now were looking like we were driving a vehicle without a spare tire. If something were to happen to the president we would have no one to replace him. To which he said that exactly was the conditions under which we were living.

On the next day, I attended the post funeral reception, which was very official and located at Al-Khuld Hall. Later on 4/7, as I remember, Sab'awi and I went to meet with the president with the intention to openly and honestly speak with him about the conditions we are in and the necessity to put in place measures to be followed in case something happens to him. We met with him at the presidential palace where we had a sad conversation about the loss of `Adnan and then I repeated what I said to Sab'awi when I compared our conditions to those of a vehicle without a spare tire. The president responded nervously saying, "What did you think of `Adnan, did you think he was qualified to rule Iraq?" He continued by saying, "Listen, do you know why people have sympathy to what happened to `Adnan?" And added, "The people have sympathy for him because he was the kind of guy who did not question why people did what they did. Because of this, if `Adnan did ever take over the rule, three months later they would have removed him."

I told the president that I was not talking about that issue and what I was talking about is the necessity of paying attention and being cautious. To which he quickly and nervously answered, "Against whom

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should I be cautious?" Because it was better to try to avoid the president's suspicious analysis which was always based on the conspiracy theory, I was compelled to continue on decisively saying that Husayn Kamil and 'Ali Hasan could arrest or kill him. To which he nervously replied, both wondering and denouncing, "How?" I told him that the Republican Guards, the private security details and the private guards are all under the command of Husayn Kamil and 'Ali Hasan. They are the ones in charge of the military organization and it is well known that they are your spokespersons. They relate your orders to the army and to the rest of the party and official institutions. Therefore, the government agency and the army carry out whatever it is they ask for. He looked at me and his look almost went through my body, but he did not comment about what I just said. Instead he asked me, "Why do you hate Husayn Kamil? Do you not realize that if it was not for Husayn Kamil, Iraq would have lost the war with Iran?" I was shocked when I heard what he said so I answered saying, "By Allah, if that was true, Husayn Kamil then deserves more than what he has now" and added, "Mr. President, now what is your position? Husayn uses your sword to slaughter and if it was not for you he would be worth nothing, all his powers and his very existence is based on you." The atmosphere then became very strained and the president said, "Let us meet tomorrow." Indeed, the next day at noon, he summoned me, along with brothers Sab'awi and Watban to the president's office. Here we found him as a country's president with the whole meaning of the word, and as a president of a country he was very formal. We entered and greeted him however, he did not shake hands with us as he was very rude, he did not greet us or order water or tea for us but rather pointed at a table with six chairs around it and asked us to sit around that table. He sat at the head of the table and began the conversation by saying, "I have sent for you to resume what we started yesterday."

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He looked at me while saying, "You Barzan hate Husayn and I am honestly fearful for my daughters. You have bad intentions towards their husbands." To which I said, "I hate no one. However, I feel that Husayn Kamil and his relatives represent danger for you, for us and for the regime of the Ba'th Party. They are not Ba'thist with the true meaning of the word but they are rather sneaking in to satisfy their own special interests, they are hasty and greedy." To which he asked, "How?" I answered, "I will not repeat what I told you yesterday however, I will say that Husayn Kamil and 'Ali Hasan are not loyal to you." He asked, "How?" I answered, "Because they force you to slaughter more people, even those from your own family and tribe." To which he asked, "How?"

I replied, "All their attempts and forgeries against me that Allah has foiled for them were intended to force you to slaughter me. In addition to what they did to force you to slaughter 'Omar al-Hazza' along with his children, this is the best supporting evidence to what I am saying" and added, "If I was close to you at that time, I would have done my best to stop you from killing them. Not because I loved them but rather because I love you and as a precaution for the future, that no one knows, and what it has for you and for all of us."

At any rate, the meeting was very stormy and the condition of the president was not normal and I did not know why?! I knew he was capable of faking the emotion to cover a certain issue or to frighten whoever he was speaking to however, until this moment; I could not guess the reason for his current emotional state.

At the end of the meeting, I said to him, "You are like a father for us all and in the same time you are the president of this country. Therefore, I tell you that you must fairly give the chance to whomever worthy of such chance." To which he asked, "How?" I answered, "There is no justice in granting your relatives all the important roles in the country." I then kept silent while, in his turn, he did not comment.

Less than one month later, he removed Husayn Kamil from the command of the Republican Guards and transferred 'Ali Hasan from

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the military organization to the civilian organization of the Party. In addition, he appointed Kamil Yasin to replace 'Ali Hasan.

Days after the formal solace of `Adnan Khayrallah, Sab'awi, Watban and I did seven days of our own solace in Tikrit, at our own expense. Despite his rudeness towards us, I went back to Geneva.

Later on, I visited Baghdad several times, after the direct talks with Iran took place, with the mediation of Sheikh Jabir Salim al-Ahmad. I will touch on this issue and other political issues and events, in addition to, what I was commissioned to do and what I did during the period when I was Iraq's ambassador at the European HQ of the United Nation, in another book about the political affairs. Especially the Iraqi regime's decision in regard to Kuwait on 8/2/1990 but here, I will mention one thing about that issue which follows.

In the morning of Thursday 8/2/1990, I was still in bed asleep when Yusif, the cook, forwarded a phone call to me. When the phone rang, I woke up. I was wondering what the purpose was, because it was still 6:30 in the morning but Yusif told me that Abu Yasir was calling. He meant my brother Sab'awi, which made wonder even more because Sab'awi had not called at such a time and before, especially since he became the chief of intelligence. He changed a lot and stopped calling every once in a while and before he was appointed as the chief of intelligence, he passed by Geneva without stopping while on his way back to Iraq from America, where he had been with two of his children for medical treatment. He changed a lot because now most of his ambitions were

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to become the chief of intelligence, it was as if he would become the Prime Minister! Anyway, I picked up the phone to speak with Abu Yasir, as Yusif said, but instead found the president on the line and not Abu Yasir. He greeted me and I answered his greeting and asked how he was doing. After that he asked me, "Did you hear of the latest news?" To which I answered, "By Allah, no ... because I am still in bed." He answered, "We annexed Kuwait." For a while, I did not understand what he said until I remembered a message that I sent, on 7/17/1990, telling him not to rush anymore that it was unnecessary and suggested his rude speech. That sending the army close to the borders with Kuwait would be enough. I told him that anything more that he may do would not be understood by the Arabs and the world and all would stand against us. I told him that all oil pipelines would be shutdown and also told him that time is precious for us because if given time to solve this issue we would be able to clarify the issue inside and outside Kuwait. In turn we would gain personalities, papers, authors and parties on our side inside and outside Kuwait.

After I remembered the message that I sent to him earlier, I fully understood what I heard him saying. He said, "Arshad says hello, he is standing by me." I said hello back. The president continued saying, "I was telling Arshad about a dream of mine where I saw my uncle Ibrahim and told him about my decision to annex Kuwait, he was very happy and began to joke with me using the same jokes that I have included in my military communications during the war with Iran. Arshad said that my uncle Ibrahim was hallucinating and definitely gathered the angels around him." I laughed and ended my conversation saying, "I wish you success." That was Abu `Uday way of

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dealing with issues such as that, he tries to have the maximum number of dignitaries take part so that he has them all on his side by making them feel important by the way of doing such things as I just wrote. However, after he wins the round, his way of dealing with them would change.

Shajarat al-Dur and the children were in southern France, while I remained in Geneva because the Human Rights Branch Committee holds its meeting in August and I must attend the opening session. I made an agreement with Shajarat al-Dur to join them after I attend the first few days of the meeting.

It was early in the morning so I did not call Shajarat al-Dur, instead I waited until nine O'clock to call her because I did not want to disturb her and in the meantime make her worry if I called her at such early time in the morning.

I called her at nine O'clock and asked her if she knew what happened to which she answered "no" because she just woke up less than half an hour ago and during that time she was preparing breakfast for the children. I told her of what I have been informed with. I felt she was stunned and after a while of silence, she asked, "What are you saying?" To which I answered, "This is what I know from Sammy," meaning Saddam because when we talk about him on the phone or write about him in messages, we call him Sammy. She asked, "Did he call you?" To which I answered, "Yes" She did not comment but rather shouted, "Allah forbid" She told me that she would return to Geneva today or tomorrow but I said, "No" and suggested she would stay there because there was no need for her return to Geneva. She agreed and said that now she understands that I will not be joining them, to which I said, "After such developments, I could not join you at this time." She said, "I understand that." A week later, as I remember, Shajarat al-Dur and the children returned back to Geneva and the events began to escalate. Sheik Zayd Bin-Nahyan and his spouse Sheikh Fatimah had a huge role in containing the issue unfortunately, the president rejected everything.



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He was rude, and I will explain this brief role in greater detail in the section that includes the political side of my life.